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ABSTRACT 
The ethnic Chinese are important players in the Philippine economy. Many 
believe that networking plays a role in their business success. This research aimed to 
develop a theory of business relations that explained why and how ethnic Chinese 
businesses enter into long-term business relationships. It sought to identify the 
antecedents to long-term business relationships and to discover how businesses 
chose their partners and structured their relationships. The research also investigated 
the tangible and intangible outcomes of these relationships. Eight in-depth case 
studies of ethnic Chinese firms were constructed using data from ethnographic-type 
interviews, observation, documents and literature. 
Using modified grounded theory, the core motivation for entering into long-
term relations was identified as accessing scarce resources. Resources were defined 
widely and included finance, technology, raw materials and skills. A framework 
termed 'essential network' was developed. This network was composed of each 
firm's most valuable set of partners. In some cases, these partners could be its key 
customers or major suppliers or both and in others, its technology partners. The 
findings revealed that contextual variables ( economic, social and political 
conditions) and the firms' strategies influenced the nature of their business 
relationships. 
Goodwill trust was not necessarily a precondition of cooperation. The 
preconditions lay partly in the objective circumstances, and partly in the 
accumulation of knowledge with reference to mutual interests and the potential 
satisfaction of those interests through cooperative behaviour. The four conditions 
V 
that sustained cooperative interaction were related to (a) payoff structures, (b) end-
game conditions, (c) embeddedness and (d) tit-for-tat mechanisms. 
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Chapter 1 
Business Networks and Chinese Economic Success 
1.1 Chinese economic success 
There are an estimated 25 to 30 million ethnic Chinese outside of China 
(Wang 1996). When the Chinese of Hong Kong and Taiwan are included, they total 
over 50 million (Economist 1992). They are a heterogenous group. But many have 
observed that no matter where they reside, the Chinese are quite successful in their 
economic pursuits (East Asia Analytical Unit 1995; Suryadinata 1996; Tan 1992). 
The economic importance of this group in Southeast Asia ( except Vietnam) is 
illustrated in the following commercial profile. 
Approximately 3.5 per cent of Indonesia's population is of ethnic Chinese 
descent and they 'control an estimated 73 per cent of listed firms by market 
capitalisation (East Asia Analytical Unit 1995). In Malaysia, approximately 29 per 
cent of the population is of ethnic Chinese descent and they account for 61 per cent 
of national capital (Irwan 1995). The ethnic Chinese community in the Philippines 
is one of the most economically influential groups in the country. This community 
of about 1.2 million ( or two per cent of the total population) controls between 50 and 
60 per cent of share capital by market capitalisation (East Asia Analytical Unit 
1995). Firms controlled by ethnic Chinese account for 35 per cent of total sales 
turnover in the Philippines (Palanca 1995). 
The Chinese constitute 77 per cent of Singapore's population and are 
estimated to control 81 per cent of Singapore's listed companies by market 
capitalisation. The number of Chinese in Thailand is difficult to estimate due to 
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their high degree of assimilation and decades of intermarriage with ethnic Thais. 
Ten per cent is commonly stated. The Sino-Thai community is estimated to control 
81 per cent of listed companies by market capitalisation and is active in virtually all 
sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing, banking and finance, construction and 
real estate, and retail and wholesale trading (East Asia Analytical Unit 1995; Irwan 
1995). 
Why are the Chinese economically successful? There is wide debate on this 
question. In a review of the literature, Mackie (1992) concludes that various 
explanations have been advanced but that there has been no consensus about which 
have been most important. One of the earlier explanations advanced to account for 
the ability of so-called outsiders to excel at commerce is given by Y ambert (1981 ). 
It is simply this: the very fact of being an outsider. The outsider has no roots either 
in the sense of intimate attachment to the soil or in the figurative sense of an 
established position in the social environment. The outsider, hence, enjoys mobility 
and freedom from social commitments that is both cause and effect of an existence 
restricted to intermediary trade and finance. 
Certain cultural dispositions, such as an ethic of trustworthiness, have also 
been put forward as contributing to business success (Redding 1991 ). Chinese 
capacity for hard work, frugality, and high saving rates has been cited as a reason for 
business success (Mackie 1992). The values of Chinese immigrants are much more 
focused on money, or what is termed 'money mindedness', than the locals 
(Abegglen 1994). This set of contrasts leads to the conclusion that the difference in 
the values held by immigrants and the locals is responsible for their differential rates 
of success in business. However, the fact of 'being different' is inadequate to 
explain, by itself, differential success in commerce. Which groups will prosper as 
_;. 
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traders cannot be deduced from the fact of their difference alone but requires further 
assumptions that are often introduced only tacitly into the discussion (Y ambert 
1981). 
Other scholars however believe that values and ideas must be translated into 
action to be useful. Superior economic performance is attributed to behavioural 
manifestations of these values and ideas, such as the various ways in which 
members of a given population associate and interact with one another (Y ambert 
1981). 
More recently, there has been a focus on ethnic Chinese business networks. 
Many scholars attribute the economic success of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast 
Asia to a unique informal network that has the effect of facilitating information and 
providing access to ready credit (Crawford 2000; Limlingan 1986; Mackie 1992; 
Wu and Wu 1980; Yoshihara 1988). Tanzer (1994) characterises this 'bamboo' 
network as a 'vast web of interlinked, cooperative Chinese firms across Asia, all 
held together by verbal agreements and trust'. Business success is, in large part, 
based on the existence of familistic ties such as kinship and common place of origin 
(Landa 1983; Yoshihara 1988). 
Indeed, the 'economy without borders' of the ethnic Chinese in Asia is 
estimated to generate an annual economic output of more than 500 billion USD -
equivalent to the gross national product of mainland China itself (Tanzer 1994). 
Additionally, it is estimated that the ethnic Chinese national product is compounding 
at 7 per cent to 10 per cent a year. The Economist (1992) contends that this is a 
'global network through which money, goods, ideas and occasionally people flow 
from one firm to another'. 
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Is this network more apparent than real (Lim 1992)? Is it possible to 
conclude that a 'Chinese economic zone' in Asia is emerging despite the fragmented 
nature of the different economic zones of the region? The differences among the 
Chinese themselves cannot be minimised. Competition and conflict between 
different groups of Chinese should not be underestimated (Lim 1992). 
A paradox also lies within family networks: family ties are at once the 
strength of Chinese business and the weakness. Constrained by the emphasis on 
keeping ownership and management within the family, Chinese firms tend to be 
limited in the size and complexity to which they can grow (Tanzer 1994). 
There is no doubt that the ethnic Chinese are important players in the 
economies of Southeast Asia and many believe that networking plays a central role 
in th~ir business success. Networking is therefore the focus of this thesis. 
. This chapter comprises five sections. The previous section provided a brief 
commercial profile of the Chinese in Southeast Asia. The second presents the two 
major arguments as to why networks are important in the ethnic Chinese business 
context. The third section covers the extent of understanding of this research topic: 
What do scholars know about Chinese networks and how they develop? Fourth, 
what are the gaps in research? The final section summarises the research problem 
and comments on the significance of the study. 
Ethnic Chinese defined 
Before proceeding to the second section, the definition of ethnic Chinese 
needs to be clarified. Wang Gungwu ( 1996) uses the term 'ethnic Chinese', or 
huaren, to refer to those of Chinese descent who live outside the territories of China, 
that is, outside mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong-Macau. This term reflects 
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the fact that the majority of Chinese sojourners have settled down and sought local 
nationality. Each group of ethnic Chinese would now be moulded by the different 
influences and conditions of the nation states of which they are citizens. A more 
thorough discussion of the Chinese as a distinct ethnic group in the Philippines, the 
field site for this research, is found in Chapter 4. 
1.2 Why focus on networks? 
The two main arguments presented by scholars for focusing on networks are 
institutional and strategic. The first argument, deriving from the work of researchers 
such as Chen and Hamilton (1991), Crawford (2000), Orm (1991), and Biggart and 
Hamilton (1992), contends that the institutional logic in Asia is different from that in 
the West. They argue that while the crucial economic actor in the West is the 
individual, in Asia it is the network. Strategic arguments, on the other hand, focus 
on transaction costs and the competitive advantage provided by being part of a 
network (Kay 1993). The institutional perspective emphasises the origins of 
networks, on what brings networks into existence. The strategic perspective 
concentrates on what networks accomplish - organizationally - that atomistic 
markets ('markets') and hierarchical organizations ('hierarchies') cannot (Orru 
1991). While these two arguments are not mutually exclusive and tend to overlap, it 
is conceptually useful to discuss them separately. 
The institutional environment 
Chen and Hamilton ( 1991, 5) argue that 'the most important organizational 
feature of Asian capitalist economies is that they are organized through networks of 
firms.' Whereas companies in many W estem economies are more or less 
autonomous from and competitive with other companies, firms in East and 
. 
Southeast Asia are interlinked, thus creating vast, cooperative networks of 
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independent firms (Redding 1994). Using the firm as the ultimate unit of analysis is 
therefore inadequate and difficult to reconcile with the networked structures of much 
of Asian business (Chen and Hamilton 1991). 
While the neoclassical 'asocial' concept of economic action is appropriate 
for the West, it is argued that Asian economies are organized through networks of 
economic actors that are believed to be natural and appropriate to economic 
development. The institutional logic in Asia is therefore different (Biggart and 
Hamilton 1992; Orru 1991). Described as 'alliance capitalism' in Japan by Gerlach 
(1992), the crucial economic actor in Asia is not the individual, but the network. 
Relations between economic actors do not impede market functioning, but rather 
promote it (Biggart and Hamilton 1992). 
_ The Japanese case is a significant frame of reference. The prevalence of 
netw~rk organization in the Japanese economy poses a formidable challenge to 
W estem economic theories that view hierarchical organizations and atomised 
markets as the polar twin mechanisms through which transactions in an advanced 
economy take place (Gerlach and Lincoln 1992). On the one hand, the Japanese 
economy appears to make less use of bureaucratic structures in the organization of 
production and exchange than does the American economy. Japanese firms are, on 
average, smaller, more specialised to particular industries, less vertically integrated, 
and far less likely to pursue growth and diversification through merger and 
acquisition. Yet the alternative to formal hierarchy in Japan is not impersonal 
arm's-length markets, but informal networks based on trust and long-term 'relational 
contracting'. Like the myriad other ties that thread through the Japanese economy, 
they have an enduring, obligatory and cooperative character that economic models 
of efficient markets fail to capture. 
..; 
7 
By comparing 'Western' and 'Asian' economic actors, is the institutional 
logic argument making sweeping generalisations? Studies abound of networks in 
'Western' economies. The 'Third Italian' district is characterised by a high degree 
of cooperative coordination (Langlois and Robertson 1995). Lazerson (1995) 
reports on the closely coordinated knitting industry in Modena, and Uzzi (1997) 
finds that embedded ( or personal) ties characterise critical exchanges in the New 
York apparel industry. There are, therefore, major concerns with using the 
institutional logic argument to explain networking behaviour. The second reason for 
focusing on networks addresses the following question: What does the network 
accomplish that markets and hierarchies cannot? 
Strategic outcomes 
If the ethnic Chinese firm is taken as the prime unit of economic action, then 
one set of conclusions is possible: that the firm stays withi11 a narrow field of 
specialisation normally associated with the knowledge and inclinations of the 
'paterfamilias'. On the other hand, networking can provide an expansion of 
activities without necessarily r_equiring a more complex integrative structure. The 
principal economic actor thus becomes an informal coalition, a linked network of 
units (Redding 1991). 
For example, Redding (1994) argues that the structure of Hong Kong's most 
successful industries is one of networked small and medium enterprises. The use of 
network alliances permits a firm to transcend the limitations of its own small scale . 
The efficiency of the system as a whole rests heavily on trust-bonding. To 
concentrate on networking is not to suggest that networking alone is the prime 
determinant of growth. It is clearly important in the Chinese case, but it lies in the 
context of a wider system (Redding 1991). 
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Several features of Chinese business organization constrain firm sizes. Most 
possess simplified organizational structures and centralised decision making and are 
predominantly family owned and controlled. However, two responses allow the size 
limitations to be transcended. The first is the careful strategic choice of business 
field. The second is networking. These are commonly combined to produce 
formidable organizations, some of which have legal status and some of which are 
virtual in character but highly effective nonetheless (Redding 1995). Table 1.1 
summarises the strengths of networking in terms of efficiency, reliability and 
flexibility. The table also identifies the weaknesses of networks. 
Table 1.1. Stren~ths and weaknesses of Chinese business networks 
Strengths 
• efficiency of transaction costs 
• reliability of networks and linkages 
• manoeuvrability of linkages 
• 
• 
Weaknesses 
limited field for cooperative relations; 
tendency to small scale 
mistrust and urge to control leading to 
capital starvation 
• technical limitations caused by scale 
restrictions 
Source: S.G. Redding, 'Weak organizations and strong linkages' , in Business Networks and 
Economic Development in East and Southeast Asia, ed. G. Hamilton (Hong Kong: University of 
Hong Kong Press, 1991). 
As most Chinese family businesses are small and managed by core family 
members, they are heavily dependent on business opportunities and credit lines 
provided by their business network (Chen 1995). This network also provides access 
to market information and ready availability of funds in societies with 
underdeveloped financial institutions (Mackie 1992). 
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Networking also operates in the field of ownership. The process of creating 
informally allied business groups provides strategically useful outcomes for capital 
raising, competitive behaviour, and political cooperation. This is done by an 
elaborate net of interlocking directorates. A web of relations ties the ethnic Chinese 
economy together through to the base of the system where either partnership or trust 
bonds serve to maintain the potent balance of two elements: flexibility in meeting 
market demand and reliability in seeing economic transactions completed (Redding 
1993). 
In summary, the two arguments for focusing on networks have a common 
element: networks deliver economic benefits to participants. However, the 
institutional logic argument stresses that these networks are somehow unique to 
Asian economies. On the other hand, strategic arguments consider that networks 
perform functions that complement markets and hierarchies. Th.ese two arguments 
will be revisited when the gaps in research are considered in the final section. 
What is the extent of understanding of the business networks of ethnic 
Chinese? The following section begins by considering a brief history of the 
development of commerce in China, followed by a discussion of business networks 
in Southeast Asia. Three sociological concepts surrounding Chinese relationships -
xinyong, guanxi and renqing - are then outlined. 
1.3 Networks in Chinese history 
Before the Tang dynasty (AD 618 - 906), most of the population in China 
remained little affected by commerce. The government restricted commerce to 
specific areas and firms. During the ninth century, this old system gave way to an 
era of vastly increased economic freedom (Elvin 1973). This period of change 
__ (Sung dynasty AD 960-1275) signalled the decline of the hereditary privileges of the 
j 
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great families and the end of formal constraints on social mobility for commoners. 
Officials supported the development of strong urban merchant associations (hang) 
and, through them, supervised all aspects of trade and manufacturing (Hamilton 
1991). 
The Chinese economy had become commercialised. One sign of this was the 
increased complexity of business structures. There was a wide variety of business 
associations, some linking larger and smaller merchants, others joining essentially 
equal partners. Functions became more specialised and services like storage became 
an independent trade in itself (Elvin 1973). 
Increased contact with the market made the Chinese peasantry into a class of 
adaptable, rational, profit-oriented, petty entrepreneurs. A wide range of new 
occupations opened up in the countryside: from vegetable and fruit production to 
sugar refining, paper manufacturing and textile production (Elvin • 1973). 
The next period of change began in the Ming dynasty ( 1368-1644) and 
continued through the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). With the founding of the Ming 
dynasty, the institutional focus turned away from an urban centred economy toward 
a rural centred economy. This shift in institutional focus strengthened local rural 
associations, especially lineage organizations. As a complex marketing system 
developed in the late Ming and Qing periods, economic organizations were, 
accordingly, extensions or adaptations of the institutions of rural society. In 
particular, these rural institutions were the form of networks spawned by ties of 
kinship and common regional origin (Hamilton 1991). 
Some scholars have argued that the Chinese were incapable of creating large 
private economic organizations during the period of late traditional China (Ming 
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and Qing dynasties). It was said that the lack of commercial law was partly the 
reason. Moreover, the Chinese had difficulty trusting anyone to whom they were 
not related, or with whom they had no long-standing relationship. Therefore 
businesses tended to stay small and restricted in geographical scope and their 
dealings with customers, employees and other businesses usually had to be mediated 
through brokers, guarantors, contractors or middlemen of some kind. According to 
Elvin (1973), there is a measure of truth in these contentions, but they need to be 
qualified in a number of ways. 
Commercial contracts could be enforced in the law courts, at least up to a 
point. Likewise, kinship bonds and partnerships could be the basis of quite large 
businesses. The device of commercial discipleship was used to extend the range of a 
business still further. There were, thus, many enterprises that were anything but 
small. Nor should it be assumed that Chinese businesses were always short-lived. 
Some of the account houses dealing in silk cloth were more than two hundred years 
old (Elvin 1973). 
The emigration of Chinese to Southeast Asia occurred against the backdrop 
of the second period of change. There had already been substantial emigration to 
Southeast Asia in the Ming Dynasty, but a new wave began during the Qing 
dynasty. The greatest waves of Chinese emigration took place in the second half of 
the 19th century, ,vhich saw more than two million people move from their 
homeland between 1848 and 1888 (Pan 1990). However, the first official 
recognition of the right of the Chinese to leave their homeland did not eventuate 
until 1870 (Purcell 1965). 
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1.4 Networks in Southeast Asian history 
The Chinese who were drawn to Southeast Asia came almost exclusively 
from the coastal areas of the provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. China had long 
had a complex economy marked by general use of money and credit, considerable 
manufacturing, and substantial regional and longer-distance trade. This was even 
more the case with the South China coast. Here, a distinct seafaring and trading 
tradition had developed over the centuries, the merchant's way of life was more 
highly honoured, and commercial skills were more highly developed (Steinberg 
1987). 
In earlier times, merchants from the region had traded along the shores of 
most of Southeast Asia, normally staying over in port towns. In the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, as the trade of Southeast Asia continued to grow, Chinese 
began· to settle in larger numbers. Some came as merchants, simply moving outward 
along their commercial channels from China's coast cities. But the great majority 
came as simple labourers, owing passage money to those for whom they first 
worked. They arrived to work as labour for the docks, hand sawmills, rice mills, and 
building trades in the port cities and towns of Southeast Asia (Steinberg 1987). 
Eventually, the majority of the labourers took a further step, becoming 
shopkeepers in the towns and villages and middlemen in the growing export trades, 
at the same time settling down and marrying in what became their new homes. 
Chinese merchants served as middlemen for peasant-produced export crops, while 
Chinese labour was generally concentrated in the service industries, on the docks, 
and in the processing mills, which for a long time held no appeal for Southeast 
Asians (Steinberg 1987). 
J 
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Mackie (1995) identifies five different manifestations of what could be 
called international networks in Southeast Asia over recent centuries. First are the 
early trading networks built up by the Chinese junk traders from Southern China 
between the 15th and 19th centuries. The second is the cobweb of shipping-
commercial-financial linkages that extended out from the Singapore hub to 
numerous ports and river-mouths in eastern Indonesia and Sumatra in the 'Joseph 
Conrad era' of small steamers and sailing ships from the 1870s on. The third 
represents the well institutionalised networks developed by the remittance system to 
channel the savings of thousands of poor coolies back to their families in China in 
the half century before World War II. During this period, private postal exchanges 
were the most important institutions for overseas Chinese remittances. Usually 
operated by traders and traditional Chinese banks, some expanded their business in 
Southeast Asia by operating jointly with inns (Hicks 1993). Fourth are the highly 
unusual networks ~reated by the smuggling trade across the Malacca Straits during 
World War II and the Indonesian war of independence between 1945 and 1949. 
Fifth are the various contemporary forms of commercial and financial networks that 
have come into being since the 1950s. All but the last came into being in 
circumstances where trust and personal connections were essential if trade was to be 
possible, and ultimately proved quite ephemeral in character. 
These five types of networks are essentially trading networks. To illustrate, 
by the end of the nineteenth century, the Netherlands East Indies trade with Asia was 
characterised by two different commercial systems. The first was made up of 
personalised, informal trading networks, mainly controlled by ethnic Chinese. They 
dealt in a wide range of agricultural products, foodstuffs and consumer articles 
destined for the indigenous population. Within this 'Asian' commercial system, low 
j 
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profit margins, large and quick turnovers, trust, personal linkages and integrated 
credit networks were customary. As a kind of superstructure, there was a more 
Westernised commercial system dominated by European merchant houses. Within 
this contractual and impersonal network, high profit margins were the rule and 
commodity flows consisted mainly of bulk goods, such as sugar, coal, oil, timber 
and tea. This Westernised . superlayer, linking small capital-intensive Western 
enclaves in the Asian region, was completely dependent upon Chinese 
intermediaries as it had few real links to local indigenous producers and consumers. 
Japan's export industry producing cheap goods destined for the indigenous 
consumer also depended on Chinese networks instead of European business 
networks in Asia (Post 1995). 
In pre-World War II Indonesia, Japan's rise as an industrial nation seemed to 
have brought greater benefits to the singkeh (new immigrants from China) than to 
the peranakan (local-born Chinese). Singkeh dominance of local trade in the 
archipelago, especially after the First World War, was due to their better integration 
with ethnic Chinese networks and their closer connections with southern China and 
Japan (Post 1995). 
An account of ethnic Chinese business in West Kalimantan in the 1930s 
described the Chinese trading network as comprising Chinese merchants who set up 
trading posts deep in the interior of West Kalimantan to collect forest products such 
as rattan and resin from the Dayaks. These merchants were, in tum, connected to 
other Chinese dealers and importers who were at the same time exporters of the 
forest products. In addition to channelling local products to the outside markets, 
Chinese merchants also brought in various commodities that they obtained from the 
importers in the larger coastal towns. In Malaysia, the Hokkienese dominated the 
_, 
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rubber trading network that spanned the towns and port cities since they controlled 
the town-dealerships and the export of rubber (Irwan 1995). · 
A common explanation for Chinese commercial ascendance in Southeast 
Asia is that their extended family organization and kinship networks provided them 
with greater capital resources than any that Southeast Asian traders could muster 
(Steinberg 1987). How and why do their family organization and kinship networks 
assist them in business? The next part examines several sociological elements of 
Chinese relationships, including xinyong, guanxi and renqing. 
1.5 Elements of network ties 
Xinyong, or trustworthiness, is a key component of economic exchange for 
the ethnic Chinese (Redding 1991; Silin 1976). Why is it considered important? 
- The formation of networks outside China is argued to be in part a special 
response to the two problems of insecurity and mistrust. The first is the insecurity 
that emerges in a society living traditionally close to the subsistence level, and 
where officialdom's behaviour is unpredictable and not always benevolent. Wong 
(1995) argues that the Chinese rely on personal relations as a defence against the 
state. For Chinese entrepreneurs, relationships precede organization. This tends to 
heighten the importance of knowing people who can be trusted and, of course, 
greatly strengthens the centripetal pull of the family. Secondly, modernisation that 
introduces institutions such as law, bureaucracy, contract and other means of resort 
when trust fails or is unavailable, has not yet moved to a point where the old-
fashioned means of coping can be abandoned (Redding 1993). 
Wong (1991) speculates that business trust as found in late traditional China 
was personal and particularistic in nature. Personal trust is dependent on familiarity, 
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and is thus limited in scope. Upon examination of the legal, political and mobility 
structure of Hong Kong, Wong (1991) concludes that system trust has been solidly 
established. Yet this has not diminished the vigour of personal trust in business life. 
Particularistic ties still prevail. For example, many small factory owners in Hong 
Kong depend heavily on particularistic relations to get business orders. Highly 
personalised methods are used, such as introductions and recommendations by 
former employers or employees, friends and relatives. 
Fukuyama (1995) argues to the contrary and describes Chinese society as a 
familistic community, characterised by weak voluntary associations because 
unrelated people have little basis for trusting each other. He refers to Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and China as examples, but argues that this economic culture can also be 
observed within the Chinese enclaves in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
Xinyong, guanxi, renqing 
Xinyong is a fairly complex concept, and can be translated in different ways, 
depending on the context. Colloquially, it means ' to credit, to have confidence in; to 
be worthy of confidence and credit.' One speaks of a person's xinyong, meaning 
their trustworthiness, their willingness and ability to meet business and financial 
obligations. Xinyong is cultivated based on a series of mutually satisfactory 
transactions. Reports of transactions with others are also taken into account when 
calculating the xinyong of a particular businessman (DeGlopper 1972). 
Guanxi refers to special relationships two persons have with each other. It 
can be translated as 'friendship with implications of a continual exchange of 
favours' (Pye 1988). Guanxi binds people through the exchange of favours rather 
than through expressions of sympathy and friendship. 
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In the Chinese art of relationship management (that is, the cultivation and 
development of guanxi), renqing plays an important role. Renqing can be 
interpreted as 'human feeling', which covers not only sentiment but also its social 
expressions such as the offering of congratulations or condolences and the making 
of gifts on appropriate occasions. The extent of renqing that two persons enjoy can 
clearly indicate the quality of guanxi between them (Chen 1995). 
For the bureaucracy in China, guanxi hampers the implementation of 
institutional rules based on instrumental rationality, leading to low efficiency and 
greater confusion. For individuals, guanxi not only brings convenience but also 
obligations. The more benefits one gets from one's guanxiwang (or one's sphere of 
guanxi), the more obligations one incurs in one's renqingwang ( or one's sphere of 
renqing). To develop guanxi with others is a kind of social investment and incurs 
responsibility and obligation. Therefore, in Chinese societies throughout history, 
there are plenty of socio-cultural mechanisms to limit the role of guanxi. In feudal 
China, for example, there was a system that strictly prohibited the assignment of 
officials to their native place (Chen 1995). 
Chinese societies have developed a 'compartmentalisation' strategy to 
separate the functionally specific economic exchanges from the fundamentally 
diffused social exchanges. In the Chinese business world, there is a saying that 
'guanxi gui guanxi,· shengyi gui shengyi', which means that when good friends are 
engaged in business dealings they should follow the principle of separating business 
from their friendship in order to keep their friendship (Chen 1995). 
Personal relations. In traditional Chinese society, the family is not only a 
tightly-linked unit; it is also a nucleus of all important social life. The family is an 
individual's first line of defence. Kin groups represent the individual's second line 
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of defence. When a person is in danger or in trouble and when he needs help in the 
performance of an economic task, he may require a measure of assistance beyond 
what his own immediate family can provide. In such circumstances, he can turn to 
the members of his larger kin group for aid. The need for the second defence line is 
more pronounced for immigrants who are living under a foreign government and 
among groups of people whose languages are unintelligible to them. In this way, 
kinship ties become even stronger. An 'old fashioned' practice is the use of verbal 
promise as a form of business contract. A transaction amounting to a few thousand 
US dollars can be made merely by the exchange of a few words. Disputes arising 
from such a mode of transaction can hardly be prosecuted in court (Hwang 1992). 
In practice, however, the breaking of trust has widespread social ramifications: the 
individual concerned is likely to be ostracised and to find it difficult to re-establish 
connections (Redding 1991). 
In the range of personal relations used by Chinese entrepreneurs to maintain 
business trust, family and regional ties are singled out as particularly important. On 
the whole, family ties play a critical role in cementing the internal organization of 
Chinese firms in Hong Kong, while regional ties are prominent in regulating inter-
firm transactions (Wong 1991). 
Wong (1995) separates Chinese familism into structural and normative 
elements. Structurally, family ties are important in cementing the internal core of 
Chinese enterprises. Familism tends to sustain ownerships bonds. Therefore, the 
importance of familism is in upholding the internal solidarity of the firm. But 
normatively, familism can be a powerful force in sustaining external, inter-firm 
relationships. It furnishes the ethical framework for entrepreneurs to spin their 
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business webs, provides the idiom for economic interaction and generates the 
blueprint to create personalised linkages. 
Basing his research in Hong Kong, Wong (1991) argues that familism found 
there is impermanent. Since sons are equal heirs in a Chinese family, there is an 
inherent tendency towards segmentation in the life cycle of the family. As the 
family is not a permanent entity, family reputation is likewise short-lived. Thus, he 
concludes that the Chinese family does not furnish a secure basis for long-term 
business trust to be maintained. Therefore, entrepreneurs, in their business dealings, 
are fully aware that trustworthiness is essentially tentative and transient, and 
personal trust has to be continually renewed. 
In inter-firm transactions, regional ties based on common territorial origins 
are !):lore important than familism, Wong (1991) argues. Regional ties play an 
important role in the establishment of a stable network of personal relations for 
several reasons. First of all, an individual's place of origin has long been 
emphasised by the Chinese state as a mechanism of social control. Second, because 
of the tradition of regional specialisation in occupational activities in China, people 
from the same locality usually have common economic skills and outlook. This is 
the tendency for people within one regional grouping to stay within a certain range 
of occupations, such as Hokkien or Chiu Chow (Redding 1993). Third, regional 
identity is flexible. The regional scope can contract or expand to suit the situation. 
Fourth and last, an important condition exists in Hong Kong that keeps most 
Chinese entrepreneurs within the effective reach of their regional networks. It is the 
credential barrier imposed by education qualifications, which reduces the 
possibilities of occupational and geographical mobility. As immigrants from China, 
most entrepreneurs were not proficient in English. Thus they turned to small scale 
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industry for advancements and had to mobilise regional ties for their business 
activities (Wong 1991). 
In a study of business relations among enterprises in Lukang, west Taiwan, 
DeGlopper (1972) notices that the population in Lukang is homogenous, in the sense 
that nearly everyone who lives there was born there. Hence, it would be very 
difficult for an outsider to succeed in business in Lukang. Some of the factors that 
influence business relations in ethnic Chinese communities do not operate in 
Lukang. After all, if all of one's potential partners in a business relation are one's 
tongxiang (province mate), and every third one bears the same surname, one cannot 
use such criteria to narrow down the field of possible partners. What other criteria 
are used instead? 
Business relations. The very first observation about the structure of 
business relations in Lukang is that one does not do business with people one does 
not know. No one deals with strangers. Nevertheless, the businessmen of Lukang 
recognise a category of relations called 'business relations'. With the exception of 
retail sales, business relations can be described as those in which post-dated checks 
are exchanged. In such relations xinyong and some degree of intimacy are 
important. But such relations can be established with anyone at all, and they are not 
influenced by such things as kinship, co-residence, brotherhood, or relations that 
could be said to involve an element of sentiment, of renqing. Xinyong is said to be 
determined entirely by a man's performance as a businessman, and to have nothing 
to do with the solidarities of common surname, schooling, or worship. Business 
relations are described as explicitly predicated on economic rationality and mutual 
self-interest (DeGlopper 1972). 
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Similar findings come from a study of a Hong Kong wholesale vegetable 
market by Silin (1972), who describes the selection of partners among wholesalers 
as predicated on three criteria. First, partners are selected on the basis of reliability. 
Second, there is an inclination to first select from individuals with whom they have 
previously worked, or who are bound to them by traditional bonds of solidarity. 
Third, trading relations do develop between individuals not linked by particularistic 
bonds. In this market, he observes that the trading relations are hierarchical -
between an agent and a jobber or between a jobber and a retailer - and bear many 
resemblances to patron-client relationships. 
Silin (1972) concludes that non-kin play a role equal to, if not more 
important than, that of kinsmen. The essential distinction is not between kin and 
non-kin but between those who continually validate their relationships and those 
who do not. The significance of universalistic criteria for the maintenance of trading 
relationships is little understood and yet is an important aspect of Chinese economic 
activity, one that gives traders considerable flexibility. 
circumstances do strong personal ties come into play? 
Personal versus business relations 
But under what 
DeGlopper (1972) argues that business involves much more than just buying 
and selling, and in practice the different categories of social relations tend to overlap 
somewhat. Simple economic rationality and functional specificity suffice to explain 
much of the pattern of economic relations in Lukang, but they are not the only forces 
at work. If one looks at other aspects of business life, one finds that, in certain 
situations, what may be loosely described as particularistic and functionally diffuse 
personal relations are of considerable significance. Their importance is most easily 
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seen if one looks at problems of credit, of access to restricted or limited supplies or 
markets, and of business partnerships. 
To start a business and to meet unexpected difficulties, businessmen must 
rely on credit obtained through informal, private channels. The best way is through 
a rotating credit society. One establishes the good character necessary for 
acceptance in the sphere of credit and mutual assistance only by participating in 
'society', by knowing a lot of people and interacting with them in the role of 
community member rather than in a narrowly defined occupational role (DeGlopper 
1972). 
DeGlopper (1972) summarises his study in this way: to do business in 
Lukang one must know people and establish relations of mutual confidence, but one 
need_ not know people terribly well, and it is better to have limited relations with a 
lot of _people than very close ties with only a few. Close, particularistic relations are 
important only in special circumstances. The small businessmen of Lukang desire to 
maximise their autonomy and freedom of choice, and prefer limited, functionally 
specific relations to diffuse ties fused with personal relations. Close personal 
relations are of less importance in Lukang' s business relations than in those of other 
Chinese communities described by other scholars. 
1.6 Gaps in the research 
The basic critique is spelled out by Mackie (1995). Very little empirical data 
or analytical rigour about how Chinese networks operate, or what they actually 
achieve, has been evident in writings on the subject. The socio-economic functions 
of reducing transaction costs and risks served by networks are not so much 
mysterious as complex, variegated and still not well researched. Mackie argues that 
__ it is highly dubious to contend that most oi- all of ethnic Chinese networks are tightly 
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connected. It would be more accurate to say that there are innumerable smaller 
networks of various kinds among the Southeast Asian Chinese, many of them 
intermeshed in various ways. 
A source of confusion about how networks operate and what functions they 
serve stem from imprecise uses of the term 'network'. It has been used to describe 
ties with a common ethnic heritage (East Asia Analytical Unit 1995; Economist 
1992; Tanzer 1994), interlocking directorates (Redding 1991), business groups 
(Numazaki 1991), and even industries (for example, the use of 'rubber network' 
instead of the rubber industry (Irwan 1995)). Because of differing meanings of 
'networks', studies done across industries and in different locations are difficult to 
compare. This casts doubt on the institutional argument that was discussed in the 
second section, as the concepts and terminology are not clearly specified. Business 
networks are almost always assumed to bring benefits to businesses, but how and 
why they do have not been researched in detail. 
Ethnic networks are often more apparent than real, since time and space 
distances, and language and experience gaps separate Chinese communities (Lim 
1992). Old links have changed and disappeared, as have many traditions. 
Competition and conflict between different groups of Chinese should also not be 
underestimated. It cannot be assumed that the ethnic Chinese residing in Southeast 
Asia still look to China as their homeland, nor that they subscribe to a common 
united purpose. 
Another crucial distinction researchers need to make is whether ethnic 
Chinese networks are different from non-Chinese networks. Mackie (1995, 4) says 
that, ' ... we really know very little in detail about those Overseas Chinese networks, 
or how they function, or in what ways they differ from the many kinds of personal, 
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social and business networks that can be found in nearly all advanced industrial 
societies.' Braadbart (1995) asserts that the mobilisation ofkinship networks in the 
pursuit of economic goals is a commercial strategy that is universal. 
1.7 The research 
Studies of Chinese business have demonstrated the importance of 
relationships based on kinship, common place of origin, schooling and other 
particularistic personal ties. In order to understand why economic relations take the 
form they do, it is necessary to understand the categories of personal relations, to 
consider the conditions under which relations of trust can be established and the way 
credit is established and granted, as well as the reasons given for trading with one 
firm rather than another (DeGlopper 1972). 
_ Mc Vey (1992) states that intra-regional and international connections of 
Chine~e businesses have hardly been mapped, and little is known about how their 
capital flows from one area to another. The Southeast Asian Chinese business 
culture remains an enigma to many observers, but its increasing power in the region, 
and especially its significance for the future of China, means that understanding it 
has become crucial to those handling business strategies in or for Pacific Asia 
(Redding 1995). Therefore, 
co-operativeness is an important issue, as it is this feature which 
converts an otherwise disparate group of entrepreneurs into a 
significant economy, whose power is normally hidden from view due 
to the simple fact that it cannot be represented in any national statistics. 
(Redding 1995, 62) 
Cooperation is investigated in this research. In particular, the research 
problem is how and why Chinese firms network with other firms. The next chapter 
presents a theoretical framework for the study of networking and addresses the 
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definition of networks. The approach used to examine networking is to examine 
dyadic interorganizational relationships. The research methodology used is the case 
study method (Chapter 3). The resulting evidence gathered consists of both 
qualitative and quantitative data. These are analysed using the constant comparative 
method, with the aid of the Ethnograph software (Chapter 3). 
The study explores the networking behaviour of the Chinese in the 
Philippines. There is no comparable work done on networking or business 
relationships for this particular community in the field sites chosen (Manila and 
Cebu). Omohundro's (1981) study of Chinese merchant families in Iloilo is the only 
detailed study of the influence of kinship and friendship ties on economic activities 
in the Philippine context. There is no comparative work for Manila and Cebu, the 
two field sites for this research. Yoshihara's (1985) study of Philippine 
industrialisation covers the Chinese community and their contribution to the 
economy, but it is based on a general analysis of economic statistics. Palanca (1995) 
uses an approach similar to Yoshihara to construct an economic profile of Chinese 
business using 1990 data. Hicks and Redding (1982) also estimated Chinese 
ownership of the top 259 corporations in the Philippines using 1980 data. 
Manila is chosen as one field site because it is the most populous city in the 
Philippines and is the capital of the country. An important work on the Manila 
Chinese community is Amyot's (1973) anthropological study of Chinese family and 
lineage. However, this study does not cover their economic activities. Limlingan' s 
(1986) study of Chinese business strategies covers the Southeast Asian region 
generally and does not provide much detail for each country. More recent is a study 
on the management practices of a few Chinese enterprises by Roman et al (1996). 
_;. 
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The case studies in this research focus on the internal management system of the 
firms. 
Cebu, a city approximately 300 kilometres south of Manila, is the other field 
site. No studies exist on contemporary Chinese business activities in Cebu. The 
work by Fenner (1985) on Cebu during the Spanish occupation (1521-1896) 
emphasises the importance of the Chinese during this period. The city presents an 
interesting opportunity to study the interaction between Chinese, Spanish and 
Filipino enterprises. It is also notable that several of the important Chinese 
businessmen started their business careers in Cebu, including John Gokongwei and 
Henry Sy. Several of the largest Chinese-owned enterprises are also based in Cebu. 
See (1989) contends that the field of Chinese economic activities in the 
Philippines is a difficult area of research because it involves delving into the 
business secrets and financial status of businesses. Chapter 3 outlines the strategies 
adopted by the researcher to address this difficulty. 
Case studies of Chinese-owned firms in Manila and Cebu are analysed 
within the historical and political context of Chinese business in the Philippines 
(Chapter 4). The individual firm's strategy needs to be considered in conjunction 
with the business and political environment in which it operates (Whitley 1992; 
Yeung and Olds 2000). A flaw in considering only one aspect of economic actors, 
such as their values, is illustrated by Weber's (1951) conclusion that the failure of 
China to achieve modern capitalism was due to the lack of the 'capitalist spirit'. The 
problem with China was not the lack of capitalist ethics, Tan (1992) argues; rather, 
China's failure to develop modem capitalism lies with other structural forms. 
Chapter 4 therefore considers the historical and political context within which 
Chinese business in the Philippines operates. 
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Three main analytical chapters on the case study firms follow (Chapters 5 to 
7). The analysis begins with a consideration of the antecedents of business relations 
(Chapter 5). The chapter addresses the question: Why do Chinese firms engage in 
networking? The nature of business relations is considered in Chapter 6. This 
chapter focuses on the different types of business relationships that firms have 
formed. Concepts of trust and reputation are examined to understand how these 
affect business relationships. The strategic consequences of these relationships are 
outlined in Chapter 7. This chapter considers two questions. First, what are the 
outcomes from networking? Second, how do networks change over time? 
The concluding chapter (Chapter 8) ties the research findings together. It 
shows that while networks are not a unique feature of Chinese business, Chinese 
networks have unique features. The chapter also explains why the data analysis 
shows that trust is not always a precondition for cooperation. 
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Chapter 2 
A Theoretical Framework for Analysing Business Relations 
A theoretical framework for the analysis of business relations is presented in 
this chapter. The first objective is to arrive at a working concept of 'network' by 
distinguishing between the many uses of the term and recommending a practical 
application. It will be evident that the term can be amorphous, thereby rendering it 
unsuitable for precise usage. The next section demonstrates why the use of the term 
interorganizational relation (IOR) is more appropriate for this research. 
Section 2.2 outlines the framework used in the research. The framework 
incorporates four perspectives from corporate strategy that affect a firm's decision in 
sourcing activities and resources. Another element of the framework is the 
consideration of the social, political, and historical context in which Chinese 
business in the Philippines operates. Section 2.3 presents the research questions. 
2.1 The network concept 
The term 'network' 1s generally used to refer to a particular type of 
organization or to attributes of any organization. In the first application, 'network' 
is used to refer to a particular type of economic organization, often by contrasting 
this type with a hierarchical organization or the market. Although the precise 
definition of the so-called 'network organization' varies from person to person, in 
general it is regarded as having many felicitous properties - flexibility, 
responsiveness, adaptability - not found to the same degree 1n alternative 
organizational forms (Kanter and Eccles 1992). In contrast, 'network' is also used 
to refer to an attribute of any organization to describe the pattern of ties that exist, 
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defined by hierarchical supporting relationships ( such as business groups), task 
interdependencies or information sharing (Birley 1985; Hara and Kanai 1994; 
Yanagida 1992). For example, Numazaki's (1991) study of Taiwanese business 
groups (guanxiqiye or related enterprises) defines these as a cluster of enterprises 
owned and controlled by a group of persons tied by a network of various guanxi. 
The focus is on network properties that can be identified in any organization or set 
of interorganizational relationships (Gerlach and Lincoln 1992). The next section 
examines these two views in greater detail. 
Network as an attribute 
This perspective portrays societies as systems of actors - people, groups, 
organizations - related to each other. Interorganizational networks consist of 
interacting organizations. There is a division of work in the network, yet no formal 
authority or hierarchy that alone can impose the necessary amount of coordination 
(Hellgren and Stj emberg 1987). Thorelli (1986) argues that 'probably the most 
salient part of the environment of any firm is other firms'. The entire economy, 
according to him, may be considered a network of organizations with a vast 
hierarchy of subordinate, criss-crossing networks. This point of view is taken by 
Johanson and Mattsson (1987) in analysing industrial markets. Networks are 
complex arrays of relationships between firms and are established through 
interactions with each other. Competing is, hence, more a matter of positioning 
one's firm in the network rather than attacking the environment. 
The argument for taking a network (or structural) approach in analysis is that 
the impact of markets cannot be properly understood outside the ensemble of 
intercorporate ties in which they are embedded. The behaviour of the business 
community requires an understanding of these business networks in all their 
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complexity. In the study of organizations, the network approach suggests that by 
understanding the structure of relations among organizations, and among individuals 
who span organizational boundaries, it is possible to learn a great deal about the 
behaviour of those organizations, as well as their internal workings (Mizruchi and 
Schwartz 1987). A comparison of the network and traditional approaches is 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. The network approach compared with the traditional approach 
Traditional approach Network approach 
Role, development and • a function of how • explained by their 
performance of companies they ability to develop 
autonomously relationships 
exploit a given set 
of resources 
-
Process of resource • takes place within • takes place 
development companies between 
companies 
Efficiency in the • internal technical • to a large extent 
performance of internal matter dependent on 
activities supplier and 
customer 
relationships 
Source: H. Hakansson and I. Snehota, ed., Developing Relationships in Business Networks (London: 
Routledge, 1995). 
Markets, hierarchies and networks 
The characterisation of markets and hierarchies serves as the starting point in 
the conceptualisation of networks as a type of organization. Networks are seen, in 
this case, as an intermediate form of economic organization. In terms of a spectrum 
of arrangement, from loose to tight, from arm's-length bargaining to total 
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integration, networks lie somewhere in between (Thorelli 1986; Zajac and Olsen 
1993). And while there has been no clear definition as to what constitutes a network 
organization, there appears to be general agreement as to what it is not. 
This form of coordinating production is not quite complete integration into a 
single firm, but not quite exchange between two separate firms in markets (Sako 
1992). Interorganizational networks are an institutional form different from the 
multidivisional corporation (Chandler 1962) and the large bureaucracy (Chandler 
1977). Grandori and Soda (1995, 184) define an inter-firm network as a 'mode of 
regulating interdependence between firms which is different from the aggregation of 
these units within a single firm and from coordination through market signals ... and 
which is based on a cooperative game with partner-specific communication.' The 
common agreement among proponents of network organizations is that transactions 
occur through networks of individuals engaged in reciprocal, pr~ferential, mutually 
supportive actions (Powell 1990). 
A critique of this general definition is that a continuum running from market 
to hierarchy can be misleading .(Bradach and Eccles 1989). First, elements of the 
ideal types ( or the poles of the continuum) are often found mixed together 
empirically. Second, markets, hierarchies and 'combinations' are embedded in or 
lead to the formation of collateral social structure. Bradach and Eccles (1989, 279) 
contend that 'the control mechanisms, price, authority, and trust - which map 
roughly on to market, hierarchy, and relational contracting - are useful concepts 
provided we recognize that they are independent and can be combined with each 
other in a variety of ways.' 
This critique can be addressed by examining Jarillo's (1988) typology. The 
network concept becomes clearer when the two variables of cooperation and 
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ownership are juxtaposed against each other. Jarillo's typology results in four 
distinct forms of economic organization (Table 2.2), with the network being 
portrayed as a type of cooperative, market-like arrangement. Arm's-length 
transactions characterise the classic market type. 
Table 2.2. The four modes of organizing economic activity 
Legal form 
No common 
ownership 
Common 
ownership 
Approach to the relationship 
N t on-coopera 1ve C t oopera 1ve 
Classic market Strategic network 
Bureaucracy Vertically-integrated 
Company 
Source: C. Jarillo, 'On strategic networks,' Strategic Management Journal 9 (1988), 31-41. 
The network concept becomes sharper still when the assumption of 
cooperation is replaced with that of coordination and set against the degree of 
ownership integration on a continuum (Figure 2.1 ). The loosest type of network is 
the Marshallian industrial district. Alfred Marshall based this concept on a 
pattern of organization that was common in late-nineteenth-century Britain in which 
firms concentrating on the manufacture of certain products were geographically 
., clustered. Transaction costs are minimal and there is high reliance on market 
mechanisms. A recent variation on the industrial district is the venture capital 
network, represented by Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the U.S. As in 
Marshallian industrial districts, coordination integration is low in these districts, but 
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some coordination is supplied by venture capitalists who put up the initial seed 
money (Langlois and Robertson 1995). 
Figure 2.1. Integration and networks 
Degree of 
ownership 
integration 
Holding 
company 
Chandlerian 
firm 
Venture 
capital 
network 
'Third 
Marshallian Italian' 
district district 
Degree of 
coordination integration 
Source: R. Langlois and P. Robertson, Firms, Markets and Economic Change, (London: 
Routledge, 1995), 124. 
The 'Third Italian' district is characterised by a higher degree of 
cooperative coordination than would be present in a Marshallian industrial district. 
The German textiles industry in Baden-Wurttemberg, Southwestern Germany, is a 
recent illustration of this type. Most of these German textile producers are highly 
specialised and the production system depends on an extensive subcontracting 
system in which key technologies are developed in a collaborative manner. In 
Emilia-Romagna in North Central Italy, firms employing fewer than 50 employees 
"' engaged 49 per cent of the Italian labour force, and the average manufacturing firm 
had only 9.19 employees in 1988. This is an example of an industrial district in 
which firms have a very low degree of vertical integration (Powell 1990). Networks 
are also prevalent in craft industries such as construction and book publishing. 
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Eccles (1981) found that in the U.S., the relations between a general contractor and 
his subcontractors were stable and continuous over long periods of time, and only 
rarely established through competitive bidding. 
In summary, the value of the goods to be exchanged in markets is much more 
important than the relationship itself. When relations do matter, they are frequently 
defined as if they were commodities. The benefits to be exchanged are also clearly 
specified. Markets offer choice, flexibility and opportunity. However, markets are 
a poor device for learning and the transfer of technological know-how. Networks 
are appropriate for situations in which there is a need for efficient, reliable 
information. Network forms of exchange entail indefinite, sequential transactions 
within the context of a general pattern of interaction. In hierarchies, 
communication occurs in the context of the employment contract. Relationships 
matter and previous interactions shape current ones, but the patterns and context of 
intraorganizational exchange are most strongly shaped by one's position within the 
formal hierarchical structure of authority (Powell 1990). 
Towards a working concept 
Kanter and Eccles (1992) see no reason to engage in a debate over whether a 
network is a property of any organization or a particular kind of organization. From 
a network perspective, all organizations can be characterised as networks and indeed 
are properly understood only in these terms. So, to say an organization has a 
network form is a tautology. By treating networks as a distinct form of organization, 
those who advocate this perspective deliberately direct attention to particular 
network characteristics that are to some degree relevant to any organization but are 
especially salient in so-called network organizations, such as dense horizontal 
linkages across formal organizational boundaries (Hakansson and Snehota 1995; 
j 
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Johanson and Mattsson 1987), reciprocal relationships between small firms in a 
regional economy (Orru 1991 ), or interlocking relationships among economic 
institutions in Asian economies (Biggart and Hamilton 1992; Gerlach and Lincoln 
1992; Numazaki 1991). 
It is the rhetorical framing of network as form that forces the analyst to 
attend to what it is that makes these arrangements efficient, governable, and flexible 
compared with traditional modes of organizing. It calls for analysis in network 
terms and directs attention to key features of these organizations that can be 
understood only from a network perspective, such as the role of linking-pin 
institutions in the governance of these organizations and the role of ties that create 
trust (such as shared ethnic, geographical, ideological, or professional background) 
(Nohria 1992). In this context, the term network is often used metaphorically and 
therefore neither defined precisely nor measured. An example is the use of terms 
such as web of kinship and web of group affiliation to represent human beings 
connected by a complex network of social relations (Barnes 1972). 
As a precisely defined concept, it is necessary to define which individuals 
belong to a network and classify the kinds of social bonds that exist between them. 
A total network refers to all the bonds between the constituent individuals, in 
contrast to partial networks, which contain only links of some specified kind (Barnes 
1972). This research takes a partial network approach to analysing the structure of 
Chinese business relationships. The aim is not to map all the ties of a firm, but to 
identify the most important ties, as defined by the firm. Dyadic relationships are 
referred to as inter-organizational relationships (IO Rs). When all relationships 
between multiple partners are aggregated, then the focus of inquiry is the network 
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(Alter and Hage 1993). IORs are equivalent to Sak:o's (1992) conceptualisation of 
obligational contractual relations (OCR). 
Sak:o's (1992) two ideal types of relations are helpful reference points in 
distinguishing a short-term relationship from a long-term one. At one extreme, 
firms rely on arm's-length contractual relations if they wish to maintain full 
independence. This involves not only being unaffected by the decision of other 
companies, but also by one's own decisions (such as over sourcing and sales) made 
in the past. The arm's-length nature of contracts also enables firms to engage in 
commercial bargaining to obtain competitive prices (Sako 1992). 
At the other extreme, firms enter into an OCR if they pref er high trust 
cooperativeness with a commitment to trade over the long run. This may involve 
tak:in_g on other obligations and requests, such as for just-in-time and ship-to-stock 
delivery. The benefits of accepting these obligations, however, -lie in good quality 
and service, growing or stable orders and other non-price aspects of trading born out 
of a tacit understanding over time (Sako 1992). This research considers as part of a 
firm's network those relations that gravitate towards OCR and that are of a long-
term nature. The primary emphasis is on dyadic relationships. Nevertheless, a firm's 
set of IORs is also examined. 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
A framework for analysing the formation of IORs is presented below (Figure 
2.2) and is partially adapted from Oliver (1990) and Sako (1992). This framework 
addresses calls for an inter-disciplinary approach to research on ethnic Chinese 
enterprises (Biggart 1997; Gomez and Hsiao 2001; Redding 1993; Whitley 1992). 
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The framework incorporates four perspectives from corporate strategy, 
which are, in turn, influenced by technological factors and market conditions. It also 
includes variables associated with the social, political, and historical context of 
doing business (Boxes B and C). It is important to analyse organizational behaviour 
in its environmental context. As Powell (1990) strongly argues, serious progress in 
understanding the diversity of organizational forms requires arguments that are 
much more historically contingent and context dependent. Whitley (1992) also 
considers a complex set of determinants in his study of East Asian business systems. 
Whitley's study brings into play the effects of government policies, financial 
systems, and historical features of the development process and the borrowing of 
organizational techniques from elsewhere. 
While organizational behaviour and the context in which organizations 
operate are interrelated, they will be discussed separately for clarity. The next 
section focuses on theories under the 'Corporate Strategy' heading (Box A) while 
the latter sections deal with Boxes B and C. 
Figure 2.2. Framework for analysing IOR formation 
BoxB 
Government policy/ 
legal framework 
Box A 
Technological .... Corporate strategy 
factors 
,.. .,, 
• Efficiency ... IOR • ,.... Market .... 
,.. 
conditions • Reciprocity 
• Asymmetry 
• Stability 
BoxC 
History I cultural 
traditions 
Individual 
preferences 
Social and 
moral norms 
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Corporate strategy 
From an organization's point of view, why does it need to engage in IORs? 
Firms establish many different kinds of relationships. Kay (1993) argues that the 
most important is the spot contract - an agreement for immediate exchange. Many 
important relationships are made as classical contracts - long-term, legal 
arrangements which contain detailed provisions as to how dealings between parties 
will evolve as events unfold. A relational contract is also a long-term relationship. 
However, its provisions are often only partly specified and it is enforced, not by 
legal process, but by the need the parties have to go on doing business with each 
other. 
Larson (1992) highlights four perspectives from corporate strategy that 
influence a company's decision to engage in IO Rs: efficiency, reciprocity, 
asymmetry, and stability. Technological factors and market conditions affect the 
operation of these strategic choices. For example, technological factors include 
variables affecting relationship patterns that are derived from the nature and extent 
of investment into production equipment. Sako (1992) hypothesises that IOR-type 
transactions are more likely to emerge if suppliers contribute to the product design 
and development process than if they do not. Market conditions include demand 
patterns and growth. Sako posits that a history of steady, rather than fluctuating, 
demand growth is considered more conducive to relational contracting as it creates a 
favourable condition for building mutual trust and confidence. 
Efficiency. Why are there any market transactions at all, if by internalising 
one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production? Why is not 
all production carried on by one big firm? Coase (1937) argues that this is due to 
limiting returns to management. First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing 
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returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional 
transactions within the firm may rise. Second, it may be that as the transactions that 
are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the 
uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the factors of 
production. Third, the supply price of one or more of the factors of production may 
rise because the 'other advantages' of a small firm are greater than those of a large 
firm. 
What determines whether markets, hierarchies (formal organizations) or 
networks will be used? In the 1930s, Coase (1937) made an argument that lay the 
foundation for transaction cost economics, namely that the decision to use a market 
or, alternatively, a firm depends on the transaction costs involved. Transaction 
costs arise from any activity that is engaged in to satisfy each party to an exchange 
that the value given and received is in accord with their expectations. These costs 
arise principally when it is difficult to determine the value of the goods or services. 
Such difficulties can arise from the underlying nature of the goods or services or 
from a lack of trust between the parties (Ouichi 1980). In Williamson's (1985, 19) 
words, transaction costs are 'the equivalent of friction in physical systems'. 
Transaction cost economics holds that the main purpose and effect of 
economic organization is economising on transaction costs (Williamson 1996). 
Transaction costs are often difficult to quantify, but it is the difference between 
them, rather than their absolute magnitude, that matters. The question is whether or 
not organizational relations ( contracting practices, governance structures) line up 
with the attributes of transactions as predicted by transaction cost reasoning. 
In a perfect market, transactions are carried out without transaction costs. 
_ Information is freely available and decision-making is rational. There are always 
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alternative suppliers and buyers and there are no carry-over effects from one period 
to the other of a specific transaction between two parties in the market. When these 
conditions do not prevail, transaction costs emerge because there is a need to devote 
efforts to organ1z1ng, carrying out and controlling transactions among 
interdependent actors. The transaction cost approach tries to explain the institutional 
form, that is, the 'governance structure' (market, hierarchy, or intermediate forms), 
of these transactions (Johanson and Mattsson 1987). 
Two behavioural characteristics are postulated: decisions and actions are 
characterised by bounded rationality, whence behaviour is 'intendedly rational, but 
only limitedly so' (Simon 1953) and opportunism, which is a condition of self-
interest seeking with guile (Williamson 1985). Under conditions of certainty, it is 
possible, ex ante, to gather information and to specify contracts between supplier 
and buyer, to take care of various future contingencies, and also, ex post, to control 
the fulfilment of the agreement between the parties. However, when uncertainty 
prevails, contracts will be very complex and costly both to construct and to enforce, 
especially in the case of small-numbers bargaining (Table 2.3). The latter means 
that there are few, if any, alternatives open for a buyer or a seller to replace each 
other in a transaction. The major reason for this is that the asset specificity is high. 
Asset specificity is defined as the need to dedicate investment to a particular 
transaction or business relationship (Kay 1993). Personal knowledge or skills, type 
of machinery or products, geographic location and so on are not homogenous across 
the population of buyers or sellers. The higher the asset specificity, the more 
dependent the parties will be on each other, and the higher the costs of switching to 
another party will become (Johanson and Mattsson 1987). For example, if the 
activity incorporates advanced technology with proprietary information, it is 
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possible that the knowledge of that activity may leak to a competitor. Therefore, the 
contracting firm is exposed to risks associated with the potential exercise of 
opportunistic behaviour by subcontractors. The contracting firm expenences 
contingent loss, leading to a loss of potential future sales, loss of market share or 
even defeat in the marketplace (Edwards and Samimi 1997). 
Table 2.3. The transaction cost model 
Environmental 
Behavioural factors Atmosphere Factors 
Bounded rationality <-------------> Uncertainty/ 
complexity 
Opportunism <-------------> Small numbers 
bargaining 
-
Source: S. Douma and H. Schreuder, Economic Approaches to Organization (~ertfordshire: Prentice 
Hall, 1992). 
The firm can respond to this contingent loss in two ways: internalisation or 
subcontracting. It can decide · to carry out the activity itself. Internalisation, 
however, involves a cost as the firm has to divert resources from more highly valued 
activities to the activity that it would have preferred to have subcontracted to the 
market. Alternatively, if feasible, the contracting firm can break the activity into a 
number of smaller component parts and subcontract these to different firms, thereby 
limiting the amount of proprietary knowledge gained by any one subcontractor and 
so eliminating their ability to exercise opportunistic behaviour. This is known as 
'decomposed' subcontracting. This alternative also involves added cost for the firm; 
it has to divert resources from preferred activities to cover the added costs of 
transacting product flows with subcontractors (Edwards and Samimi 1997). 
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Another reason for internalisation centres on asset specificity. A 
subcontractor may be required to invest in equipment or skill development specific 
to one end-user only, the contracting firm. The investment may have no alternative 
use and thus have no resale value. The subcontractor would be aware that, once the 
investment is undertaken, the contracting firm may set prices below a level that 
gives adequate compensation for asset specific outlays or may not provide sufficient 
demand to ensure continuous efficient use of asset specific investments. In these 
instances, the subcontractor is exposed to a contingency loss (Edwards and Samimi 
1997). 
In summary, some subcontractable activities raise problems of opportunistic 
behaviour. Because firms often do not know in advance the scope for exercise of 
opportunistic behaviour, the extent to which it may be exercised, and the level of 
directly related contingency losses, there tends to be a bias in favour of 'make' 
rather than 'buy' and, where subcontracting occurs, in favour of decomposed 
subcontracting even though the scope for opportunistic behaviour may not warrant 
such a response (Edwards and Samimi 1997). · 
From an efficiency and transaction cost point of view, the firm takes into 
consideration the total costs of undertaking an activity internally and externally. An 
internal activity incurs internal costs (IC). In the case of subcontracting, the external 
cost (EC) includes the external price (EP) charged by the supplier plus the 
transaction cost (TC). Therefore, the firm will network if EP + TC < IC (Jarillo 
1988). 
Alternatively, the firm will integrate if: EP + TC > IC, even if EP < IC 
(Jarillo 1988). Corporations will therefore adopt a multidivisional form or vertically 
__ _integrate when the costs of transactions with customers and suppliers exceed the 
43 
costs of administration and production under the firm's rubric. Therefore, the 
transaction cost argument is wedded to the concept of efficiency - the idea that 
changes in corporate behaviour are impelled by the pursuit of the most efficient 
structure as measured by market performance (Mizruchi and Schwartz 1987; Oliver 
1990). 
In summary, proponents of efficiency argue that establishing an efficient 
network implies the ability to lower transaction costs, for it is precisely those costs 
that lead firms to integrate, shunning the flexibility offered by a market relationship, 
together with the advantages of specialisation, both their own and their suppliers' 
(Jarillo 1988; Johanson and Mattsson 1987). Efficiency contingencies are internally, 
rather than externally, oriented. In this situation, the formation of an IOR is 
prompted by an organization's goal to improve its internal input/output ratio (Oliver 
1990). 
Reciprocity. Motives of reciprocity emphasise cooperation, collaboration, 
and coordination among organizations. According to this perspective, the major 
advantage of IORs is that they facilitate the pursuit of common or mutually 
beneficial goals or interests (Oliver 1990; Schmidt and Kochan 1977). Networking 
is one of the methods by which entrepreneurs can get access to external resources 
(Jarillo 1988). This is also termed an 'asset-seeking alliance response' (Dunning 
1995, 469). 
From a strategic management perspective, Langlois and Robertson (1995) 
argue that transaction cost theorists have a narrow view of the necessity for 
economic coordination. The efficient coordination of resources not only permits 
operational efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and services along 
existing lines, but is also vital for strategic uses that require new, and not always 
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readily evident, combinations of resources. To put it another way, business 
institutions may also arise as solutions to coordination games, not merely incentive-
alignment (which is what transaction cost theorists argue). 
How do reciprocity theorists answer the question of when firms choose to 
develop new capabilities internally or to purchase them on the market? This 
depends, it is argued, on a firm's internal capabilities, the range and quality of 
capabilities available through purchase, and the relative production and transaction 
costs of the various options. The most efficient relationship between source and 
user firms also depends on, inter alia, the prior existence of information networks, 
the scope of the innovation, its impact on various user industries, the presence or 
absence of economies of scale, and the stages of the product life cycle reached by 
both the innovating product and any product into which it might be incorporated. 
Specialisation and the appropriability of benefits also exert conflicting influences on 
the choice of organizational form in an innovative environment (Langlois and 
Robertson 1995). 
The approach of Swedish researchers to studying networks is to argue that 
coordination is not achieved through a central plan or an organizational hierarchy, 
nor does it take place through the price mechanism. Instead, coordination takes 
place through interaction among firms in the network, in which price is just one of 
several influencing conditions (Hakansson and Snehota 1995; Johanson and 
Mattsson 1987). Table 2.4 compares this network approach with Williamson's 
transaction cost approach in five respects. 
The theoretical foundation of the Swedish approach is resource dependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Organizations engage in resource exchange 
_; 
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Table 2.4. The transaction cost approach contrasted with the Swedish approach 
to networks 
Transaction Cost Approach Swedish approach to networks 
Theoretical • neo-classical framework • in terms of control 
foundations focusing on conditions for assumptions, based on 
stable equilibrium resource-dependence theory 
Problem • aims to explain institutional • describes and analyses 
orientation governance structures dynamic aspects of industrial 
systems and strategies pursued 
by firms in such systems 
Basic • bounded rationality • uses Williamson ' s basic 
concepts concepts to describe important 
• opportunism characteristics of networks: 
• uncertainty • bounded rationality is an 
implicit assumption and 
• small numbers bargaining uncertainty is also linked to 
relationships in the network 
• asset specificity 
• asset specificity is related to 
-
heterogeneity, mutual 
adaptation and market assets. 
. 
• disagrees that high asset 
specificity leads to vertical 
integration 
System • bases conclusions on • looks at relationships in 
delimitation characteristics of aggregates networks within context of 
of specific types of other network relationships 
transaction relations 
Nature of • relationships barely exist in • industrial markets 
relationships markets, only within characterised by lasting 
hierarchies relationships among firms 
because such relationships 
reduce costs of exchange and 
production and promote 
knowledge development and 
change 
Source: 0. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985); and 
J. Johanson and L.G. Mattsson, 'Interorganizational relations in industrial systems: a network 
approach compared with the transaction costs approach,' International Studies of Management and 
Organization 17, no. 1 (1987):34-48. 
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relationships because no one organization possesses a sufficient amount of every 
resource it needs (Song 1995). Thus, it is predicted that more alliance relationships 
are expected when resource flows are particularly problematic and environmental 
uncertainty is high (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Williamson's basic concepts are 
accepted by network theorists, in particular, the assumptions of bounded rationality, 
uncertainty, and the conditions of asset specificity. However, the Swedish approach 
disagrees with the transaction cost prediction that high asset specificity leads to 
vertical integration. 
In contrast to the market ideal where relationships are considered friction, the 
network perspective recognises that firms' activities in industrial markets are 
cumulative processes. Firms develop relationships that secure access to important 
resources and the sale of products and services. The basic assumption of the 
network model is that the individual firm is dependent on resources controlled by 
other firms: the firm obtains access to external resources through its network 
position (Johanson and Mattsson 1987). 
Another approach that emphasises reciprocity is transactional value analysis. 
Instead of considering costs as determining network behaviour, it takes the 
perspective of value as determining network behaviour. Zajac and Olsen (1993) 
argue that one limitation of the transaction cost perspective in explaining IOR 
strategy has to do with the notion of value instead of cost. The usual transaction cost 
minimisation calculation for the vertical integration decision _ reflects a single-firm, 
rather than multi-firm orientation. This perspective on the decision to integrate 
vertically reduces fundamentally to one firm's 'make or buy' decisions. The 
transaction cost calculations that lead to that decision are conducted by one firm for 
its own independent purpose and use. 
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Contrary to transaction cost reasoning, performance gains from accessing 
internal routines, not performance losses from opportunism in markets, drive 
boundary decisions (Poppo and Zenger 1995). The resource-based literature rejects 
the transaction cost notion that opportunism and market failure drive decisions to 
vertically integrate, arguing instead that vertical integration is a 'creator of the 
positive' rather than an 'overrider of a negative'. From a resource-based 
perspective, decisions as to internal or external sourcing of an activity hinge on the 
degree to which activities can exploit the distinctive knowledge, skill and routines 
housed within a firm. 
IORs are formed voluntarily by two (or more) organizations seeking to create 
and sustain a relationship that is valuable to both firms. In such cases, exchange 
partners are not 'eliminated' through the creation of a single vertically-integrated 
hierarchical entity established through complete ownership, nor can the partners be 
viewed as only engaging in market-based transactions. Firms involved in a joint 
venture, for example, while obviously interested in satisfying their own interests, are 
also interested in maintaining the co-operative arrangement to satisfy these interests 
- which requires some consideration of the satisfaction of their partner' s valued 
interests. This does not require an assumption of altruistic behaviour on the part of 
the firm involved, but only an assumption that neither partner in an 
interorganizational strategy wishes the relationship to be terminated prematurely due 
to one partner's dissatisfaction with the relationship (Zajac and Olsen 1993). 
The crucial transactional issue for IORs is not merely a single organization's 
concern for minimising its transaction costs, but rather both organizations' concern 
for also (a) knowing the partner's preferences and concerns as a basis for exchange 
and mutual gain, and (b) discovering ways in which similarities or shared interests 
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can be exploited to maximise cooperative joint gains that accrue to both parties. It 
follows, then, that the type of analysis required is one that addresses how both 
parties attempt to create and claim value within a relationship over time (Zajac and 
Olsen 1993). 
Asymmetry. Asymmetry refers to IORs prompted by the potential to 
exercise power or control over another organization or its resources. In contrast to 
\ 
the proposition that resource scarcity motivates organizations to cooperate with one 
another, a power approach to explaining IORs suggests that resource scarcity 
prompts organizations to attempt to exert power, influence, or control over 
organizations that possess the required scarce resources (Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). Because organizations are not internally self-sufficient, they require 
resources from the environment and, thus, become interdependent with those 
elements of the environment with which they transact (Pfeffer 1982). 
The resource dependence perspective is based on two premises: that 
organizations are the primary social actors and that intercorporate relations can be 
understood as a product of organizational dependence and constraint. The key to 
organizational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources. This 
constraint would be simplified if organizations were in complete control of all the 
components necessary for their operation. However, no organization is completely 
self-contained: it is embedded in an environment comprised of other organizations 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The question becomes: To what extent can 
intercorporate relations be accounted for by patterns of resource interdependence? 
Two forms of dependence are identified by Pfeffer (1987): symbiotic, in 
which the output of one organization is the input to the other (for example, 
manufacturers as suppliers of products to retailers), and commensalistic, in which 
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the organizations compete in the same niche ( such as manufacturing firms 
competing for the same markets). The resource dependence position 1s that 
organizations survive to the extent that they are effective. The effectiveness of an 
organization lies in its ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions. 
Pfeffer (1987) cautions that it is important to avoid confusing organizational 
effectiveness with organizational efficiency. The difference between the two 
concepts is at the heart of the · external versus internal perspective on organizations. 
Organizational effectiveness is an external standard of how well an organization is 
meeting the demands of the various groups and organizations that are concerned 
with its activities. Effectiveness derives from the management of demands, 
particularly the demands of interest groups upon which the organizations depend for 
resources and support. Organizational efficiency is an internal standard of 
performance and is measured by the ratio of resources utilized to output produced. 
The question of whether what is being done should be done is not posed, but only 
how well is it being done (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
To summarise, from an .asymmetry point of view (Johanson and Mattsson 
1987), the relationships in an industrial network are significant because they may: 
• promote development of knowledge of the respective parties; 
• give the parties some control over each other; 
• be used as bridges to other firms; and 
• be used when utilizing partners against third parties. 
Stability. Another reason for relationship formation is to increase stability 
(predictability). The formation of relations has often been characterised as an 
adaptive response to environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; 
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Williamson 1985). Environmental uncertainty is generated by resource scarcity and 
by a lack of perfect knowledge about environmental fluctuations. Uncertainty 
prompts organizations to establish and manage relationships in order to achieve 
stability, predictability, and dependability in their relations with others. 
In contrast to the efficiency argument, the emphasis of resource dependence 
is on reducing uncertainty and dependence through activities which either organize 
networks of relations or which manage dependencies inside the organization, 
regardless of considerations of profit or efficiency for the most part. In contrast with 
the class perspective!, resource dependence emphasises actions serving the interests 
of, and being organized by, organizations rather than families, individuals, or social 
class. The class perspective is more consciously rational in its approach: individuals 
possess interests, and organize themselves to pursue those interests (Pfeffer 1987). 
According to resource dependence theory, organizations employ a variety of 
strategies for bringing stability and certainty to their environments. They may ( a) 
restructure the organization to avoid instability or its consequences; (b) stabilise 
exchange relationships; or ( c) . restructure the set of exchange relationships to 
enhance stability. Each organizational action taken to reduce uncertainty or manage 
problematic transactions may alter the connectedness of the system, possibly altering 
the transaction flows to other organizations. In other words, actions taken to manage 
interdependence may, in the long run, increase the interdependence among 
environmental elements, requiring further actions to manage the new uncertainties 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
1 Social class theorists view corporations as tools of a dominant social class whose interests both 
. embody and transcend those of any particular organization (Mizruchi and Schwartz 1987). 
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From a strategic management point of view, risk-sharing arrangements are 
basic to the long-term success of the relationship between principal and 
subcontractor. The networking arrangement gives flexibility to the large firm while 
the subcontractor is better off because of the risk absorbed by the big firm (J arillo 
1988; Thorelli 1986). 
Redding (1993) explains that personal networks among the ethnic Chinese 
are built in order to control uncertainty in three ways: 
• through the gathering of information, for which contacts in an 
industry are crucial, 
• through the stabilising of sources of supply and markets, and 
• when starting a new venture. 
Implications of corporate strategy for the research design. Several 
critical variables stand out from the discussion. Transaction cost economics point to 
asset specificity and small numbers bargaining as highly influential conditions 
affecting IOR decisions. Under reciprocity theory, however, Langlois and 
Robertson (1995) caution against narrow efficiency calculations and suggest that 
industry characteristics such as the extent of information networks and the scope of 
innovation and its impact on users be considered. The case studies in this research 
are constructed to take into account of these variables. The fieldwork allows for 
selection across a range of industries and covers both manufacturing and service 
.. industries. 
Social, political and historical context 
The second part of the theoretical framework focuses on the factors in boxes 
B and C in Figure 2.2. Granovetter's social embeddedness theory and the 
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institutional approach are presented, highlighting the importance given to the 
influences of social structures and institutional arrangements on relationship 
behaviour. 
The central argument of the theories in this section (which include economic 
sociology, organization theory and institutional theory) is that analysts cannot 
separate organizational behaviour from its social, political and historical context. 
For instance, the concept of resource dependence is accurate in the proposition that 
organizations seek to connect or take over other organizations that control the supply 
of a critical resource, but less helpful if one needs to explain why certain resources 
become critical. Indeed, Gomez and Hsiao (2001) argue that to provide a holistic 
understanding of the operation of Chinese business, issues of state ( such as state 
policies and state-business linkages) and society ( such as culture and ethnicity) need 
to be considered. 
Orru's (1991) 'institutional logic' argument posits that economic action is 
socially specified and is never simply a matter of cost-benefit calculations in an 
abstract way. Economic action is also a matter of: 
• specified cultural values and beliefs; 
• socially shaped interpersonal and institutional routines and 
expectations; and 
• identifiable authority claims and legitimation principles. 
Yambert (1981) asserts that any explanation of the competitive success of 
immigrant ( or other minority) groups requires reference not only to the 
characteristics of the population, but also to the wider order of institutional 
arrangements and intergroup relationships within which the groups are located. 
53 
Historically, prior positions of prominence and influence of immigrants translated 
into access to goods and markets. Trading connections are ·an important aspect of 
their commercial predominance in subsequent levels of incorporation into the 
European economy in the 19th century. Success has also been furthered in many 
instances when the interests of immigrants coincided with the political and economic 
interests of powerful groups. 
Is there a cultural aspect to the development of networks? One strand of 
argument is that Chinese networks derive their legitimacy and attraction from certain 
cultural predispositions, most of which are traceable to Confucian values (Crawford 
2000). The very success of these networks encourages other cultural 
predispositions, such as patrimonial authority patterns that give high organizational 
influence to key individuals, and an ethic of trustworthiness, which provides 
discipline and moral justifications to the system. This reciprocation releases other 
forms of efficiency, which can be explained technically in terms of low transaction 
costs, strategic flexibility, and a capacity for innovation, all of which facilitate a 
continuation of the successful recipe in the future (Redding 1991). 
An opposing argument emphasises that motivation and values can activate 
orientation towards economic success only in a larger society whose economic and 
administrative systems are rationally organized for economic achievement and 
where there is room for economic expansion. The ability to adapt to changing 
conditions is shaped by the nature of the society and the opportunities available: 
both structural and cultural factors are necessary for explanation (Tan 1992). 
However, it would be wrong to assume that conditions for networks exist only in the 
East because of Asian culture. Silicon Valley's semiconductor industry manifests 
network properties. In Europe, there are also examples of cooperative contracting in 
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specific industrial areas such as Northern Italy, Sweden, and Western Denmark 
(Alter and Hage 1993). 
Embeddedness. The efficiency perspective on networks is sharply 
distinguished from the embeddedness argument within economic sociology, which 
claims that the notion of efficiency cannot be used to explain existing institutions, in 
the economy or elsewhere (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Granovetter 1985; Swedberg 
1991 ). How behaviour and institutions are affected by social relations is one of the 
classic questions of social theory. Granovetter (1985) compares the 
'undersocialised' and 'oversocialised' conceptions of human action in economics 
and sociology. Classical and neoclassical economics operate with an atomised, 
undersocialised conception of human action, he argues. The fact that actors may 
have social relations with one another has been treated as a frictional drag that 
impedes competitive markets. The literature on economic development from the 
1940s to 1970s typically assumed that any embeddedness of economic action in 
non-economic relations was a barrier to 'true' economic development (Granovetter 
1985). 
Granovetter (1985) maintains that new institutional economics (transaction 
cost theory) explains why daily economic life is riddled with mistrust and 
malfeasance. Malfeasance is averted because clever institutional arrangements 
make it too costly to engage in. Therefore, social institutions and arrangements are 
better viewed as the efficient solution to certain economic problems. He notes that 
the institutions do not produce trust, but instead are a functional substitute for it. 
This theory implies an 'undersocialised' conception of human action. 'Generalised 
morality' arguments, on the other hand, have the oversocialised characteristic of 
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calling on a generalised and automatic response, even though moral action 1n 
economic life is hardly automatic or universal. 
The embeddedness argument, however, stresses the role of concrete 
personal relations and structures ( or 'networks') of such relations in generating trust 
and discouraging malfeasance. Social relations, rather than institutional 
arrangements, are mainly responsible for the production of trust in economic life. 
Granovetter (1985) argues that, as a solution to the problem of order, the 
embeddedness position is less sweeping than alternative arguments, since networks 
of social relations penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees different sectors of 
economic life. In addition, social relations may often be a necessary condition for 
trust and trustworthy behaviour, but they are not sufficient to generate these. 
_ Williamson (1985), on the other hand, treats social structural influences on 
market behaviour as exceptions, although he acknowledges that social context has a 
bearing on economic activity. Granovetter (1985) contends that the anonymous 
market of neoclassical models is virtually non-existent in economic life and that 
transactions of all kinds are rife with the social connections described. Table 2.5 
summarises the differences in explanation and prediction between Williamson' s 
transaction cost approach and Granovetter' s embeddedness view. The latter argues 
that pressures toward vertical integration are expected in a market when transacting 
firms lack a network of personal relations or where such a network eventuates in 
conflict, disorder, opportunism, or malfeasance. On the other hand, where a stable 
network of relations mediates complex transactions and generates standards of 
behaviour between firms, such pressures should be absent. In terms of empirical 
studies, Orru's (1991) study of small-firm economies in Italy and Taiwan illustrates 
the embeddedness view. 
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Table 2.5. A comparison of the transaction cost model and the embeddedness 
approach 
Williamson's approach Embeddedness approach 
Explanation of • explains inhibition of • a high level of order can 
institutions 'opportunism' in be found in the 'market' 
economic life and the and a correspondingly 
general existence of high level of disorder 
cooperation and order by within the firm 
the subsumption of 
complex economic • whether these occur 
activities in hierarchically depends on the nature of 
integrated firms personal relations and 
network relations 
between and within firms 
Prediction • whatever organizational • pressures toward vertical 
form that is most efficient integration should be 
will be the one observed expected in a market 
when transacting firms 
lack a network of 
personal relations or 
- where such a network 
eventuates in conflict, 
disorder, opportunism, or 
malfeasance 
• on the other hand, where 
a stable network of 
relations mediates 
complex transactions and 
generates standards of 
behaviour between firms, 
such pressures should be 
absent 
Source: M. Granovetter, 'Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness,' 
American Journal of Sociology 91 , no. 3 (1985): 481-510 and 0 . Williamson, The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985). 
Granovetter (1985) suggests that research on the markets-hierarchies 
question should pay careful attention to the actual patterns of personal relations by 
which economic transactions are carried out. Small firms in a market setting may 
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persist because a dense network of social relations is overlaid on the business 
relations connecting such firms and reduces pressures for integration. 
Whitley's (1992) view is that the embeddedness of organizations in a societal 
context leads to certain formulae or 'recipes' becoming dominant as a result of their 
special appropriateness for that context. An important component of any recipe is 
the way economic exchange in a society is coordinated and made to run smoothly. 
In many Western economies, the main efficiencies in coordination derive from 
large-scale organization. It is argued that in the case of the ethnic Chinese, the 
equivalent efficiencies derive from networking (Redding 1991 ). 
2.3 Research questions 
The main research question is: How and why do Chinese firms engage in 
IORs with other firms? The following three supporting questions refine the main 
questi_on: 
• How can both technical (economic) and value factors be used to 
explain relationships? 
• What is the relationship between the firm's stage of development 
(size, complexity, age) and its networking behaviour? 
• How does the nature of the industries affect networking behaviour? 
The 'why' question considers the technical and strategic questions: How do 
the firm's strategic considerations explain IORs? The 'how' question looks at who 
the firm's IOR partners are, how it chooses its partners and how it structures its 
relationships. 
The four elements in corporate strategy box of the theoretical framework 
( efficiency, reciprocity, asymmetry and stability) are examined in this research. On a 
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practical level, the fieldwork considers several variables that might affect IOR 
behaviour from a strategic point of view. These variables include opportunism and 
transaction costs, a firm's internal capabilities and its need for external resources. 
In addition, the research also looks into any possible relationship between the 
firm's stage of development and its IOR behaviour. This question allows the 
research to focus beyond just one point in time and to study the changes in IORs 
over time. Finally, the industry that the firm operates in may influence IOR 
behaviour. In particular, the research looks for influences from the other firms in the 
industry and government policy. The next chapter on research design demonstrates 
how the study goes about answering these questions. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design 
This chapter discusses the research design for the study of the 
interorganizational relationships (IO Rs) of ethnic Chinese firms in the Philippines. 
The aim of this research is theoretical development: to seek answers to the questions 
of how and why Chinese firms engage in IORs with other firms through the 
development of case studies and their analysis using modified grounded theory. The 
research also considers the environmental context within which these businesses 
operate. It is anthropological in approach. 
The following section discusses why the research follows the case study 
method and the modified grounded theory approach to data gathering and analysis. 
The three stages of research design are then presented. The research strategy 
incorporates the criteria for selecting cases and the method for data collection. Data 
collection discusses the sources. of data, period of collection and the pilot study. 
Finally, data analysis incorporates three levels of coding, starting from general ( or 
open) coding to specific ( or selective) coding where categories of data are 
developed. The objective of coding is to find patterns in the data. Patterns within 
individual cases are discovered (within-case analysis). In addition, cases are also 
compared to find similarities and differences ( cross-case analysis) . 
3.1 The case study method and grounded theory 
The methodological approach to field research adopted in this study is 
described by the term 'clinical field research'. It is defined as the detailed 
understanding of individuals or companies through the use of comprehensive 
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descriptions (cases) and detailed analysis of their problems, decisions, and operating 
environments. A particular strength of this approach is the flexibility and ability to 
collect rich data. In addition, the results may be more significant than broader, 
extensive surveys. The approach also takes into account the impact of culture, 
history, and economic and political systems on organizations (Wright, Lane, and 
Beamish 1988, 55-56). 
Yin (1994, 8) argues that it is necessary to obtain a fit between the research 
approach and three conditions: (a) the type of research question posed, (b) the extent 
of control the investigator has over behavioural events, and ( c) the degree of focus 
on contemporary as opposed to historical events. Table 3.1 displays these three 
conditions and demonstrates how each is related to five major research strategies in 
the social sciences. In this particular study, both 'how' and 'why' questions are 
being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little 
or no control. It is these situations that are most suitable for using the case study 
strategy. 
In addition to these three conditions, the nature of the inquiry and its 
relationship to existing theory must also be considered. Case studies are 
appropriate, Parkhe (1993) argues, where existing research is at the stage where the 
phenomenon is not well-understood and relationships between phenomena not clear. 
In such situations, a novel, testable and empirically valid approach is the use of case 
studies. Indeed, Gomez and Hsiao (2001) encourage the use of historically-based, 
micro-oriented analysis to understand Chinese entrepreneurship. 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Yin 1994, 13). It is a research 
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strategy that focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
Table 3.1. Relevant situations for different research strategies 
Requires control Focuses on 
Form of research over behavioural contemporary 
Strategy question events? events? 
Experiment how, why yes yes 
Survey who, what, where, no yes 
how many, how 
much 
Archival analysis who, what, where, no yes/no 
how many, how 
- . 
much 
History how, why no no 
Case study how, why no yes 
nd Source: Robert Ym, Case Study Research, 2 ed. (Cahforma. Sage, 1994), 6. 
The analysis of IORs in a case study context is the main outcome of this 
research. The main sources of data for the case studies are interviews, observation 
and source documents. Data gathered are both qualitative and quantitative. Data 
analysis takes guidance from the grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 
1967) and is qualitative in emphasis. Theoretically, grounded theory proposes no 
preconceived concepts and theory before going into field and during data gathering. 
In practice, highly inductive and loosely designed approaches are suitable when 
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researchers have plenty of time and are exploring exotic cultures or understudied 
phenomena. When one is interested in better-understood phenomena within a 
familiar culture or subculture, however, a loose, highly inductive design is a waste 
of time (Miles and Huberman 1984, 27). Hence, a theoretical framework was 
constructed (in Chapter 2) as a guide to focus the fieldwork and to construct 
questions for the interviews. This framework is used as a starting point but 
flexibility is adopted in order to take note of: 
• influences not recognised in the literature; 
• interrelationships between variables (interrelationships may not be 
clearly known); and 
• influences that may not have been defined clearly (for example, trust). 
3.2 Research strategy 
· The research design takes into account the theoretical framework as the 
frame of reference for data gathering. The purpose is not only to test the theories, 
but to use the chosen variables as a starting point for asking questions. The role of 
theory development, prior to data collection, is one point of difference between case 
studies and pure grounded theory (Yin 1994, 27). Yin (1994) emphasises that 
theory development as part of the design phase is essential, even if the ensuing case 
study' s purpose is to develop theory. 
The three main stages of the research design are shown in Figure 3 .1. The 
first stage is research strategy. In this stage, methods for selecting cases were 
developed, the collection strategy was formulated and the collection instrument was 
crafted. The second stage is data collection. Triangulation of data and overlap of 
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data collection and analysis are discussed. A pilot study was conducted. Finally, 
data analysis considers the techniques for within-case and cross-case analysis. 
Figure 3.1. Research design for the study of IORs 
RESEARCH ..... DATA ..... DATA 
STRATEGY 
.... 
COLLECTION .... ANALYSIS 
I 
I I 
Selecting cases Data collection methods Within-case Cross-case 
analysis analysis 
•specified population •overlapping collection 
•Theoretical sampling and analysis 
•Multiple collection 
methods 
Collection strategy 
- . 
•Form of relations Pilot study 
•content of relations 
- -
• Levels of analysis 
Crafting instruments 
The case studies are based on a mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
and, hence, should not be confused with qualitative research. The research design 
incorporates elements of qualitative case study, with careful attention to past designs 
of studies relating to networks and business relations. Numazaki (1991) uses the 
case study method and network analysis techniques to study social relations among 
large businesses in Taiwan. He adopts a historical approach to observing how 
business relations are formed. He also takes a structural approach to examining how 
the whole system is shaped and why it took that shape. Numazaki' s first point of 
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analysis is the social relations within the Taiwanese business community. In 
contrast, this study takes the business relations between two ,firms as the first point 
of analysis, without regard to social relations in the first instance. 
The research design is driven by the research question: How and why do 
Chinese firms engage in IORs with other firms? The main objective is the 
understanding of the external relations of a business. The four elements of the 
research strategy are: the choice of sampling units, the content and form of relations, 
the levels of data analysis and the design of the data collection instrument. These 
four elements are discussed in the following sections. 
Theoretical sampling 
A case study does not represent a sample in the statistical sense, where an 
inference is made about a population on the basis of data collected. Rather, the 
object~ve in this research is analytical generalisation, where a previously developed 
theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case 
study. In this sense, the objective is to expand and generalise theory (Yin 1994, 31). 
Case studies, consequently, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and 
not to populations or universes (Yin 1994, 31 ). In this research, sampling is guided 
by the search for contrasts, a requirement in order to classify the analysis and 
achieve the saturation of emergent categories (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The aim is 
not to strive for a representative sample but to identify purposive cases that represent 
specific types of a given phenomenon. This sampling strategy allows the researcher 
to study the range of types rather than determine their distribution or frequency 
(Minichiello et al. 1995, 13). 
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The goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases that are likely to replicate 
or extend the emergent theory (Eisenhardt 1989, 537). Multiple cases, therefore, are 
not analogous to multiple respondents in a survey (Parkhe 1993, 34). Multiple cases 
are considered as one would consider multiple experiments, that is, following 
'replication' logic. The logic implies that each case predicts similar results (a literal 
replication) or produces contrasting results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical 
replication) (Yin 1994, 45-46). 
The Philippines is the focus because no such study has been done. Chapter 1 
has outlined the important studies on Chinese economic activities. Several scholars 
have investigated the economic position of the Chinese in the Philippines (Hicks and 
Redding 1982; Palanca 1995; Yoshihara 1985). Limlingan (1986) attempted to 
explain their success by referring to their business strategies but did not study their 
networks. Roman et al. (1996) studied Chinese firms in Manila, looking at their 
internal management controls rather than external relationships. Omohundro (1981) 
conducted a detailed and illuminating study on Chinese business and culture in 
Iloilo, a small province south of Manila. 
The three criteria for case selection of Chinese owned firms in the 
Philippines were size, age, and industry. The ranking of the top 5000 corporations 
of the Philippines was used as the size cut-off (no case firm ranks below this, except 
for the pilot study). The researcher obtained a mix of manufacturing and service 
businesses to search for contrast. Previous studies have mainly focused on Chinese 
trading firms, particularly those that are small-scale in size (Armstrong and Yee 
2001; Menkhoff 1991; Menkhoff and Labig 1996; Omohundro 1981). 
Larger companies offer a more diverse range of activities to study than small 
firms. Their management structures tend to be more complex. As revenues 
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increase, these companies are better able to employ outsiders in management 
positions. This ability affects their networking behaviour. Another requirement was 
that the firms chosen needed to have been operating for at least five years. The age 
of the firms is meaningful because the history of a company's development is 
significant in understanding how and why it has certain relationships. It also 
becomes possible to investigate changes in strategy and business relations over time. 
Content and form of relations 
In conjunction with choosing the appropriate sampling units, an analyst must 
decide what specific network linkages to investigate. These linkages between 
businesses have both content and form. 
Content refers to the substantive type of relation represented in the 
connection (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982). Hakansson and Snehota (1995, 26) 
identify three different layers of content within a business relationship. These are 
activity links, resource ties and actor bonds. Activity links refer to the technical, 
administrative or commercial activities of a company that can be connected to those 
of another company. Resource ties connect the various resources (technological, 
material, knowledge) of two companies. Actor bonds join actors and influence how 
two actors form their identities in relation to each other. 
Relational form refers to the properties of the connections between pairs of 
actors (dyads) that exist independently of specific contents (Knoke and Kuklinski 
1982). For example, the content of the relationship with a supplier is made up of the 
supply of raw materials to the firm as well as any financing component. Relational 
form simply refers to any equity ties, licensing agreements and other connections 
that might exist between the firms. 
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Levels of analysis 
The third element of the research strategy is the level -of analysis of business 
relations. For this research, the effects of a business relationship are investigated by 
taking into account three levels: the dyad, individual company and third parties 
(Hakansson and Snehota 1995, 27). These case studies, in effect, employ an 
embedded design because multiple levels of analysis are present within a single 
study (Eisenhardt 1989, 534). 
The primary level of analysis is the dyad: the one-to-one relationship of the 
case study firm to another firm. Some questions that are explored are: 
• what resources are exchanged between the two companies? 
• what activities do they share in common? 
• what novel combinations of activities emerge as a result of their 
business relationship? 
A second level of analysis is the function for the individual company. What 
are the costs and benefits of the relationship for a particular company? Finally, the 
effects on third parties, such as the case study firm's competitors, are also 
investigated. 
Crafting instruments 
An interview guide was prepared based on Larson (1992) (Appendix A). 
The three sections of the guide cover questions on the form and content of relations. 
The interviews were focused on the issues central to the research objective, but the 
type of questioning and discussion allowed for greater flexibility than does the 
survey-style interview. The interviews are characterised as semi-structured 
interviews, which ask each subject the same questions but not necessarily in the 
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same order. At the initial stages of the interviews, the researcher asks broad, open-
ended questions about the nature and history of the subject's firm. In contrast, 
structured interviews are taken strictly to mean that standardised questions are 
carefully ordered and worded and each research subject is asked exactly the same 
question, in exactly the same order as all other subjects (Minichiello et al. 1995, 63-
65). The guide was tested in a pilot study (SS Sawmill). 
The interview guide served as a list of the general issues to be covered. 
However, the guide did not always determine the order of the conversation. For 
instance, in two case study interviews, the research subjects interviewed the 
researcher first and asked questions about her background. 
3.3 Data collection 
_ The three data collection methods used in this research are interviews, 
obseryations, and archival sources (Figure 3 .2). In order to test for convergence, 
interviews must be triangulated with multiple data sources (Park.he 1993, 23). These 
other sources include archival records and observation. The three methods are 
combined in the same study to highlight different dimensions of the same 
phenomena, to compensate for the shortcomings of each method and to validate the 
findings by examining them from several vantage points (Minichiello et al 1995, 14; 
Park.he 1993, 23). 
The case studies were constructed using input from the three data collection 
methods. The quantitative data consisted of company financial statements, which 
were principally sourced from the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission 
and the Philippine Stock Exchange. The Annual Handbook of the top 7000 
corporations in the Philippines was used as a cross-reference for the financial 
statements. Archival corroboration involved cross-referencing to databases, news 
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clippings, and other reports in the media. Ultimately, case studies stress the holistic 
examination of a phenomenon and they seek to incorporate environmental 
components from the larger context to which these matters may be related 
(Jorgensen 1989). 
Figure 3.2. Triangulation of data for the case studies 
Case studies 
Company visits 
Interviews 
Participant 
observation 
Non-participant 
observation 
Interviews 
0 
Archival research 
Company archives 
Government archives 
Academic libraries 
Non-government 
organizations 
Philippine Stock 
Exchange 
Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
Other interviews 
Academics 
0 Bankers 
Businesspeople 
Chinese community 
leaders 
Journalists 
Initial interviews in the field were with academics in Manila, in particular 
those connected with the Asian Institute of Management, University of the 
Philippines, De la Salle University, Ateneo de Manila University and the University 
of Asia and the Pacific. After about a month in the field, permission was granted to 
conduct a pilot study in a sawmill factory in the city of Bulacan, approximately 
thirty kilometres south of Metro Manila. Interviews were conducted with the 
factory's chief accountant, sales manager and general manager. In the course of 
visits, observations of the premises were also undertaken. The chief accountant kept 
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in close contact with the researcher because she was keenly interested in the study 
and became a good resource for verifying business information. 
Details of the case study firms are discussed in Chapter 5. The firm names 
were all replaced by generic titles. For example, MM Textiles was used to represent 
the firm in the textile industry. Names of respondents were also disguised. However, 
facts relating to the firm's background and current operations were not altered ( such 
as financial statistics, firm location and business activities). Anonymity was 
requested by the informants from the case study firms because all of their companies 
were currently in operation. They were also providing information on critical 
suppliers and customers as well as the firms' operating strategies. 
The main location for participant observation was MM Textiles' head office 
in Manila. In addition, the researcher was also able to visit its two other factory sites 
in Bul~can as well as the joint venture knitting factory in Manila. -· 
Two case studies on Chinese firms and an interview with a Chinese-Filipino 
joint venture company were completed in Manila before going to Cebu. The 
researcher gained access to FF .Food and MM Textiles through her family network. 
The pattern of using one's personal connections to gain access to interviews was 
repeated in Cebu. A former student provided the introduction to JJ Chemical. A 
friend furnished a list of the ten largest Chinese-owned businesses and the names of 
the CEOs. The researcher contacted each one and gained access to three. These 
were GG Shipping, SS Shipping and KK Stores. Interviews were also conducted 
with representatives from other companies, but data were insufficient to construct 
case studies. These companies were a shipping company and a food processing 
factory. 
71 
Local bankers, academics and other business informants were also consulted. 
The President of the Cebu Chamber of Commerce became a good resource. 
Government agencies such as the National Economic and Development Authority 
and the Cebu Investment Promotion Center were also visited and key managers were 
interviewed. Frequent visits were made to the University of San Carlos and the 
University of the Philippines (Cebu) to use their libraries and interview academics. 
Chinese community leaders were helpful and members of the non-
government organizations Kaisa Para sa Kaunlaran and the Philippine-China 
Resource Development Center were also interviewed. The research libraries of the 
Philippine Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission contained 
valuable statistical information. 
_ In all the case interviews, the researcher used the funnelling technique to 
control the flow of information. This is a process of questioning in which questions 
of a general and broad nature were asked at the start of the interview. These initial 
questions, listed in the first section of the interview guide, were designed simply to 
start the informant thinking about the issue in general terms (Minichiello, et al 1995, 
84). Then, as the participants engaged in conversation, the interviewer guided the 
informant's attention towards more specific topics by using questions that focused 
on precise issues in section II of the interview guide. Finally, the interviewer asked 
specific questions directly about the issue being examined ( section III of the 
interview guide) (Minichiello, et al 1995). 
The researcher often used the statement: 'Tell me about how your business 
got started' as a way to open the conversation. By asking informants to reflect upon 
the historical development of their business, the researcher injected a time element 
into the conversation. This approach also aimed to meet another objective of 
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gathering data, namely to discover important milestones in the firm's history. The 
informant's narrative about how his or her business grew (oi ,declined) proceeded in 
this manner. Milestones were recorded and used as reference points for questions 
about who and what the respondent thought were crucial to success or failure during 
that particular event. 
Permission to record was requested at the beginning of each interview. Half 
of the interviewees granted this permission. Interviews were conducted in three 
languages: English, Filipino and Hokkien Chinese. The researcher transcribed the 
interviews at the end of the each interview day. Transcripts in Filipino and Chinese 
were translated into English by the researcher at the field sites. The company names 
and interviewees were all disguised at the request of the informants. 
Participant and non-participant observation 
_ Whereas interviews and questionnaires elicit responses from the subjects, the 
researcher can also gather data without asking questions of the respondents by 
observing them in their natural work environment (Sekaran 1992, 215). The 
researcher can either be a nonparticipant observer or a participant observer. 
As a nonparticipant observer, the researcher collects data without trying to 
become part of the organizational system (Sekaran 1992, 216). For example, the 
researcher might sit in the comer of an office and watch and record how various 
customers and suppliers interact with the owner. 
As a participant observer, the researcher enters the organization, actually 
becoming part of the team (Sekaran 1992, 216). For instance, she may enter the 
organization in the role of an employee and observe the dynamics of customer and 
owner interaction. 
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Participant observation is well-suited to studying processes, relationships 
among people and events, continuities over time as well as the immediate socio-
cultural context in which human existence unfolds. It is especially useful for 
scholarly problems where there are important differences between the views of 
insiders as opposed to outsiders (such as ethnic groups and labour unions) 
(Jorgensen 1989, 12). The world of everyday life is, for the methodology of 
participant observation, the ordinary, usual, typical, routine or natural environment 
of human existence. This methodology aims to provide practical and theoretical 
truths about human existence. 
At the site for participant observation, MM Textiles' head office in Manila, 
the researcher was able to assist in tasks such as word processing and answering the 
telephone calls as well as sales assistant duties. It was a good opportunity to observe 
the daily comings and goings in the office and the many problems and situations that 
came up. There was a constant stream of suppliers, delivery people, customers, staff 
and other visitors to the site. Occasionally, the researcher served as a receptionist, 
which gave her a good chance to engage in conversation with people who were 
waiting to see someone in the company. 
In addition, by making field visits to the case study 'sites ', the researcher 
created opportunities for direct, or non-participant, observation. Observations on 
relevant behaviours or environmental conditions served as yet another source of 
evidence in a case study (Yin 1994, 86). 
By going to the sites, the researcher was able to observe the firms ' 
manufacturing and other business activities. The condition of buildings or work 
spaces indicated something about the climate of the organization. Similarly, the 
location of respondents' offices provided information about how accessible they are 
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to others. Some managers did not have a closed office and instead occupied a desk 
within an open-plan work space. Others had a private office away from the rest of 
their staff. 
Period of data collection 
The period of data collection was from 1994 to 1998. Interviews in the field 
were conducted over ten months (June 1996 - March 1997), first in Manila (June-
August), then four months in Cebu (September-December), then back in Manila 
(January to March). The researcher was fortunate to have been able to live with two 
business families, one in Manila and the other in Cebu. The Manila family was 
involved in the textile industry while the Cebu family was engaged in real estate 
development and agricultural commodities trading. The researcher was also able to 
gain access to the Manila family's business as a participant observer for the two 
periods of her stay in Manila. 
Preliminary findings were presented at a conference on Overseas Chinese 
Business Networks at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
Experts in the field were consulted in Singapore, Philippines, Australia, and 
Malaysia. 
Strengths and weaknesses 
A particular advantage of an 'insider' doing research on the ethnic Chinese is 
that the insider is able to gain access to a secretive community. On the other hand, a 
criticism of insider research is the perceived bias in data gathering and 
interpretation. The goal and aim of objectivity is to enable knowledge to be shared. 
The criticism of bias can, therefore, be addressed by providing systematic evidence 
of the actual research methods used to collect and analyse data so that there is some 
possibility of replication (Minichiello et al 1995, 184). 
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Although the insider may be more attuned to the informant's meanings, this 
in itself could present a problem. The insider must guard against assuming a taken-
for-granted stance toward the informants' meanings, languages and concepts. The 
danger is that the researcher might not probe for details that indicate different 
interpretative schemes being used by the informants. To retain the integrity of the 
phenomena, the ethnic researcher must attempt to straddle her insider's perspective 
with her outsider's stance (Minichiello et al 1995, 184). 
The researcher was aware of this dilemma and addressed it in all three phases 
of the research design: strategy, data collection and analysis. First, she interviewed 
a cross section of the business and non-business communities, including bankers, 
journalists, academics, community leaders and representatives of non-government 
organizations. These informants are of Filipino, Spanish and Chinese descent. This 
approach enabled cross-verifying of responses to certain questions and impressions 
about ways of doing business. Second, the data sources are triangulated and 
research methods are also well-documented. Finally, the data analysis method 
applies principles of grounded theory. This approach searches for theory and does 
not assume concepts and constructs from the data prior to analysis. 
3.4 Data analysis 
The procedure for data analysis closely patterns the grounded theory 
approach (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Broadly, the analysis emphasises coding and 
finding patterns. The three goals for coding are to: (1) make sense out of each 
collection, (2) look for patterns and relationships both within a collection, and also 
across collections, and ( c) make general discoveries about the phenomena one is 
researching (Seidel, Friese, and Leonard 1995, ES). 
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The focus of data coding is conceptual specification. The approach used to 
analyse interview data is based on methods used in grounded theory. Grounded 
theory is based on a concept-indicator model, which directs the conceptual coding of 
a set of empirical indicators. The latter are actual data, such as behavioural actions 
and events observed or described in documents and in the words of interviewees and 
informants (Strauss 1987, 25). 
Table 3.3 summarises the three steps in data coding. The first step in the 
process is open coding, defined as the process of breaking down, examining, 
conceptualising and categorising data (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 61). The interviews 
are analysed very closely: line by line and even word by word. The aim is to break 
down and conceptualise the data. The procedure involves transferring interview 
transcripts and field notes to the Ethnograph software, then performing line by line 
coding. 
Table 3.3. The three steps in data coding 
Open Coding 
Breaking do\Vll, 
exam1n1ng, companng, 
conceptualising and 
categorising data 
Output: 
• Developing 
concepts as the 
building blocks of 
theory 
• 
Axial Coding 
Putting the data back 
together in new ways after 
open coding, by making 
connections between 
categories. 
Output: 
Developing each category 
(phenomenon) in terms of: 
(a) the causal conditions 
that give rise to it (b) its 
properties and ( c) the 
context within which it 
operates 
Selective Coding 
Selecting the core 
category, systematically 
relating it to other 
categories, validating 
those relationships, and 
filling in categories that 
need further refinement 
and development. 
Output: 
• Developing a clear 
story line and 
translating this into 
an analytic story 
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The second step, axial coding, moves to a more explanatory level. The aim 
is to produce pattern codes. Finally, selective coding allows the analyst to take 
another step up. The aims are to sort the codes into classes and categories and find 
patterns. 
Open coding 
The initial type of coding done for this research project is open coding 
(Strauss 1987, 28). It is done by scrutinising the field note, interview, or other 
document very closely: line by line, or even word by word. The aim is to produce 
concepts that seem to fit the data. It is the breaking down and conceptualising of 
data (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 63). 
Open coding is grounded in the data on the page as well as on the analyst's 
experience, including her knowledge of the technical literature (Strauss 1987, 29). 
This grounding in both sources of data gets the researcher away from too literal an 
immersion in the materials ( documents, field notes, and interviews) and quickly gets 
her to think in terms of explicit concepts and their relationships. In a sense, it is a 
'conceptual stepping back' that forces the analyst to break the data apart analytically 
and leads to grounded conceptualisation. 
The researcher created a 'start list' of codes prior to coding. Table 3.4 
provides some examples. These codes are structured according to the theoretical 
framework. This structural order makes the codes easy to memorise and use. It also 
facilitates the retrieval and organization of material. 
The next step is to define the codes. Clear, operational definitions are 
indispensable, so that they can be consistently applied by a single researcher over 
time (and by multiple researchers, if needed) (Miles and Huberman 1984, 60). 
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Table 3.5 presents an excerpt of definitions from the list of codes shown in Table 
3.4. 
Finally, line by line coding is performed using the Ethnograph software. 
Table 3.6 shows a page from a case study. Each line is numbered and limited to 40 
characters. At this point, each line is analysed. 
Table 3.4. Illustration of a list of codes 
Company characteristics cc 
CC: Industry CC-IND 
CC: Core business CC-CB 
CC: Stage of development CC-SD 
CC: Ownership CC-OW 
Objective of relationship OB . . 
OB: Efficiency OB-EFF 
OB: Asymmetry OB-ASY 
OB: Reciprocity OB-REC 
OB: Growth OB-GR 
OB: Leaming OB-LRN 
Interorganizational relationship IOR 
IOR-Nature IOR-NAT 
IOR-Duration IOR-DUR 
IOR-Partnership IOR-PSHIP 
IOR-Joint venture IOR-N 
I OR-Subcontracting IOR-SUB 
79 
Table 3.5. Definitions of selected codes from Table 3.4 
Company characteristics 
Industry 
CC-IND 
Core business 
CC-CB 
Objective of relationships 
Efficiency 
OB-EFF 
Reciprocity 
OB-REC 
In terorganizational 
relationship 
Duration 
IOR-DUR 
Subcontracting 
IOR-SUB 
cc 
Specific industry or industries that the 
company operates in 
Core business of the company, as stated 
by CEO, literature; where majority of 
revenue is derived 
OB 
Forming interorganizational relationship 
prompted by efficiency reasons: usually 
least-cost alternative 
Forming interorganizational relationship 
to pursue common or mutually beneficial 
goals or interests. 
IOR 
Indication of how long the IOR has been 
in existence 
Subcontracting relationship between the 
firms 
Table 3.6. An example of open coding using a page from the Ethnograph 
software 
M: In terms of marketing, is it your 
responsibility? 
A: Marketing is a joint effort. 
They have the international 
connections. 
M: So this arrangement seems 
beneficial for both parties. 
A: Well, there are good points but there 
are also bad points. You know how 
the Japanese are, they are quite 
shrewd in business, you have to be 
very careful. 
M: This means that if they can ... 
-A: I'm sure that in the first five years, 
they make a lot of money, because 
they handled all the marketing. 
Because we had no knowledge 
about activated carbon, we did not 
know how to sell. That was our first 
exposure to activated carbon. So for 
the first five years, it was a learning 
stage for us. So the first five years 
all marketing was done by the 
Japanese. So I'm sure they made a 
lot of profit. 
M: Because they controlled the price? 
A: They had control of the price, the 
payment goes to them first, then 
they give us an LC. Of course, they 
put a mark-up on that already. Right 
now, it's equal between us. 
160 
161 
163 J ,o~ - J.A. k-Tq-
164 
165 
167 
168 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
176 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
190 
192 
193 
195 
196 
197 
198 
199 
200 
M: It's already been more than twenty 202 
years. 203 
A: Twenty one years. So as I said the 
first five years is a learning stage for 
us. 
205 
206 
207 
80 
t~NIN~ 
81 
A code, then, is an abbreviation or symbol applied to a segment of words -
in this case, a sentence of transcribed field notes - in order to classify the words. 
Codes are categories. They derive from the research questions, key concepts, and 
important themes. They are retrieval and organizing devices that allow the 
researcher to spot quickly and then cluster all the segments relating to a particular 
question, concept, or theme. Clustering then sets the stage for analysis (Miles and 
Huberman 1984, 56). 
Given a working set of reasonably clear codes that describe the phenomena 
and events that are depicted in transcribed field notes, how can the researcher move 
to a second, more general and explanatory, level? The first step, open coding, is a 
process of summarising segments of data (Miles and Huberman 1984, 67). The next 
step is axial coding. 
Axial _coding 
Axial coding produces pattern codes. These codes group the summaries of 
data produced in the first step into a smaller number of overarching themes or 
constructs. Axial coding has two important functions in this research. First, it 
reduces large amounts of data into a smaller number of analytic units. Second, it 
helps the researcher build a cognitive map for understanding what is happening. 
Axial coding generates four summarisers: themes, causes/explanations, 
relationships among people, and theoretical constructs (Miles and Huberman 1984, 
68). Table 3.7 provides examples of pattern codes derived from the data. Even 
during the initial fieldwork, the researcher is looking for threads that tie bits of data 
together. For example, if two or three informants say independently that personal 
ties are not really important when choosing business partners, this suggests to the 
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researcher that this may be an important variable to check out. This gets her to 
consider other factors that may account for choosing partners: , 
Table 3. 7. Examples of pattern codes produced from axial coding 
Themes: 
PATT (pattern): Selection of business partners seems to depend to a great extent on 
previous experience with the person or firm, whether directly or indirectly. 
Causes/explanations: 
SITE-EXPL (informants' explanations): Price is not the only factor for entering 
into IORs. Other factors cited include access to limited supplies and sharing knowledge. 
Relationships among people: 
NET (personal network): The businessperson's personal network (strong ties) appears 
to be separate from their business network, but occasionally will overlap. 
Theoretical constructs: 
CHANGE (overtime): Long-term business relationships change over time. They may 
become weaker or stronger. 
Selective coding 
In this final step in coding, the researcher is sorting codes into classes and 
categories. She is asking, 'What things are like each other? Does this specific thing 
belong to a more general class?' The analysis is taking another step up, trying to 
locate the event or activity in a more abstractly defined class (Miles and Huberman 
1984, 243). 
Glaser (1967) characterises this step as 'subsuming particulars into more 
general classes'. It is a conceptual and theoretical activity in which the analyst 
shuttles back and forth between first-level data and more general categories. They 
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evolve and develop through successive iterations until the category is 'saturated' 
(new data do not add to the meaning of the general category) (Miles and Huberman 
1984, 223). 
Practically, the researcher used the Ethnograph software as an aid to 
selective coding. Ethnograph was used as a tool to facilitate the analysis of data 
collected. Files consisting of interview transcripts and field notes were created and 
subsequently coded (Table 3.6). This software enabled the 'sorting and sifting' of 
data through its search function. It was then possible to compare and contrast the 
data by searching for coded segments. 
For example, the researcher noted specific statements by informants, such as: 
• 'They gave us access to overseas markets for our products.' 
• 'In the first few years of the relationship, we learned a lot about the 
manufacturing technology.' 
• 'During times of scarce supply, our supplier can give us preferential 
treatinent because we have been doing business with them for a long 
time.' 
These statements can be subsumed into a more general class: There is a 
specific resource need being met by the firm's relationships with other firms, a 
variable that turns out to be very important in explaining the decision to enter into 
long-term relationships or to 'do it themselves'. 
Finding patterns 
As analysis proceeds, the researcher needs to formalise and systematise her 
thinking into a coherent set of explanations. Field research typically has both a 
descriptive and an exploratory function. The researcher wants to depict the local 
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context and what happens within it and to disclose the reasons that determine why 
things happen the way they do (Miles and Huberman 1984, 132). 
Table 3.8 is the 'analytical story' of the process of networking as derived 
from the field data. Table 3 .9 presents a stylised diagram representing the process. 
The three chapters that follow (chapters 5, 6 and 7) use the diagram to organize the 
discussion. 
Table 3.8. The networking process - the analytical story 
An organization faces a series of dynamic opportunities and constraints from its 
environment. What external resources does it need? How does it go about acquiring 
those resources? 
The main story seems to be about how and why businesses have certain relations 
with other firms. Crucial relations change from time to time as the needs of the 
company change. A firm's need for resources, information and technology, for 
instance, changes as it moves through different stages of its development. Smaller 
companies may need access to partners that are different from larger companies' 
needs. 
What determines whether a company decides to undertake an activity on its own or 
engage with outsiders (internalisation vs. subcontracting)? This decision affects the 
kind of action it will take vis-a-vis outsiders, for even if it decides to internalise, 
dependence on outside firms may still occur (e.g. raw materials, finance, 
equipment). The firm undergoes a process of assessing, taking into consideration its 
own competencies and resources. It may also evaluate the cost and benefit of 
particular decisions and take into account its own attitude towards external relations. 
How does a company choose its business partners? In other words, what are the 
antecedents to business ties? Firms used several criteria for choosing a business 
partner, including the partner's business reputation and ethnic background. The 
relationship that results is the firm's interactional strategy and can be characterised 
by the extent, depth, and intensity of the tie. 
Ifit is assumed that arm's-length transactions are pursued solely on the basis of 
price, then what are the consequences of embedded ties? 
Who is important to the company at different stages of its development? Why? 
Table 3.8. A diagram depicting the process of networking 
Antecedents 
• 
• Why network? 
Strategies and 
nature 
• With whom? 
• Why with this 
particular firm? 
• 
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Outcomes 
• Short-term 
• Long-term 
The next chapter presents the context of Chinese business activities in the 
Philippines. The chapter covers two main categories from the theoretical 
framework: (a) government policy and (b) history and cultural traditions. 
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Chapter 4 
The Development of Chinese Business 
In the analysis of the changing economic roles of the Chinese, the historical 
development of institutions cannot be ignored, as business relationships have 
developed in the context of a number of supporting institutions, such as the legal 
framework, financial structures, and the form of entrepreneurship (Sako 1992). To 
understand the behaviour of an organization one must first understand the context of 
that behaviour. 
The objective of this chapter is to provide both a series of snapshots of 
Chinese economic roles in Philippine history and a moving picture in terms of 
analysing changes in these roles over time. It is argued that political and economic 
policies of government administrations are of unquestionable significance in shaping 
patterns of so-called alien enterprises (Yambert 1981 ). The moving picture will also 
highlight the opportunities for and obstacles against business and economic 
development. In essence, this chapter covers two major elements of the theoretical 
framework (Figure 2.2): (a) government policy and (b) history and cultural 
traditions. 
The discussion is organized according to the changing political periods in the 
country. It traces the development of Chinese business in the Philippines, beginning 
with Chinese settlement during the Spanish occupation and the formation of a 
unique system of credit arrangement and economic organization. During the 
American era, Chinese were predominantly traders, though a small number 
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embarked upon the manufacture of soap, shoes, and cigarettes. After the 
interruption of the Second World War, the Philippine goverinnent began a program 
of economic nationalism, with the aim of restricting alien (mainly Chinese) 
involvement in economic activities. A more outward-oriented outlook emerged 
during the 1960s, followed by a period of liberalisation and decentralisation in the 
1980s through to the 1990s and 2000. Case interviewees were in strong agreement 
in acknowledging two events as turning points in Chinese business development: (a) 
the enactment of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law in the late 1950s and (b) the 
granting of citizenship to aliens in 1975. The chapter also addresses the question of 
the identity of the Chinese in the Philippines. 
4.1 Humble beginnings 
The Chinese have been trading with the Philippines since the thirteenth 
century (Fenner 1985; Omohundro 1981; Wickberg 1965). Merchants frequented 
the archipelago to exchange porcelain, pottery, silk and bronze for Philippine 
products (Yoshihara 1985). However, it was not until the Spanish occupation that 
they settled there permanently (Fenner 1985). 
Spanish arrival in the Philippines 1n the 1560s expanded business 
opportunities. Ship owning merchants in Fujian province profited from the newly 
developing Manila Galleon trade between the Philippines and Mexico. Chinese 
goods were shipped to Manila, there to be loaded for markets in Mexico. On the 
return voyage, silver was brought to Manila, whereupon traders took it to China in 
repayment for the luxury goods they had brought (Wickberg 1965). 
Early migration 
The Chinese, known to the Spanish as sangleys (from the Hokkien word 
__ sengli, meaning 'trade'), began to migrate to the archipelago after the Spanish 
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arrival. Mostly originating from Fujian province, they were predominantly from the 
vicinity of the cities of Amoy (now Xiamen) and Jinjiang, formerly known as 
Ch'uanchou (Amyot 1973). In the mid-1840s, the size of the Chinese community 
stood at 5,736, representing no more than O .14 per cent of the total Philippine 
population (Wickberg 1965). 
From around the early 1830s, Spain's policy toward Chinese immigration 
and settlement underwent a fundamental revision. Basically, the change was from a 
policy of limiting new immigration and restricting the activities of Chinese already 
in the country to one of openly encouraging immigration, easing restrictions, and 
providing attractive opportunities for profit. In the 1903 census the Chinese 
population appeared as 41,035, slightly over one per cent of the total Philippine 
population. The tremendous growth in the size of the community was brought about 
by increased immigration, which generally assumed two forms: coolie-broker and 
kinship-based (Wickberg 1965). 
Coolie-broker immigration developed after 1870 in response to the demands 
of foreign business houses in the Philippines. Coolie immigrants might have 
initially worked as part of labour gangs, or perhaps as corredores (house-to-house 
vendors). In the latter case, there was some hope of improving one's condition. A 
corredor working for a cabecilla (wholesale merchant) could often save enough 
money over a few years' time to enable him to open a chucherias (variety store) or 
textile shop of his own, often in partnership with another ex-corredor. Or a 
newcomer might be used by his cabecilla as a stock clerk, with an opportunity to 
move up the business and eventually, having learned what he needed to know, to go 
out on his own (Wickberg 1965). The coolie-broker system was also used widely in 
Singapore, where it was known as kheh-tau (Hwang 1976). 
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Kinship immigration appears to have followed a general pattern not only in 
the Philippines but also in Singapore and Malaya (Hwang 1976). Once a Chinese 
had established a foothold in the Philippines and achieved a modest measure of 
success, he sent for, or else returned to China and brought back, a teen-aged son or 
nephew. Eventually, other relatives, usually adolescents, came over in the same 
way, until a kind of fragmentary family - usually minus females - existed in the 
Philippines. Younger members could be used as agents or operators of branch 
stores. Otherwise, they might be kept in the original family store and apprenticed as 
clerks or, with sufficient educational background, used as bookkeepers (Wickberg 
1965). Those who had migrated under the kinship-based system were initially 
dependent on their kinsmen for employment and financial aid. Others who came as 
free immigrants also sought help from their kinsmen and relatives from time to time 
(Hwang 1976). 
Three broad economic systems were identified after the establishment of 
Spanish rule over the archipelago (Wickberg 1965). The first was the 'W estem' 
economy, whose major interest was speculation in the Manila Galleon trade. The 
'native' economy was locally oriented and of a subsistence character. The majority 
of Filipinos were part of an agriculturally based socioeconomic system in which 
market forces had little relevance (Carroll 1965, 24): Finally, the 'Chinese' 
economy included maritime trading between China and the Philippines, artisanry 
and the provision of goods to the Spaniards (Wickberg 1965). 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the restriction that forced Chinese to live in 
the vicinity of Manila was removed. The Philippine governor-general's decree of 
1839 gave the Chinese 'complete liberty to choose the occupation that best suits 
them', whatever their place of residence (Wickberg 1965, 52). The doors to the 
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provinces were now wide open. They subsequently fanned out to all parts of the 
Philippines as buyers of crops, distributors for importers based in Manila, 
entrepreneurs, and craftsmen. In the process they added permanent stores to many 
local economies previously restricted to periodic markets (Doeppers 1972, 103-104). 
In contrast to the 'old Chinese economy' (pre-1850), the 'new Chinese 
economy' during the Spanish period assumed new forms and extended its 
geographical reach (Wickberg 1965). Table 4.1 contrasts these two systems. At the 
end of the Spanish period, Chinese became, on their own account, importers of 
European goods and exporters of cash crops to world markets. 
Table 4.1. Chinese economic roles during the Spanish regime 
-
Old Chinese economy New Chinese economy 
• pre-1750 to 1850 • from 1850 to 1898 
-· 
• maritime traders • most important new activity was 
that of commercial agent, or 
• provisioners and retail dealers in middleman: 
urban settlements 
collected produce for export • 
• distributors of Chinese imports in • acted as wholesalers of 
the areas adjacent to Spanish imported goods, distributing 
settlements them in the provinces 
• processors of Philippine products 
• artisans in both Spanish settlements 
and native communities 
Source: Edgar Wickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1965), 63. 
Credit arrangements and economic organization 
Wickberg (1965) argues that three sets of preconditions made the Chinese 
successful in their role as middlemen during the Spanish period. First, they had the 
right combination of patience, adaptability, pioneering spirit, . economic 
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sophistication and organization to be markedly successful distributors and 
purchasing agents. Second, liberalised travel and residence laws provided the 
Chinese commercial agents with needed access to the provinces. Third, they had 
long-term dependable financing and effective economic organization. 
It was doubtful that there was much capital available within the Chinese 
community in the pre-1850 period. Few enterprises were sufficiently lucrative. One 
could borrow at six per cent from the Chinese 'community chests', but after 1755 
these funds were not large. Outside the community, individual Spaniards provided 
venture capital to some Chinese in the middle and late eighteenth century. But there 
appeared to have been nothing systematic or organized about this practice. In the 
pre-nineteenth century there were no banks but during the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century a few private banking businesses were initiated in Manila. It is 
not known whether they lent to Chinese (Wickberg 1965). 
One source of funds for the Chinese was the European and North American 
entrepreneurs in Manila, who gave advances to Chinese wholesalers to help them 
dispose of European imports and to buy up produce for export. Another source was 
the Banco Espanol-Filipino de Isabel II. European firms became guarantors for 
Chinese borrowers from the bank, forwarding their payments to the bank, and 
assuming responsibility for settlement with the bank in case the Chinese defaulted 
(Wickberg 1965, 69-70). 
For Chinese dealers who concentrated entirely on distributing or retailing 
imports, obtaining goods on credit was more important than access to cash loans. A 
European or American firm usually advanced imported goods to Chinese dealers in 
an interesting credit system that worked as follows. A Chinese dealer would ask one 
of the merchant firms for a rather modest amount of goods on credit of perhaps three 
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to six months' term. As soon thereafter as possible, he made a token repayment of a 
portion of the debt, and then asked for a larger advance. Again, only part of this was 
repaid, and additional credit secured. The process continued in this fashion, so that 
some Chinese dealers were constantly in debt to foreign firms (Wickberg 1965, 70). 
From the point of view of the Chinese, a system of constant indebtedness 
bound the creditor to him and ensured the future availability of credit on the 
assumption that only in this way could the total investment be regained. From the 
European merchant's point of view, this system was stable only so long as it was the 
only way to deal with Chinese middlemen, and so long as Chinese business defaults 
were kept to a reasonable minimum (Wickberg 1965, 71). 
No less important than financing was economic organization. The most 
char_acteristic element of this was the cabecilla system. A cabecilla was usually a 
large wholesaler of imported goods and export produce. -Ordinarily, he was 
established in Manila, where he dealt with the foreign business houses. He was apt 
to have several agents located in the provinces, running stores as retail outlets for the 
imported goods he had acquired, at the same time buying up crops for the cabecilla. 
The cabecilla assisted his agents by extending them a line of credit, all the while 
keeping this relationship confidential (Wickberg 1965, 72). 
The cabecilla-agent relationship offered a number of advantages to all 
parties concerned. The foreign merchant could be assured that by dealing with a 
cabecilla who had numerous agents, his imported goods would receive the broadest 
possible distribution. A wide network of purchasing agents would funnel Philippine 
produce to him in return. To the cabecilla, this system provided a broad scale for 
his operations. The agent, too, found this system advantageous. Usually he had 
neither the capital nor the access to credit to start his own business. These he could 
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get from the cabecilla, who started him in business, kept him supplied with 
whatever he needed, and provided a sure outlet for the pr"oduce the agent bought 
(Wickberg 1965, 74). 
The system was also beneficial to consumers and producers. The agent's 
store, most often a general merchandise store called tienda de sari-sari, was 
established in market towns. Unlike the periodic markets held in these towns once 
or twice per week, the Chinese sari-sari store was open all the time. Another 
consumer advantage was the readiness of the Chinese to offer credit to his 
customers. From the producer's point of view, the Chinese store was also an 
improvement over previous marketing systems. As early as the 1780s producers of 
export crops had been receiving cash advances from agents of the Royal Philippine 
Company and mestizo2 (Filipinos of mixed-blood) wholesalers. The Chinese 
storekeeper continued this practice. Because he also had something to sell, a 
producer who needed supplies rather than cash could barter with him, which would 
take the form of credit at the Chinese store instead of cash advances against crops 
(Wickberg 1965, 74). 
A system similar to the cabecilla was also observed in Java around the same 
period (Willmott 1960). Chinese middlemen in Java not only supplied urban centres 
with food but, as native production was accommodated to an export crop economy, 
they also transported local produce to bulking and shipping centres for eventual 
export as well as distributing imported manufactured products throughout the whole 
economy. 
2 The term mestizo is broadly used to refer to Filipinos of mixed Malay and other blood. They are 
products of intermarriage of the Malay Filipinos with the Chinese, Spaniards, Americans and other 
_ _ foreigners (Reynolds 1964, 3). 
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In the years after 1860, Western imports continued to be funnelled through 
the Manila cabecilla system, but prominent Chinese in Cebu City established their 
own export cabecillas. The cabecilla based in Cebu City dealt directly with the 
representatives of the leading foreign commercial houses, accepting cash advances 
in order to collect goods from the countryside and deliver them to the firms . Thus, 
the Chinese cabecilla system created a commercial link between the port and the 
countryside (Fenner 1985). 
The tax figures for the Cebu Chinese community in 1896 not only provide a 
more precise picture of the occupational nature of the community but also indicate 
the wide range of economic activities present in the port area (Table 4.2). In 
contrast to the majority of the immigrants who were labourers, a small number of 
Chinese had become artisans and merchants. 
In the late nineteenth century, Chinese began to carry on new sets of 
economic functions in the Philippines as well as elsewhere in Southeast Asia. 
Though European settlements often were little more than trading ports and entrepots 
for transhipment of luxury goods, their inhabitants required food and urban services 
that the Chinese provided. Seaborne trade in precious commodities remained their 
principal occupation, but the Chinese also devoted themselves to artisanry and local 
level trade. Their roles as local middlemen represented a change from their previous 
position as long distance traders (Yambert 1981, 184). Chinese commercial 
middlemen, ·or compradors, occupied a position subordinate to the big European 
companies of the colonial era in Southeast Asia. Since the end of colonial rule, the 
economic roles of the Chinese have been changing and they have been able to 
diversify their occupations and economic strength in the Philippines, as in the rest of 
the region (Mackie 1992). 
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Table 4.2. Tax figures for the Cebu Chinese community, 1896 
Taxpayer Percentage of 
Classification Chinese Occupations 
First class 2% Owners and operators of stores that sold 
textiles, thread, silk, books, or European 
luxury goods 
Second class 5% Operators of small textile stores that sold 
piece goods, operators of hardware stores, 
pharmacists, candle-makers, bakers and 
blacksmiths 
Third class 1.5% Grocers, silversmiths, shoemakers, 
carpenters, tanners and manufacturers of 
soap 
Fourth class 5% Owners of candy shops, slaughterhouses, 
furniture shops or Chinese restaurants 
- . 
Fifth class 86.5% Unskilled labourers, performing the heavy 
manual work on the docks or wharves 
Source: Bruce Fenner, Cebu under the Spanish Flag: 1521-1896. (Cebu City: San Carlos 
Publications, 1985), 112-113. 
To summanse, the Chinese in the Philippines were able to expand their 
economic influence because of three factors: liberalised Spanish policies, new 
opportunities offered by the new export crop economy, and Chinese business 
methods. Of the three, the last was perhaps the most decisive, as liberalised Spanish 
policies and new export products offered new opportunities to various groups, not 
only the Chinese (Wickberg 1965). 
4.2 The American period (1898-1941) 
At the close of the nineteenth century, the majority of Filipinos were part of 
an agriculturally based socioeconomic system in which, for those below the landlord 
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class, market forces had little relevance. In 1902, only sugar milling and cigar and 
cigarette manufacturing employed more than 10,000 workers each. Factories and 
larger workshops in all other manufacturing industries together employed less than 
25,000 (Carroll 1965). The Chinese were starting to make their presence felt in 
manufacturing during the American era, but were second to the Americans in 
business investment. The economy went through a growth and decline cycle, but 
positive economic policies of the American administration had a beneficial impact 
on business activity. 
Economic development 
The growth of the Philippine economy was attributed to its increasing 
integration into the Western marketplace, a process that began in the mid-19th 
century and was strengthened in the early 20th century by free trade with the United 
States. A number of policies of the American government influenced the economic 
environment of the Philippines in general. Policies were introduced that instituted 
the rule of law, emphasised capitalist doctrines, implemented economic reforms, 
promoted infrastructure projects, and tolerated organizational mobilisation. In other 
words, the overall policy settings of a level playing field and private enterprise 
benefited all players, Chinese included (Wong 1994). 
The development of Philippine manufacturing since 1902 through to 193 9 
was characterised by ( a) the bulk of investments going to export-oriented industries, 
most of which were regionally concentrated in Manila, (b) sugar emerging as the 
leading industry, and ( c) a scale of production that was limited to the household 
level of operation (Valdepefias and Bautista 1977). Up until the 1920s, 
manufacturing in general was confined to small shops that produced barely enough 
to meet the immediate and local wants of the inhabitants. From a total value of 
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about 2 million Philippine Pesos (PhP) in 1900, exports rose to over 128 million PhP 
in two decades (Bureau of Commerce and Industry 1924). Throughout this period, 
traditional exports such as sugar, abaca, tobacco and coconut products comprised 76 
per cent to 93 per cent of the total export value (Valdepefias and Bautista 1977). 
The Chinese community was smaller than elsewhere in Southeast Asia, both 
1n absolute terms and in relation to the indigenous population. Its provincial 
homogeneity and the concomitant dominance of the Hokkien speech group were not 
found elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Lineage, hometown, surname, commerce, trade, 
cultural, and political associations created a network of social and economic 
relationships among the Chinese (Wong 1994). Their business activities in 
manufacturing, commerce, finance, and transport are discussed below. 
Chinese business investment 
Chinese investment in manufacturing was mainly in rice-milling and liquor 
(Shozo 1939). In industries such as tobacco processing and footwear making, 
investments and production capacity were small (Wong 1994). Although they were 
not permitted to engage directly in the cultivation of rice, the Chinese were 
extremely important in the milling and marketing end of the rice industry. Another 
area of involvement was the lumber industry (Jensen 1975). As early as 1901 , 
Chinese operated 21 out of 46 lumber mills. In 1935, there were 204 lumber yards, 
out of which 148 were owned and operated by Chinese (Alip 1974). They also 
participated in the desiccated coconut, Manila hemp, and sugar industries (Jensen 
1975). There were also entrepreneurs involved in smaller-scale businesses such as 
candy factories and bakeries, leather production (mainly preparation of raw hides 
and skins), cigar box manufacturing, soap making and aerated water factories 
(Bureau of Commerce and Industry 1924). 
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Foreign trade in the Philippines mainly involved exporting agricultural 
products in a raw or semi-raw form and the importation of manufactured goods. The 
main trade was carried on through a small number of large commercial houses, most 
of which were American. Chinese constituted the most important agents in retail 
distribution in the country. Cotton textiles have been the single largest import of the 
Philippines, and the Chinese were the most important retailers of textiles. It has 
been observed that they always kept prices just a little below those prevailing in 
non-Chinese shops, but rarely attempted to cut each other's prices (Jensen 1975). 
The Chinese commercial structure during this period has been characterised 
as a tight network, embracing everything from traders down to village general stores 
and peddlers. The storekeepers who lived in the villages and the itinerant peddlers 
who made regular rounds started by selling Filipinos the necessities of life. These 
were usually imported goods or Chinese manufactured products. Being in constant 
contact with Filipinos, they extended them considerable credit. This was not limited 
to sales on credit, but included small cash loans. Repayment was received in kind, 
such as rice, coconut oil, vegetables, or chicken. These goods were then supplied to 
exporters or consumers. Therefore, profit was made by supplying goods to both 
Filipinos and middlemen (Shozo 1939). 
Flores (1987b) asserts that during the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese merchants 
excelled most as retail traders. Humble sari-sari stores directly served the localities, 
while various specialty stores ( dry goods, rice dealers, grocery shops) enlivened the 
calles (or streets) of colonial Manila. Among the large hardware houses of the 
American years were the Yutivo Sons Hardware founded by Don Jose Palanca Yu 
Ti Vo and the older Mariano Uy Chaco Hardware. Chua Farruco and Don Mariano 
Velasco Chua Chengco operated the biggest Chinese bazaars in the city. Their 
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merchandise ranged from Viennese furniture to galvanised iron for roofing and fine 
Chinese silks. Rivals in the alcohol trade were Don Carlos Palanca of La Tondefia 
Distillery and Lim Chay Seng of Disteleria Limtuaco (Flores 1987b ). 
While still a young man, Dee C. Chuan had become known as the 'lumber 
king'. He operated a large sawmill, possessed logging concessions in the provinces, 
and was the country's single biggest lumber exporter. By the time he was thirty 
years old, he was elected president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the 
youngest president in the Chamber's history. A year later, in 1920, he spearheaded 
the group that founded the China Banking Corporation (Flores 1987a). Another 
bank started by Chinese capitalists was the Mercantile Bank of China (Shozo 1939). 
It was unfortunate that whereas the China Banking Corporation was able to 
successfully weather the financial crisis of 1931, the Mercantile Bank of China 
succumbed to the Depression (Jensen 1975). 
The Chinese had their own vessels for inter-island navigation, but the scale 
was not significant. Most shipping was combined with trading concerns (Shozo 
1939). By 1937, the Chinese Consul-General estimated the total investments of 
Chinese at 201 million PhP (Table 4.3). 
Another prominent Chinese businessman during the American era was 
Guillermo Cu-Unjieng, who founded the Yek Tong Lin Fire and Marine Insurance 
Company in 1906. Don Benito Siy Cong Bieng led the Chinese community as 
Chinese Chamber president for nine years. His business was primarily in import-
export trading. The Li and Go clans, both from Fujian province, were among the 
pioneers of the modem lumber industry (Flores 1987b ). 
Table 4.3. Total investments of Chinese in the Philippines, 1937 
Areas of business 
Retail merchandisin 
Wholesale merchandising 
Lumber 
Bankin and other financial institutions 
Distilleries 
Soa and candles 
Real estate and other investments 
Amount invested 
(in million PhP) 
50 
30 
20 
10 
5 
5 
Source: Irene Jensen, The Chinese in the Philippines during the American Regime: 
1898-1945 (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1975), 129. 
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Americans were also active in the business sphere. Three foreign groups 
dominated the manufacturing of soap: American, Swiss, and Chinese. Americans 
also controlled the Manila hemp industry and desiccated coconut exports. In 
mining, 3 7 per cent of total assets were owned by Americans. Before the outbreak 
of World War II, they had invested approximately 200 million PhP in sugar, 
coconut, abaca plantations, mining, lumber operations and public utility enterprises 
(Jensen 1975). 
The Chinese were quick to recover after World War II. Many Filipinos 
complained that Americans discriminated against them by granting the Chinese 
credit immediately after the war. The head of a large business firm in Manila agreed 
that all the banks in the Philippines showed favouritism towards Chinese and 
Americans immediately after WWII, but maintained that in the light of his own 
experience this was merely sound banking. His firm, in business in the Philippines 
for about fifty years, had done 70 per cent of its 75 million PhP business with 
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Chinese and Americans, losing less than 25,000 PhP in bad debts in the process. 
But in the remaining 30 per cent of the business that had been done with the 
Filipinos, about 200,000 PhP in bad debts had been lost, despite the fact that the firm 
had screened the Filipinos much more closely than it had the Chinese (Appleton 
1960). 
4.3 Osmefia, Magsaysay, Garcia and Macapagal Administrations (1945-1965) 
Three political periods since independence are presented. The first is one of 
electoral democracy that was marked in the 1950s and 1960s by a growth in factory 
manufacture and industrial entrepreneurship, aided by state protection (Pinches 
1996). The second period, rule under Marcos, is associated with 'crony capitalism', 
the expansion of export industries and the growing importance of state technocrats. 
The third period, under Aquino, Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo, is characterised by the 
partial dismantling of' crony capitalism' and a more liberal econc:>mic environment. 
Inward-oriented industrialisation 
Shortly after the Second World War, the Philippine government embarked on 
an import-substitution process, .first under a system of foreign exchange and import 
controls, later behind a substantial tariff wall with liberal tax concessions for 
investment activities. Termed the 'decade of controls' by Carroll (1965), the period 
1950-1960 saw policies utilised to favour Filipino over alien manufacturers and 
one's friends, relatives, and political supporters over all others. The system 
provided an abundance of opportunities for the 'graft and corruption' in the 
relationships between government and business that have been a most prominent 
feature of life in post-war Philippines (Carroll 1965). 
Industrialisation by means of protection for import substitution began in 
1949 when the government imposed import and exchange controls. This stimulated 
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domestic production of consumer good substitutes partly because imported raw 
materials and capital goods needed by these industries were obtained at artificially 
low prices in peso terms. The overall high level of protection created a bias against 
agriculture and export-oriented industries, leading to import substitution and capital-
intensive development (Cabalu 1993). 
In addition to providing these incentives, the Philippine government exerted 
itself in making credit available to prospective industrial entrepreneurs. The policy 
of favouring Philippine citizens over foreigners - and, informally, native-born over 
naturalised citizens - in the distribution of the various forms of government 
assistance tended to increase the incentives for the favoured groups (Carroll 1965). 
A major industrialisation policy had been that of granting subsidies to 'new and 
necessary industries'. The term 'new' had been interpreted as industries that had not 
been commercially exploited in the Philippines before the Second World War. The 
term 'necessary' referred to industries that contributed to industrial and economic 
development. New industries were not only protected from the competition of 
imports of finished manufactures, but were also heavily subsidised by tax exemption 
and foreign exchange allocation. The number of products that had been approved 
for tax exemption by the middle of 1958 amounted to more than two thousand. By 
mid-1958, over 700 firms had been granted tax exemption (Table 4.4). Wide 
administrative discretion was inevitable in assessing qualifications for new and 
necessary industries (Golay 1961 ). 
Filipino and qualified Chinese entrepreneurs were not slow in responding to 
incentives and opportunities such as these. They seemed to have developed a form 
of entrepreneurship far more political in its methods than that which appeared at 
Table 4.4. New and necessary industries granted tax 
exemption, end of June 1958 
Nationality of firm owners Number of firms 
Filipino I 429 
Chinese 144 
Filipino-Chinese 107 
American 22 
Filipino-American 45 
Filipino plus mixed 45 
nationalities 
Unidentified 28 
Firms not including Filipinos 6 
Source: F. Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic 
Development (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961 ), 252. 
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similar stages of development in the Western nations (Carroll 1965). Indeed, the 
growth rates in manufacturing were relatively high in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
The sector's share in total output increased from 7 per cent in 1946 to 25 per cent in 
1960. Industrial growth in this period was mainly oriented towards the domestic 
market and assisted by high rates of effective protection (Vos and Yap 1996). In the 
late 1960s, however, manufacturing was a lagging sector, with a 4.8 per cent annual 
growth rate between 1962 and 1968, compared to 5.3 per cent for net domestic 
product (Lindsey 1976). 
In the relative absence of interest from the landed elite, the manufacturing 
sector of the 1950s remained open to those from humbler origins. Yoshihara (1985) 
found that the Chinese who entered import substitution came primarily from 
amongst the merchants, with a few who were artisans or financiers. Among 
Filipinos, the entry patterns were more varied, with import-substituting 
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manufacturers getting their start in trading, agricultural processing, management of 
other enterprises, the professions and government service (Yoshihara 1985, 124-34). 
It was during this period that one of the case study firms, MM Textiles, began its 
operations. Jose Yu and his father saw the opportunities in manufacturing textiles to 
substitute for imported products. They were also hindered from continuing with 
their trading business due to the restrictive effects of the Retail Trade 
Nationalization Law, to be discussed later. 
In the early post-war era, three old Chinese business families who branched 
out into the assembly and distribution of transport equipment were the Cosetengs 
with Honda Motorcycles, the Lees with Mercedes Benz limousines and the Yus with 
General Motors cars and trucks (Flores 1987 c ). At the beginning of this period, the 
Chinese comprised almost two per cent of the total population, were homogeneous 
and closely-knit, lacked a large proletarian sector and were predominantly located 
(50 per cent) in Manila (Carifio 1998). 
Economic nationalism 
Anti-Chinese legislation has been practised since Spanish times. At times 
the Spaniards tried to restrict Chinese immigrants to farming or labouring, but no 
matter where they started the Chinese soon found their way into commerce. 
Eventually, the Spaniards discovered that the most profitable policy was to permit 
the Chinese to operate, but to tax them heavily (Appleton 1960). A major 
discriminatory act under U.S. Administration was the Bookkeeping Act of 1921 , 
which required merchants doing business in the Philippines to keep accounts in 
English, Spanish or a local dialect (Alip 1959). With the establishment of the 
Philippine Commonwealth in 1934, the pressure for anti-Chinese legislation 
increased. The Commonwealth Constitution itself contains provisions excluding 
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Chinese from owning land, exploiting Philippine natural resources, or operating 
public utilities (Appleton 1960). 
A major policy goal of the Magsaysay administration (1953-1957) was an 
acceleration of economic nationalism in the narrow sense of wresting various lines 
of economic activity from Chinese control. The major legislative move in this 
direction was the Retail Trade Nationalization Law of 1954. If fully implemented, 
the law aimed to dispossess all aliens presently engaged in retailing in the 
Philippines within one generation (Golay 1961 ). Alien firms in the retail trade 
tended to be relatively large (Table 4.5). Some Chinese reacted by moving out of 
retail into wholesaling or manufacturing, while others used dummies or placed their 
businesses in the names of their Filipina wives. Still others took their capital out of 
the country and invested it elsewhere, particularly Hong Kong (Appleton 1960). A 
similar pattern has been observed in Indonesia. There the Chinese extended 
business into areas untouched by mounting government restrictions and so have 
become involved in construction, processing and small-scale manufacturing 
(Y ambert 1981, 193). 
President Carlos Garcia issued the Filipino First Policy on January 25, 1960, 
aimed at allowing Filipinos to obtain major and dominant participation in the 
national economy (Arefio 1997). Other areas of economic policy in which economic 
nationalism has been evident were that governing the exploitation of natural 
resources and the assembly and marketing of agricultural products. Only citizens of 
the Philippines or corporations having at least sixty per cent Filipino ownership were 
permitted to develop agricultural, timber, and mineral lands. A bill providing for the 
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Table 4.5. Retail trade by nationality of trader, 1948 
Value of Gross 
Number of Per assets Per sales Per 
Nationality establishments cent of (million cent of (million cent of 
of trader (thousands) total PhP) total PhP) total 
Filipino 113.6 90 213 67 467 61 
Chinese 12.1 10 93 29 295 38 
Other 0.4 11 4 10 1 
Source: Frank Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development (Ithaca 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), 323. 
nationalisation of trade, milling, and warehousing of rice and com was passed in 
1969 (Rice and Com Industry Nationalization Act), aiming to eliminate alien 
middlemen from the assembly and marketing of agricultural crops. The bill 
provided that aliens presently engaged in retailing and wholesaling rice and com 
could continue in business for two years and in milling and warehousing three years 
(Golay 1961). 
In banking, the Monetary Board ruled that naturalised citizens were 
forbidden to own any portion of newly established banks. The intent of the ruling 
was to construct a legal barrier against Chinese, since the bulk of applicants for 
naturalisation was of Chinese descent (Hutchcroft 1993). This ruling was eventually 
relaxed in 1965 and 20 to 30 per cent ownership by naturalised Filipinos was 
allowed. 
An important aspect of Filipino economic nationalism has been the 
reluctance of the Philippines to promote economic assimilation of aliens. Philippine 
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naturalisation policy was strict and reflected a determination to prevent any abuse or 
misuse of acquired citizenship. There were numerous requirements for 
naturalisation, including the length of residency in the country, minimum value of 
real estate holdings, language competency and schooling of children. As an 
illustration, consider the case of a Chinese applicant whose nine children attended 
government approved schools in the Philippines as required by the naturalisation 
laws, except for one who lived in China and was attending an English school. 
Failure of the one child to meet the schooling requirement was enough to defeat the 
application of the petitioner (Golay 1961 ). Many Chinese businessmen found ways 
to survive without Philippine citizenship. Some used the names of relatives who 
were Philippine citizens for registering the business; others changed their line of 
business while some transferred their investments elsewhere. 
The Chinese outside Manila 
In a study of the Chinese in three Philippine provincial cities (Dagupan, 
Dumaguete and Davao), Doeppers (1972) gives us a glimpse of Chinese business 
outside Manila. The Chinese consistently dominated the retail trade in Davao, 
Dagupan and Dumaguete cities. Dry goods stores were principally run by Chinese, 
which, according to Doeppers, was the result of a historical situation that dated from 
the early nineteenth century or even earlier when the Chinese became the 
distributors of cloth manufactured in England. 
Hardware stores throughout the country were typically run by ethnic 
Chinese. This position was an outgrowth of the historical relationship between the 
Chinese distributors and the English, American, and Japanese manufacturers of 
tools, pumps and engines (Doeppers 1972). 
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In these three provincial cities, business and residential location of the 
Chinese was virtually synonymous. In all cases documented in the three cities, 
Chinese lived above or in their place of business (Doeppers 1972, 133). 
Profits by Chinese merchants in Capiz were deposited in Chinese-owned 
banks in Manila. The ability to periodically borrow large amounts within a short 
period of time made it practical for the Chinese to operate within the sphere of 
Chinese banks (Yengoyan 1983, 119). 
Minority within a minority 
The Cantonese formed the principal minority group within the Philippine 
Chinese community. In provincial cities, they were principally found as bakers, 
cooks, managers of restaurants and grocers. The average Cantonese social standing 
in provincial cities, as in Manila, tended to be lower than that of the Hokkien. The 
big c;:hinese businesses in commodities, logging, distributing;. and retailing were 
Hokkien. Nevertheless, while Cantonese in various cities have been successful in 
generally modest businesses, a few Cantonese have achieved considerable success 
(Doeppers 1972; See 1988). 
Trade, employment and business patterns moulded different lifestyles among 
the Hokkien and Cantonese immigrants. Most Cantonese were in the service trades 
and worked as craftsmen. They were dominant in the restaurants, hotels and 
laundries in Manila's Chinatown district. Many of them worked as cooks, waiters, 
typesetters, tailors, bakers and carpenters (See 1981 ). 
The Cantonese went to particular cities because of specific contacts. The 
typical young Cantonese migrant described by Doeppers (1972, 119-120) 
immediately begins to learn one of the 'Cantonese' occupations ( e.g. cooking and 
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restaurant management) while in the employ of a cousin in Manila. Doeppers 
writes: 
After a decade or more the immigrant learns of an opportunity to 
manage a restaurant business in a provincial city for a different cousin. 
Having saved for years, he accumulates and borrows sufficient capital 
to open his own restaurant and a small second floor hotel. If he has no 
sons, he sends to Manila for a nephew to come carry some of the 
burden of work. This pattern of migration, occupational training, and 
system of family contacts has been often repeated (Doeppers 1972, 
119-120). 
4.4 Outward oriented industrialisation (Marcos Administration, 1965-1986) 
Late in the 1960s and in the following decade, there was a shift towards a 
more outward-looking strategy. Under Marcos, the administration tried to pursue a 
policy of greater export-orientation and liberalisation. These policy goals were 
undermined, however, by the availability of cheap foreign loans that Marcos used to 
fuel a 'debt-powered' strategy of growth (Rivera and Koike 1995, 1). Pricing and 
regulatory interventions by the government fostered rent-seeking activities by 
special interest groups (also known as Marcos 'cronies') (Cabalu 1993). The main 
source of growth was external in origin, mainly through a massive loan inflow. The 
existing protectionist regime was further bolstered when non-tariff barriers became 
more restrictive. Monopolies in various sectors of the economy ( such as coconut 
and sugar trading, beer, construction, and large department stores) were enjoyed by 
Marcos's closest associates. By 1983, a balance of payments crisis led to the 
suspension of the trade liberalisation program initiated by Marcos (Rivera and Koike 
1995). The economy went into recession and the years following 1983 saw a 
massive outflow of private sector foreign exchange holdings (Vos and Yap 1996). 
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AA Plastics' founder was encouraged to go into manufacturing in the 1960s. 
During this time, they were the only manufacturer of acrylic plastic in the 
Philippines and, with no foreign competition, controlled product pricing. AA's 
business flourished in this era, as did MM Textiles and JJ Chemical. AA and MM 
belonged to the import substituting industrial segment while JJ was involved in 
export. 
Chinese economic position 
Yoshihara's study of the top 250 manufacturing companies of the Philippines 
1n 1968 classified these companies in terms of foreign and domestic ownership 
(Table 4.6). Of the 250 companies, 87 were foreign-owned and 163 domestic. Of 
the 163 domestic companies, 80 were owned by Chinese and 83 by Filipinos 
(Yoshihara 1985). According to Yoshihara, the most common entry pattern into 
import-substitution manufacturing was from trading. Chine_se entrepreneurs in 
manufacturing were aln1ost without exception merchants. Among Filipino 
companies, 3 were owned by government organizations, 48 (or 58 per cent) were 
family companies, and 32 were non-family companies. The proportion of family 
companies was greater in the case of Chinese companies. Of the 80 Chinese 
companies in the sample, 68 ( or 85 per cent) were family companies. 
Japanese investment in the Philippines increased significantly during this 
period. Total investment increased from 0.40 million USD in 1970 to 12.90 million 
USD in 1972 and 62.59 million USD in 197 5 (Tsuda 1978). Among the leading 
Chinese business partners of Japanese companies were Alfonso Yuchengco, Patricio 
Lim and Emerson Coseteng (Table 4.7). 
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Table 4.6. Ownership of the top 250 manufacturing companies in the 
Philippines, by nationality, 1968 
Number of firms Percentage of firms 
Filipino- Filipino-
Industry Chinese Filipino Foreign Chinese Filipino 
Food 15 25 21 24.6% 41.0% 
Beverages 3 3 2 37.5% 37.5% 
Tobacco 9 1 2 75.0% 8.3% 
Textiles 17 12 5 50.0% 35.3% 
Pulp and paper products 5 3 2 50.0% 30.0% 
Rubber products 4 0 3 57.1% 0.0% 
Chemicals 6 10 25 14.6% 24.4% 
Petroleum products 0 0 4 0.0% 0.0% 
Non-metallic 
mineral products 3 10 3 18.8% 62.5% 
Metals 11 8 8 40.7% 29.6% 
Machinery, equipment 
and components 3 3 7 23.1% 23.1% 
Transport equipment 3 3 2 37.5% 37.5% 
Electrical appliances 1 4 3 12.5% 50.0% 
Other 0 1 0 0.0% 100.0% 
Source: Kunio Yoshihara, Philippine Industrialization (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 1985), 38-39. 
Foreign 
34.4% 
25.0% 
16.7% 
14.7% 
20.0% 
42.9% 
61.0% 
100.0% 
18.8% 
29.6% 
53.8% 
25.0°1o 
37.5% 
0.0% 
Table 4.7 Leading Chinese-Filipino partners in major Japanese-Filipino 
joint ventures, 1976 
Firms with connection to 
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Leading partners leading partners Japanese partner firm 
Alfonso Yuchengco Pan Malayan Insurance Mitsubishi 
Philippine Fuji-Xerox Mitsui 
Rizal Commercial Banking Sanwa 
Corporation 
Super Industrial (Hi-Dai ' ei; Sanwa 
Hi-Daiwa; Hi-Eisai; House 
of Investments) 
Patricio Lim Filsyn Sanwa, Mitsui 
Emerson Coseteng Mariwasa-Honda Honda, Mitsubishi 
Porcelana-Mariwasa Toyota 
-
Source: Mamoru Tsuda. A Preliminary Study of Japanese-Filipino Joint Ventures (Quezon City: 
Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978). 
Alien Naturalization Law 
A positive development for the Chinese community under Marcos was the 
passing of the Alien Naturalization Law. Under the mass naturalisation programme 
of 197 4, Chinese were given the opportunity to apply for Filipino citizenship. 
Eusebio Wu of JJ Chemical remarked: 
This has changed the nature of finance. It's now easier to borrow 
money from the banks, because with collateral these institutions will 
lend you money quite easily. Larger sums can now be borrowed 
because of the real estate boom. 
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4.5 Liberalisation and deregulation (Aquino, Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo 
Administrations, 1986-2003) 
After an initial spurt of manufacturing activity 1n the 1960s, industrial 
growth began to stagnate. Between 1961 and 1987, the proportion of total 
employment in manufacturing dropped from 12 to 10 per cent. In addition, the 
manufacturing sector's share in GDP barely moved between 1972 and 1988 (Rivera 
and Koike 1995). 
In the post-Marcos era, starting with the Aquino administration and 
continuing under Presidents Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo, industrial reform has 
focused on liberalising, deregulating and privatising the economy. A major 
economic policy has included the privatisation of government-owned and controlled 
corporations (GOCCs). Several Chinese businessmen have taken advantage of the 
opportunities afforded by privatisation by investing in these GOCCs. PR Holdings, 
- . 
controlled by Lucio Tan, bought a majority share in Philippine Air Lines in 1992. 
The country's largest ship repair facility was privatised with the majority of equity 
purchased by a consortium which included Henry Sy. John Gokongwei Jr. has 
obtained a stake in the country's largest oil exploration company, Oriental 
Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (Rivera and Koike 1995). 
A complementary policy pursued by the Ramos administration was the 
liberalisation and deregulation of key sectors of the economy, including 
telecommunications, energy, banking and shipping. The leading Chinese 
businessman In telecommunications IS John Gokongwei Jr. (Digital 
Telecommunications Philippines). In the energy sector, the Lopez and Gokongwei 
families have jointly invested in power generation. The banking sector was opened 
to more foreign participation and the inter-island shipping industry became 
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accessible to new operators and investors. Greater trade liberalisation will see tariff 
reduce from levels of 30 per cent to less than 10 by year 2-004 (Rivera and Koike 
1995). 
Liberalising policies presented both opportunities and threats to the case 
firms studied. Initially, most saw these policies as detrimental not only to profits but 
even to their own survival. Several had been beneficiaries of protectionism in the 
past. The manufacturing businesses, AA Plastics, · MM Textiles, and JJ Chemical, 
benefited from tariff rates imposed on imports competing with their product lines. 
The two shipping companies were for many years protected from new entrants to the 
industry due to government regulation. KK Stores was also protected from foreign 
competition by restrictions on the foreign ownership of retailing businesses. 
4.6 - The Philippine financial market 
The Philippine financial system has a strongly dualistic -nature, in which an 
important informal financial market segment coexists with the formal banking 
system. Informal money-lenders fund, at relatively high cost, small businesses and 
household firms which have little or no access to the formal banking system. Large 
private corporations are the preferred borrowers of the highly-concentrated formal 
banking system (Vos and Yap 1996). 
A 1957 ruling of the Monetary Board forbade naturalised citizens from 
owning any portion of newly established banks. In other words, all new banks were 
required to have 100 per cent natural-born Filipino ownership. Since the vast bulk 
of applications for naturalisation were of Chinese descent, the intent was quite 
clearly to construct legal barriers against ethnic Chinese ownership of banks. While 
these regulations may have temporarily obstructed greater ethnic Chinese 
__ involvement in the banking sector, they continued to enjoy a major stake in the 
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banking system (Hutchcroft 1993). A former Central Bank Governor, Gregorio 
Licaros, observed that the 'average Filipino banker is in the banking business not for 
banking profits; he uses his bank for allied business' ( quoted in Vos and Yap 1996, 
108). Certainly in the 1960s, ownership of a bank became among the surest means 
of securing credit for the other components of the diversified family conglomerate, 
and most major business families flocked to the industry. These families set out to 
obtain bank licenses and commercial banking became something of a fad in the 
1960s. The families that flocked to banking included both those of old landed 
wealth and those that had been involved in the import-substitution industries of the 
1950s. Among the Filipino and Spanish mestizo businessmen who invested in 
banks were Ramon Aboitiz, Gonzalo Puyat, Salvador Araneta, Antonio and Jose 
Madrigal (Hutchcroft 1993, 260). 
In subsequent years, many ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs were able to acquire 
significant ownership stakes in other, already existing, commercial banks 
(Hutchcroft 1993). These include Henry Sy's investments in China Bank and Far 
East Bank, Gokongwei in Far East Bank and Philippine Commercial International 
Bank (PCIBank) and Yuchengco in Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. In 
1999, the Gokongwei and Lopez families sold their stake in PCIBank for 31.6 
billion PhP (835.9 million USD) to the Equitable Banking Group and the state-run 
pension funds (Government Security and Insurance Service (GSIS) and Social 
Security System (SSS)). Equitable Bank is headed by the ethnic Chinese tycoon 
George Go. Go is said to be a friend of former President Estrada, but Equitable 
Bank was founded in 1950 by his father Go Kim Pah. George Go became President 
of the bank in 1988 when it had resources of 8 .1 billion PhP (3 83 million USD at the 
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average exchange rate that year). Ten years later, assets had grown to 109.1 billion 
PhP (2.8 billion USD) (Lopez and Espinosa-Robles 1999). ·. 
It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the three largest companies 
among the case studies have strategic investments in banks. SS Shipping, GG 
Shipping and KK Stores have equities in Chinese-controlled banks and 
representatives of these three families sit on the boards of directors. 
The interlocking interest of banks and corporate enterprises have been 
systemic problems which have required Central Bank and government intervention 
to bail out ailing financial institutions, often at substantial macroeconomic costs 
(Vos and Yap 1996). One characteristic of the Philippine banking system is rampant 
favouritism. The favour or disfavour of those oligarchs currently holding state 
offi9e is a major determinant of the relative success or failure of particular banks. 
Favoured treatment, it should be noted, is not imperative to the success of a 
commercial bank, but in instances where banks have enjoyed mercurial growth, one 
is nearly sure to find special favours, granted through special relations with 
prominent officials (Hutchcroft _ 1993). 
The case of Allied Bank is particularly illustrative of the success that comes 
from favourable access to the political machinery. The bank' s founder, Lucio Tan, a 
Chinese-Filipino, was a well-known associate of Marcos. Hutchcroft (1993) asserts 
that by 1980, thanks to extensive support from Marcos in gaining tax, customs, 
financing, and regulatory favours , Tan' s Fortune Tobacco Co. had become the 
country's largest maker of cigarettes. His bank, Allied Bank, was among the most 
favoured commercial banks in the allocation of rediscounting and foreign exchange 
swap privileges. Moreover, it had privileged access to government-guaranteed 
foreign loans. Allied Bank, of course, is only one of many examples of banks that 
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ended up in crony hands and only one of many examples of how private banks 
received special favours from the Central Bank and the presidential palace. 
Determining what constitutes a 'Chinese' bank can be problematic, for no 
bank can claim to have only Chinese customers, nor are there any banks that are 
wholly managed by Chinese. The conventional definition is that these are banks 
where the majority of the equity is held by ethnic Chinese (Go 1995, 86). As of 
1996, ten of the thirty four commercial banks were classified as 'Chinese' banks 
(Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8 Value and ranking of Chinese-owned banks among all private 
domestic banks, 1996 (in million PhP) 
Total Total Total 
Bank assets Rank loans Rank deposits 
-
Metropolitan Bank 170 2 109 1 104 
Rizal Commercial - -
Bank 72 7 49 8 48 
Allied Bank 58 10 37 10 35 
Equitable Bank 47 11 28 11 31 
China Bank 37 12 26 12 24 
Philippine Bank of 
Communications 19 20 13 17 12 
Westmont Bank 14 23 10 21 12 
Banco de Oro 13 25 9 22 10 
Philippine Banking 
Corporation 12 27 9 24 8 
East West Bank 4 41 2 39 2 
Total 446 292 276 
( as a percentage of total 
private domestic banks) (41.8%) (42.6%) (39.8%) 
Total private 
domestic banks 1066 686 693 
Source: Businessworld (12 August 1996), 30. 
Rank 
2 
7 
9 
10 
12 
19 
18 
23 
22 
34 
The clientele of 'Chinese' banks is not limited to Chinese clients just as 
Filipino-owned banks do not deal only with Filipinos. The important considerations 
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are ( a) where the management controls lie and (b) where the benefits go. Chinese-
controlled banks accounted for 41.8 per cent of total assets of the private domestic 
banking sector as well as 42.6 per cent of loans and 39.8 per cent of deposits in this 
sector (Businessworld 1996). In tum, the private domestic sector accounted for 69.1 
per cent of the assets of the total banking system (Table 4.9). 
Four Chinese-owned banks figured in the top ten banks of first quarter 1999 
(Table 4.10). These banks were Metrobank (majority owned by George Ty), 
Equitable Bank/PCIBank (George Go), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation 
(Yuchengco ), and Allied Banking (Lucio Tan). 
4. 7 Government-business relations 
What is the nature of the involvement of government in markets and, 
conversely, the nature of the involvement of business in political life? In Southeast 
Asia, business-government interaction generally reflects the pervasive importance of 
patrimonial or clientilistic links between government figures and business people 
(MacIntyre 1994). The Philippines is said to have the most decentralised political 
system in the region, with the _economic policy machinery routinely hijacked by 
powerful business interests (Hutchcroft 1994 ). 
The Philippine state apparatus has been continually choked by an anarchy of 
particularistic demands from, and particularistic actions on behalf of, those oligarchs 
and cronies who are currently most favoured by its top officials. Some will have 
obtained highly coveted loans or import licenses while others will have enjoyed a 
stake in a cartelised industry protected by highly discretionary state regulations. The 
case of government involvement in the financial markets was illustrated in the 
previous section. It was because of the weak institutionalisation of the state 
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Table 4.9 Philippine banking system composition (assets, loans and deposits), 
1996 (in million PhP) 
Total Share of Total Share of Total Share of 
assets total(%) loans total(%) deposits total(%) 
Total private 
domestic banks 1066 69.1 686 73.1 693 72.3 
Total government 
banks 289 12.2 151 10.8 214 5.3 
Total foreign banks 188 18.7 101 16.1 51 22.4 
Total banking system 1543 100.0 938 100.0 958 100.0 
Source: Businessworld (12 August 1996), 30. 
Table 4.10 Top ten banks according to assets, first 
quarter 1999 (in billion USO) 
Total 
Bank assets 
Metrobank 6.6 
Equitable Bank and PCIBank 6.2 
Philippine National Bank 5.7 
Bank of the Philippine Islands 4.7 
Land Bank of the Philippines 4.7 
Citibank 3.8 
Far East Bank and Trust Company 3.4 
United Coconut Planters Bank 2.7 
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation 2.6 
Allied Banking Corporation 2.2 
Source: Antonio Lopez and Raissa Espinosa-Robles, 'The bank that 
could ', Asiaweek (May 28, 1999), 90. 
apparatus that personal favour and disfavour of those currently in power was a 
critical determinant of business success and failure for some (Hutchcroft 1994). The 
cronies during the Marcos administration came from the newer, non-landed 
capitalists whose initial entry into manufacturing was facilitated either by access to 
loans from government institutions or to special licenses and import privileges from 
political connections (Vos and Yap 1996). 
120 
Hutchcroft (1994) uses the terms 'booty capitalism' to refer to the case of the 
Philippines where rents were generally grabbed by groups -with an economic base 
outside the state. This is differentiated from bureaucratic capitalism, where rents are 
most commonly grabbed by a bureaucratic elite based inside the state. 
With their history as trading immigrants to the country, the Chinese-Filipino 
capitalists were rarely oligarchic in their social origins, but some Chinese had 
developed sufficient personal or business ties with the Marcos family and its 
associates to qualify as cronies. Among the Chinese-Filipino capitalists 1n 
manufacturing, two Marcos cronies stand out: Jose Yao Campos, who monopolised 
the distribution of pharmaceuticals in government hospitals, and Lucio Tan, who 
built his powerful diversified conglomerate around the cigarette industry. A 
powerful bloc of support for Lucio Tan lies in a grouping of about 27 legislators in 
the lower house of Congress who represent the tobacco-producing provinces of the 
!locos region. Since the 1960s, Tan's tobacco and cigarette business has served as 
the major buyer of the tobacco products of the !locos region (Rivera 1997). Some of 
the Chinese-Filipino capitalists, through their equity linkages with government 
financing institutions, controlled firms that monopolised particular sectors. An 
example was the Lim group of Filsyn that monopolised the processing of polyester 
(Rivera 1994, 121). 
Chinese businessmen have often used former leading public officials in 
various roles in their companies (Rivera 1997). George Ty of Metro bank had as co-
founders of the bank Pio Pedrosa, former finance secretary, Placido Mapa Sr. , 
former secretary of agriculture, and Emilio Abello, an influential former 
ambassador. Alfonso Yuchengco's Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation had as 
original partners the Antonio Floirendo family whose patriarch was a logging 
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magnate and one-time senator of the Philippine republic. Finally, Lucio Tan hired 
as his top managers former well-placed military generals. 
4.8 Chinese economic profile 
Using data from 1980, Hicks and Redding (1982) conducted a study of the 
top 259 corporations (Table 4.11 ). While Yoshihara (1985) limited his sample by 
considering only the companies that were engaged in manufacturing, Hicks and 
Redding included the largest 259 in terms of revenue, regardless of company 
activity. The two samples are, thus, not directly comparable. However, it is still 
possible to highlight some common patterns. There appears to be no noticeable 
difference in the proportion of ownership. In Yoshihara' s study, ethnic Chinese 
owned 32 per cent of the manufacturing companies, while the Hicks and Redding 
study showed 33 .2 per cent of Chinese ownership of the top 259 companies. The 
two most significant sectors in the Hicks and Redding study were the manufacturing 
sector, to which 140 out of the 259 largest companies belonged, and the commercial 
Table 4.11 Ownership of the top 259 companies in the Philippines by ethnic 
background, 1980 
Industry Spanish Filipino Chinese American Other Total 
Manufacturing 14 53 47 18 8 140 
Commercial 2 34 32 3 3 74 
Mining - 6 2 2 3 13 
Services 1 9 1 1 2 14 
Utilities 1 7 3 2 - 13 
Agriculture - 3 1 1 - 5 
Total 18 112 86 27 16 259 
Percentage 7.0% 43.2% 33.2% 10.4% 6.2% 100.0% 
Source: George Hicks and Gordon Redding, "Culture and corporate performance in the Philippines: 
The Chinese puzzle," in Essays in development economics in honor of Harry T Oshima, ed. 
Philippine Institute of Development Studies (Manila: Philippine Institute of Development Studies, 
1982). 
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sector, which accounted for 7 4 corporations. In terms of manufacturing, Chinese-
owned companies predominated in tobacco, textiles and garments, vegetable and 
animal oils, food and beverage, paper products and basic metals. In the commercial 
sector, Chinese owned the majority of companies in machinery supply, general retail 
and chemical-based products. 
The third major study to investigate the share of Chinese in top corporations 
utilised 1990 data and included the top 1000 corporations (Palanca 1995). Table 
4 .12 shows that the Chinese share in the top 1000 corporations in the Philippines 
was 35.9 per cent in 1990. There has been an expansion into the finance and 
services industries, such as real estate, banking and insurance by Chinese as well as 
other ethnic groups. In manufacturing, Chinese were dominant, in terms of the 
number of firms, in industries such as textiles and leather, wood products, paper and 
publishing, paints, rubber and steel products (Table 4.13). 
Table 4.12 Comparison of the three ownership studies 
Yoshihara Hicks and Redding Palanca 
Top 250 
manufacturing Top 259 Top 1000 
companies, 1968 corporations, 1980 corporations, 1990 
Filipino-Chinese 32.0 33.2 35.9 
Filipino 33.2 43.2 34.8 
Foreign 34.8 23.6 29.3 
The Chinese business hierarchy 
The ethnic Chinese operate business of all sizes, from small to medium and 
large-scale enterprises. If one were to imagine a hierarchy of business people, then 
Table 4.13 Ownership of private firms in the Top 1000 corporations of the 
Philippines, by ethnic background, 1990 
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Number of firms 
Chinese-
Percentage of firms 
Industry Fili ino Fili 1no Forei 
Chinese-
Fili 1no Fili 1no Foreign 
6 7 4 
2 12 5 
0.7% 
1.2% 
0.4% 
0.5% 
Agriculture, fishery 
and forestry 
Mining and 
quarrying 
Manufacturing 
Utilities 
Wholesale and retail 
Construction 
Transportation, 
storage and 
communication 
Finance,insurance 
and real estate 
Community, social 
and related services 
Others 
170 124 169 
0 2 1 
124 77 41 
4 14 8 
0.6% 
0.2% 
17.0% 
0.0% 
12.4% 
0.4% 
12.4% 
0.2% 
7.7% 
1.4% 
16.9% 
0.1% 
4.1% 
0.8% 
TOTAL · 
__ ,. ~ , 
3 
37 
8 
5 
22 
67 
19 
4 
· 348' 
.. . , _ _, . ,··~ ... 
11 
40 
8 
6 
0.3% 
3.7°/o 
0.8% 
0.5% 
2.2% 
6.7% 
1.9% 
0.4% 
Source: Ellen Palanca, 'An analysis of the 1990 top corporations in the Philippines: Economic 
position and activities of the ethnic Chinese, Filipino and foreign groups', in China, Taiwan and the 
Ethnic Chinese in the Philippines, ed. Ellen Palanca (Quezon City: Philippine Association for 
Chinese Studies, 1995), 67. 
at the top level would be the so-called 'six taipans'. They are considered the most 
prominent businessmen of the 90s era. Having a net worth of at least 1 billion USD 
each before the Asian financial crisis in 1997, they were brought together to 
accompany former President Ramos on his official visit to China in the early 1990s. 
They represent the upper echelon of the Chinese business hierarchy and most did not 
come to prominence until the 1970s. They include John Gokongwei Jr, Henry Sy, 
Alfonso Yuchengco, Andrew Gotianun, George Ty and Lucio Tan. While 
Yuchengco was born in the Philippines and Ty in Hong Kong, the rest were born in 
Fujian, China. 
1.1% 
4.0% 
0.8% 
0.4% 
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John Gokongwei Jr began his business career in Cebu. In 1954, he 
established a com starch factory in Metro Manila. He listed the foods and oils 
division Universal Robina Corporation on the Philippine Stock Exchange in 1994 
and J.G. Summit in 1993. J.G. Summit functions as the holding company for a 
group of companies engaged in branded consumer goods, textiles and garments, real 
estate development, hotel management, banks, power generation, cement, 
petrochemicals, telecommunications and printed circuit board manufacturing. He 
has engaged in joint ventures with numerous foreign companies, among those are 
with Marubeni in petrochemicals and Nissin Foods in noodles and biscuits (Young 
1994). 
Shopping mall magnate Henry Sy opened a small shoe store in the late 1940s 
and his first Shoemart department store in 1958. His holding company, SM Prime 
Holdings, was listed in 1994 and develops commercial shoppin~ _centres. The initial 
public offering of SM Prime Holdings allocated 10.95 per cent to foreign investors 
and 6.55 per cent to domestic investors. He has also diversified into banking, real 
estate, cement manufacturing, shipbuilding and repairs, and entertainment (Young 
1994). 
Alfonso Yuchengco's business group is the oldest among the taipans and 
stems from the inheritance of his father's pre-World War II lumber and insurance 
businesses. His listed holding company, House of Investments, is organized into 
five main groups: manufacturing, construction, agribusiness, finance and insurance, 
and services and trading (Young 1994). He has several joint ventures with foreign 
companies, including a cement plant with Nissho Iwai and polyethylene 
manufacture with Nissho Iwai and Maruzen. 
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Andrew Gotianun began a consumer finance company in 1955 and then 
expanded into banking. Filinvest Land was listed on the stock exchange in 1993 to 
engage in the development of residential property. Filinvest Development is the 
family's holding company with interests in banking and financial services, 
infrastructure investments and manufacturing (Young 1994). Gotianun also has a 20 
per cent share in a 1.5 billion USD consortium that developed the Fort Bonifacio 
area in Manila. 
Born into a poor immigrant family from Fujian, Lucio Tan was at various 
times a janitor, chemist and trader. He now has a controlling interest in 
approximately 48 companies, ranging from farming, brewing, tobacco and banking 
interests to real estate, textile and packaging. His companies control 60 per cent of 
the local cigarette market, a major share of the live hog market, and are dominant in 
chemicals, beverages, banking and hotels. Tan has also acquired substantial 
international holdings, including banks in the U.S. and Canada, a shopping centre in 
Guam, tobacco and steel companies in Papua New Guinea and one of Canada's 
largest carpet manufacturers (Young 1994). 
4.9 A question of identity 
The Chinese community in the Philippines is smaller than elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, both in absolute terms and in relation to the indigenous population 
(Wong 1994). Estimates have ranged from 600,000 to 1,000,000 (Wickberg 1992, 
45). Suryadinata (1996) estimates the Chinese population in the Philippines to be 
850,000, or 1.3 per cent of the total population, as of 1990. Furthermore, the 
provincial origin of migrants to the Philippines is more homogeneous. 
Approximately 85 per cent of the ethnic Chinese community in the Philippines today 
can trace their origins to southern Fujian. Ninety per cent of these Fukienese 
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originated from Jinjiang, Nan-an, and Hui-an hsiens (townships) of Quanzhou 
prefecture (See 1981 ). In Dumaguete, for instance, the Fukienese community stems 
principally from a dozen villages in Heshan. In Dagupan, most Chinese come from 
Jinjiang county and in Davao, Fukienese Chinese originate from Nan-an county and 
Cantonese Chinese from Taishan (Doeppers 1972). 
The homogeneous origin of the Chinese migrants to the Philippines means 
that there are few regional or language differences except for the Cantonese 
minority. Instead, clan associations emerge as one of the most prominent kinds of 
organization while tongxianghui (hometown associations) are formed on the basis of 
southern Fujian villages. Recent years have seen the development of alumni and 
class associations. Classmate ties are intimate personal relationships with quasi-
kinship features in the Chinese social world (See 1988). 
In a study of the Chinese during the American period, Wong (1994) 
identified a minority who had acquired Philippine citizenship while the majority 
were still Chinese citizens. This situation was subsequently reversed after Marcos 
allowed the Chinese to apply for Philippine citizenship in 1975. Notwithstanding 
the difference in citizenship status, both groups share common denominators that 
characterise them as ethnic Chinese. Among these denominators are Chinese 
descent, varying degrees of Chineseness, and a self-identification of themselves as 
Chinese and being regarded as such by others. There are three features of 
Chineseness. First, Wong observes that though some have Christian names, all have 
Chinese names. Second, ethnic Chinese know a Chinese language. Since the vast 
majority originates from Fujian province, the lingua franca within the community is 
the Hokkien dialect. Third, the proliferation of Chinese schools and newspapers 
helps spread Chinese culture across the community (Wong 1994). Charles 
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McCarthy (1974) defines an ethnic Chinese as someone with a measure of Chinese 
immigrant parentage who is sufficiently influenced by Chinese culture, can use a 
Chinese language, and observes Chinese customs enough to rightly call himself, and 
to be regarded by his neighbours, as Chinese. 
Is it still relevant to speak of the Chinese in the Philippines as a distinct 
ethnic group? In this context, it is useful to distinguish an 'ethnic group' from a 
'culture' (Omohundro 1977, 148). An ethnic group has a boundary, which is 
consciously maintained by cognitive criteria, while a culture is a complex of traits 
and institutions which characterise it at one point in time. The continuity of an 
ethnic group is, therefore, easier to define than that of a culture, which lacks a 
boundary. For example, cultural change has certainly been occurring among the 
Chinese in Iloilo City. Language, manner of dress, religion and even the role of 
women have undergone modification. Nevertheless, an ethnic group persists and the 
cognitive criteria for membership remain. Chinese birth, facility in Hokkien, 
conscious affiliation with Chinese organizations, and a commercial occupation all 
assure one of a place in the community (Omohundro 1977, 152; Yoshihara 1985). 
The evolution of the Chinese from itinerant traders and seafarers to 
sojourners and later residents of the Philippines was a long process (See 1997). The 
ethnic Chinese today are mostly university graduates and most have had more wide-
ranging contact with Filipinos than the older group. While identifying themselves as 
Filipino-Chinese and using Hokkien in the home, many feel affection for the city or 
town they live in and their Filipino neighbour (Doeppers 1972). It is argued that the 
Chinese who are born in the Philippines are not 'Chinese who live in the 
Philippines' but rather 'Filipinos of Chinese descent' (See 1997). The majority of 
the local-born are young Chinese with no first-hand experience of China. Most of 
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them are articulate both in Filipino and English and are graduates of local 
universities. They are a 'deculturated' Chinese group, Westernised in ideology but 
not really assimilated to the Filipino culture. Not very many work in the 
government bureaucracy, while the well-educated may work in the corporate world. 
The majority either work in the family businesses or venture into new trades (See 
1988). 
4.10 Conclusion 
The preceding analysis of the historical development of Chinese business 
activities in the Philippines covered their early migration pattern, economic roles, 
and the various government policies that have influenced business. Two general 
trends can be observed. One is the changing economic roles of the Chinese in the 
Philippines while the other 1s. a seemingly unchanging approach to economic 
organization. 
Wong (1994) asserts that the Chinese were both a product of and a 
contributor to the growth process of the Philippines during the early 20th century. 
As Mc Vey (1992) remarks, a population group that is assigned a business role in 
society will come to emphasise business values. 
Several transformations in Chinese economic roles were observed: first they 
were long distance merchants dealing with luxury items, then many became artisans 
and local middlemen supplying urban centres with services and subsistence items. 
Later, they acted as intermediate traders with the dual function of conveying native 
produce to export houses while distributing imported n1anufactures locally (Y ambert 
1981 ). The 1896 tax survey serves as an invaluable snapshot of the occupational 
composition of the Chinese in Cebu. A movement into secondary industry and the 
professions occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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The transition from being coolies, peddlers, small shopkeepers and 
compradors during the Spanish occupation to taipans irt, the 90s and 2000s is 
dramatic, but one should not for get that this period spans several centuries. 
Expanding markets, foreign capital inflows, new technologies and the growth of 
urban middle classes created the environment in which business could take off 
(Mackie 1992). Differences in operations can be attributed to historical, social and 
political factors rather than just ethnicity. The modem Chinese business enterprise 
is characterised by family-based ownership, large scale operations and management 
based on a mixture of kinship and professionalism. The large-scale firms usually 
started with family ownership, but grew in size and gradually transformed into a 
W estem-type of public liability company under the control of one or several related 
families (Hwang 1992). 
While the change 1n economic roles is dramatic, what appears to have 
changed very little is the Chinese approach to economic organization, in which 
elements of adaptability and flexibility feature prominently. For instance, the source 
of financing may change, but the nature of financing has not. The earlier 
dependence on European and American importers as well as Spanish banks has been 
replaced by reliance on Chinese and American banks. Japanese partners are also 
becoming increasingly important. While taipans have substantial holdings and 
wealth, none are important global players. However, many have made large foreign 
investments in China, Guam, the United States and Hong Kong. 
This chapter not only provided a historical snapshot, but also traced the 
changing nature of Chinese business and the interaction of government policies and 
business activities. An underlying theme is the uncertain environment in which 
Chinese business operates. This uncertainty stems from different government 
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administrations' approaches towards the Chinese and the resulting fluctuation in 
public policy, including economic policies and regulation of direct foreign 
investment and industries such as banking and retailing. 
Finally, the question of the identity of ethnic Chinese in the Philippines was 
addressed. There is no simple definition of 'Chinese-Filipino' and no single identity 
within the Chinese community. While it is possible to identify the Chinese as an 
ethnic group in the Philippines, See (1997) points out that there is a contrast in how 
the different generations of Chinese perceive themselves. While first-generation 
Chinese may perceive themselves as Chinese who live in the Philippines, See (1997) 
contends that most of the next generation have become Filipinos of Chinese descent. 
Having set out the context in which Chinese business operates, the next three 
chapters examine in detail the case study firms' networking behaviour. What are the 
antecedents to interorganizational relationships (IORs) (Chapter 5)? What is the 
nature of IORs that are formed and what is the role of trust (Chapter 6)? What are 
the short-term and long-term outcomes of IORs (Chapter 7)? 
Chapter 5 
Antecedents of Exchange Relations 
Every organization exists in a specific physical, technological, cultural, 
and social environment to which it must adapt. No organization is 
self-sufficient; all depend for survival on the types of relations they 
establish with the larger systems of which they are a part. 
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(Scott 1992, 20) 
The previous chapter discussed the macro environment of Chinese business 
in the Philippines and covered the economic and political context. This chapter 
continues to the intermediate environment, which links the organization and its 
macro environment. Also termed 'organizational domain', it includes the claims 
that an organization makes with respect to products or services provided and 
populations served. These claims immediately relate it to a number of other 
organizations - suppliers, customers, competitors - that affect an organization's 
behaviour and outcomes (Scott 1992, 126). Each unit in the intermediate 
environment facilitates the acquisition of resources from the environment or the 
distribution of products and services to the environment (Hodge and Anthony 1988, 
69). The next section introduces each of the case study firms. The discussion then 
proceeds to consider the IOR process as derived from analysis of the fieldwork data. 
5.1 Introduction to the case studies 
There are eight main case studies, including a pilot study of SS Sawmill. A 
ninth case is that of China Construction, a mainland China-based company chosen to 
gain the perspective of a partner firm. As previously noted, company names are 
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disguised to preserve their anonymity, which was a condition for the granting of 
access and interviews. The cases are roughly divided between the manufacturing 
and service sectors and also roughly divided between Manila and Cebu-based firms 
(Tab le 5 .1). 
Table 5.1. Case studies according to industry and location of headquarters 
Manufacturing Services 
Manila • AA Plastics • FF Food 
• MM Textiles • China Construction 
• SS Sawmill (Pilot) (foreign partner) 
Cebu • JJ Chemical • KK Stores 
• SS Shipping 
• GG Shipping 
Firms are ranked according to the size of their revenues in Table 5.2. The 
last column indicates their asset size. A graphical representation of this ranking is 
presented in Figure 5 .1. A brief description of each case study firm is then given. 
Table 5.2. Revenue, assets, ranking and year established of the case study firms 
Sales revenue, Assets, 1995 
Year Rank in top 1995 (in million (in million 
established 1000 PhP) PhP) 
SS Shipping 1949 Top 150 2400 4300 
GG Shipping 1970 Top 200 2000 2200 
KK Stores 1936 Top 500 730 370 
FF Food 1986 Top 600 620 330 
JJ Chemical 1960 Top 1200 230 110 
AA Plastics 1968 Top 2000 100 80 
MM Textiles 1956 Top 4500 40 70 
SS Sawmill (pilot 1966 n/a 20 40 
study) 
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission, Philippines 5 000 (Manila: Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 1998). 
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Figure 5.1 Case study firms ranked according to sales revenue 
Case study firms, 1995 sales revenue 
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Case study firm 
AA Plastics 
Founded in the late 1960s by three Chinese partners, AA is engaged in the 
manufacture of acrylic plastic. One of its original partners was a Taiwanese Chinese 
who provided the equipment and technology while the other two were Filipino-
Chinese businessmen who contributed capital to the venture. AA has benefited from 
being a first-mover in the industry. As the only manufacturer of acrylic plastic in 
the Philippines and one of the few in Southeast Asia, it enjoyed consistent sales 
growth well into the 1980s. Not only did it dominate the domestic market, but its 
exports encompassed Southeast Asia and extended to the Middle East. Another 
crucial advantage stemming from its dominance of the domestic market was its 
power to set domestic prices. 
The company's product, acrylic plastic, is used mainly for advertising 
displays, such as illuminated shopfront, signage and advertising boards. Point of 
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purchase displays can also be made from this material and the plastic is also able to 
substitute for glass in certain applications, such as in tabletops. It is much lighter 
than glass and does not shatter upon impact. 
By the early 1970s, the three original partners had gone their own way. One 
returned to Taiwan and another started his own business in a completely different 
industry. The remaining partner brought in his eldest daughter Wilma to help him 
run . the company. Soon after taking over from her father as General Manager in 
1994, she was faced with a difficult challenge when the Ramos government began to 
liberalise imports of plastic products. While remaining confident that local 
competitors would not be able to match AA's quality, the company faced a more 
serious threat from competing plastic imports from Taiwan and Malaysia. 
In the earlier years, when AA was the sole manufacturer in the country, the 
challenge was to master the production technology and consistently produce quality 
goods. With current competition seemingly focused on price, the impetus has 
become the improvement of product distribution and international competitiveness. 
MM Textiles 
MM Textiles was incorporated in the late 1950s and since then has achieved 
consistent sales growth by diversifying into upstream and downstream businesses. It 
was founded by Yu Eng Lit, a Chinese migrant from Fujian province who worked as 
a storekeeper for a textile merchant when he first arrived in the Philippines. After he 
had accumulated enough savings to start his own business, he became a retailer 
selling textiles imported by Chinese wholesalers. 
When his two sons eventually joined the business, Yu Eng Lit sold his shop 
and went into the manufacture of textiles. His sons' engineering degrees enabled the 
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company to improve its production efficiency and keep up-to-date with the latest 
production technologies. The rapid growth of the company was attributed to the 
addition of two new businesses: textile dyeing and finishing in 1992 and garment 
manufacturing in 1993. Realizing that integrating the finishing process for textiles 
meant higher value-added for their products, the Yu brothers engaged the services of 
a Taiwanese consultant to set up the textile dyeing operation. Its entry into garments 
manufacturing enabled it to serve a new set of customers, mainly retailers such as 
boutiques and department stores as well as being a subcontractor to garments 
exporters. MM has three main business lines and employs 400 people (Figure 5 .2). 
Figure 5.2. MM Textiles' business activities 
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SS Shipping 
With a fleet of 17 ships consisting of ten passenger/cargo and seven cargo 
vessels, SS Shipping ranked among the country's top five shipping companies 
throughout the 1990s in terms of assets and revenues. With its head office in Cebu 
City, the company's principal business is to provide inter-island passenger and cargo 
liner services in the Philippines. 
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SS Shipping was incorporated in 1949 to transport passengers and products 
to and from Cebu. During the 1950s and 1960s, the founder and his son expanded 
and modernised the company's fleet. By the late 1970s, the company decided to 
change the emphasis of its operations from conventional break-bulk operations to 
containerised cargo operations in response to the perceived growth in inter-island 
trade and travel activity. In the early 1990s, the company raised funds through an 
initial public offering on the Philippine Stock Exchange. 
KKStores 
KK. Stores credits its beginnings to the family matriarch, Constancia Tan. 
Widowed at an early age, she began to engage in the general merchandise business 
in the early 1930s. Her second son Mark recalled, 'When we started, everyone in 
the family helped out. We did not use any outsiders, doing the manual labour 
ourselves. At that time prices were very cheap, sales reached ~_en pesos every day. 
Life was very hard but everyone was united.' 
When World War II came, the store closed. After the War, the five Tan 
brothers (Solomon, Mark, James, John and Robert) sold flour and bread. It was not 
until 1947 that KK Stores was revived. They kept prices low and the store well-
stocked. Third son James narrated, 'After the war, our eldest brother shipped two 
fluorescent light bulbs from Manila. They were installed in front of the shop so that 
passers-by would notice. Every evening, the other shopkeepers used pale light 
bulbs. Our store was bright as day; this became our unique feature. Passers-by 
could not help but stop, go inside the shop to have a look, and always ending up 
buying something.' 
In the 1960s, KK expanded by opening other branches. The family also 
invested in real estate, banks and restaurants. The business was divided in the late 
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1970s. Each of the five brothers decided to control their own business group. Each 
group has its own set of department stores, supermarkets, movie theatres, and food 
shops. They operate independently, but taken together the whole group comprised 
24 department stores and had annual retail sales of approximately 300 million USD 
in 1990. In the early 1990s, it was estimated that the group's department stores and 
supermarkets had a total combined floor area as big as the entire Cebu downtown 
area. 
GG Shipping 
The founder of GG Shipping arrived in the Philippines as a young man in the 
early 1900s and began his business career as a general merchant in the southern 
Philippines. As a merchant, he would load his goods on 50-ton sailboats and travel 
from island to island buying and selling agricultural products. 
He later chose Cebu City as his permanent residence and established a 
trading firm with his brother. He organized GG Shipping on his own in the late 
1970s and managed the company with the help of his sons. One of the largest 
shipping companies in the Philippines today, the company generated revenues of 2.4 
billion PhP in 1995. As one of his sons, now CEO of the company, remarked, 'We 
have the support of the Chinese business community.' 
FF Food 
'Where East Meets West' is the concept behind the founding of FF Food. Its 
image is the fusion of two restaurant concepts: the Chinese noodle restaurant and the 
Western fast food outlet. Commencing operations in the mid- l 980s with one outlet 
located in the commercial centre of Makati, FF has grown to about 140 outlets in 
1997 and 200 at the end of 2000. 
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The company's franchising program started 1n 1989 and marked the 
beginning of its expansion into provincial markets. For · FF, franchising is the 
preferred route as it enables the company to grow without unduly straining funds. 
By 1997, FF Food outlets were found in all parts of the archipelago, from Baguio 
and Dagupan in the north to Cebu City and Iloilo in Central Visayas, and Davao and 
General Santos City in Mindanao. 
JJ Chemical 
Mr. Honoria Wu, the founder of JJ Chemical, started his business career on a 
small scale in the late 1940s, raising pigs and poultry on small plots of land. His 
father had come to Cebu from Fujian, China and went into the sari-sari store 
business. When his father passed away, Honoria went into different ventures. He 
established a corn mill because he realised that the staple food in Cebu and the 
surrounding region was com and not rice. Later on, he expanded into corn oil 
manufacturing. 
The current manager of JJ Chemical, Honoria's younger brother Eusebio, 
attributed the family's success to their ability and character. He emphasised that 
'We always saved everything we eamed and expanded the business. Hard work and 
thriftiness are two important elements in anybody's business success.' 
Figure 5.3. JJ Chemical's business activities 
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SS Sawmill (pilot study) 
The company was established in 1966 with four partners, one managing and 
the others silent. By 1988, the partners were in conflict; the managing partner was 
retained and the others had to bid for shares in the company. Only two of the 
original partners remained: the managing partner ended up holding 75 per cent and 
another family 25 per cent. 
The managing partner's family has always been in the lumber industry. His 
father, uncles and cousins are all involved in the industry, due to the fact that when 
his father arrived in Philippines, he settled in a logging area in Agusan. The 
manager also owned a plywood shop in Manila, which his wife and two sons 
managed. 
China Construction Company 
China Construction Company (CCC) is a Chinese state-owned enterprise 
headquartered in Beijing, China. It had a total of 200,000 employees globally in 
1997 and had been operating in the Philippines since 1990. The country general 
manager, Mr. Jiang, had previously been assigned to Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines. 
CCC was involved in four major highway projects in the Philippines and 
planned to expand into real estate development and reclamation projects. Its 
projects were both foreign and locally funded. Wholly foreign funded projects did 
not need a local partner, but, by law, the locally funded projects had to have a 
minimum of 60 per cent local equity. Partners were taken on a per-project basis, 
with a defined contract for each. Initially, it had Filipino-Chinese partners for 
projects, but had recently taken Filipino partners as well. 
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5.2 The IOR process 
This section discusses the process of interorganizational relationships (IO Rs) 
as derived from the qualitative analysis of the case studies. The diagram depicting 
the process of networking as derived from the analysis in Chapter 3 is reproduced 
here (Table 5.3). 
This chapter considers the antecedents to forming an IOR. An organization 
faces a series of dynamic opportunities and constraints from its environment. What 
external resources does the firm need? How does it go about acquiring the needed 
resources? 
Table 5.3. A diagram depicting the process of networking 
Antecedents 
• 
• Why network? 
Strategies and 
nature 
• With whom? 
• Why with this 
particular firm? 
• 
Outcomes 
• Short-term 
• Long-term 
The external resource needs of a firm, and the way that it meets these needs, 
are influenced by a number of factors. These factors include the firm ' s existing 
competencies and resources, the transaction costs and risks associated with different 
alternatives and the firm's attitude towards external relations. Section 5 .3 discusses 
these considerations using Porter's (1980) five forces framework. 
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The organization in its environment 
· An organization's interaction with its environment may be conceptualised 
using micro/intermediate/macro environmental distinctions (Hodge and Anthony 
1988). The micro environment represents the organization itself, including its 
mission, people, resources, procedures and product or service produced. The 
intermediate environment encompasses those systems that span the boundaries 
between the organization and its general, or macro, environment. Figure 5 .4 depicts 
the interaction of these three environments while Table 5 .4 gives examples of the 
factors operating in each of the three levels. 
Figure 5.4. Micro-intermediate-macro environment 
Macro 
Intermediate 
Micro 
Source: B.J. Hodge and W. Anthony, Organization Theory (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988). 
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Table 5.4. An organization's micro-intermediate-macro environment 
Micro environment Intennediate environment Macro environment 
• Goal and work system • Suppliers • Economic 
Resources Buyers ( distributors, • Performance • • 
brokers, agents) • Policy 
• Skills • Financial market 
• Service units (including 
financial services) 
• Political 
• Policy making 
• Government-
business relations 
Source: B.J. Hodge and W. Anthony, Organization Theory (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1988). 
Several elements within its intermediate and macro environment influence a 
company's business decisions. The macro environment includes the economic, 
political and social side of the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. In 
general, the interviewees discussed the macro environment within a longer-term 
context, specifically in terms of analysis and reflection on overall changes within 
their industry. The intermediate environment was discussed in terms of more 
immediate concerns, for instance the effect of foreign competitors entering the 
market. The intermediate environment is also the direct source for resources. 
5.3 Assessing the environment and evaluating needs 
A business might ask itself these hypothetical questions: What strategies 
have we decided to follow and what are the corresponding resource needs for such 
strategies? What resources do we have and what external resources do we need to 
implement such strategies? 
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The first question in the analysis of the internal environment is: What 
resources does the business have? Nevertheless, steps subsequent to the assessing of 
internal resources, evaluating strategy and analysing external resource needs are, in 
reality as seen from the case studies, accomplished simultaneously. 
An organization's intermediate environment consists of its suppliers, buyers, 
and service units (including financial services). The patterns arising out of the case 
studies portray these groups of organizations in terms of power differences, a 
categorisation similar to that of Porter's five competitive forces (Porter 1980). The 
forces that affect resource requirements are: (a) the threat of new entrants, (b) the 
bargaining power of suppliers, ( c) the bargaining power of buyers and ( d) the rivalry 
among the existing competitors. The fifth, the threat of substitute products or 
services, did not come up in the interviews. 
The discussion of the findings is, therefore, organized in five categories: 
• starting out in business 
• threat of new entrants 
• bargaining power of suppliers 
• bargaining power of buyers 
• rivalry among existing competitors. 
Resources for starting a business 
The two most important resources needed for starting a business are financial 
capital and technology. All the case study firms began as small businesses, whose 
initial capital came from the founders' own savings or the founding family's 
contributions. At this stage of their development, the capital needs were small. Most 
of these firms also started operations during the 1940s and 1950s. Many have moved 
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from their original activity and diversified into other areas. One of the founders of 
AA Plastics was operating a Chinese herbal medicine business. He then started a 
business in plastics manufacturing. Over a period of four decades, JJ Chemical 
assembled a set of business operations in unrelated areas: com oil, activated carbon 
and mosquito repellent manufacturing. 
Others started as traders and grew by moving into manufacturing. MM 
Textiles' founder started as a textile merchant, KK. Stores' family began as small 
retailers and SS Sawmill's managing partner was a merchant who bought and sold 
lumber. These initial ventures did not require large amounts of capital but when the 
businesses moved away from trading as their principal business activity and towards 
manufacturing and other services, sources of finance outside the family became 
more significant. This change in financing requirements will be examined in this 
chapter and the next. 
For its initial venture into manufacturing ( corn oil), JJ Chemical purchased 
machinery from Japan to extract oil from com and modified this technology to suit 
local Cebu conditions. It was eventually able to manufacture a local version of this 
equipment and sell it to other processors in the area. With the activated charcoal 
business, however, it neither had the technology nor was it able to purchase it. 
Hence, it decided to enter into a joint venture (N) with a large Japanese trading 
company, Nippon. 
While it had domestic competitors in the manufacture of its product, JJ had 
technical support from its Japanese N partner to enable it to produce to the highest 
quality. It considered itself the leader in the local market, but was facing tough 
competition in the international market due to lower cost competitors from Vietnam 
and China. The crucial resource needed at this stage of development was 
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international marketing skills, which JJ did not have. However, JJ Chemical 
identified one of its strengths as having an efficient infrastructure in place to collect 
agricultural commodities in the Visayas and Mindanao regions. Its network of 
collection branches, together with sub-purchasing networks in the smaller towns, 
were considered by CEO Eusebio Wu as one of the most extensive in the country 
and represented a key resource. 
Technology was needed by MM Textiles and AA Plastics in the early stages 
of business development. MM Textiles' entry into manufacturing involved the 
owner's two sons researching the technology needed to manufacture cotton fabrics. 
They were able to purchase textile machinery from Japan, and the eldest son went to 
train there for six months. For its fabric dyeing and finishing venture, the company 
was unable to purchase the equipment itself and accepted a Taiwanese partner who 
provided the equipment and technological skills. 
AA Plastics' founder had no previous experience in manufacturing as he had 
assisted his father in the Chinese herbal medicine business. He felt that there would 
be little room for growth in the traditional herbal business and decided to enter the 
plastics manufacturing business with two partners. While he had sufficient capital to 
contribute to the venture, he knew nothing about the business and relied on the 
Taiwanese partner to provide the technological know-how. 
Technology was needed because the case study firms were entering new 
areas. Most were moving from trading to manufacturing activities. IORs were used 
because they had no access to the technology. They were unable to purchase it, often 
because the other party was unwilling to simply sell it outright. 
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Start-up capital needs were not crucial in the case studies examined. This is 
because these firms started out in small-scale activities. · The next four sections 
proceed to the next stages of business development, which include business growth 
and diversification. 
The threat of new entrants 
This section reveals the challenges that arise when new entrants come into 
the markets served by the case study firms. In the Philippine case, there were several 
causes for new entrants. Government deregulation policy was the most pressing 
issue for the case study firms, in particular as it related to investment by foreigners. 
In addition, favourable market conditions also attracted new entrants. 
As part of the policy reforms discussed in the previous chapter, the Ramos 
government issued Executive Order 185 in 1996, which opened all shipping routes 
to a~ditional operators to attract more investments into the industry. This 
encouraged the entry of new players into developmental routes, deregulated entry of 
new vessels into routes already served by franchised operators, and eased 
restrictions on vessel and voyage scheduling. Rates for passenger fares were also 
deregulated except for third-class passengers (Sun Star Daily 1996, SAl ). These 
developments had a direct impact on the shipping companies SS and GG. Since 
they had previously operated in a highly regulated and protected environment, these 
liberalised policies pushed them to action. How did they respond to the threat of 
new entrants? SS Shipping decided to join forces with other firms while GG 
Shipping defended its market position alone. 
With the threat from large and resource-rich competitors (including the 
Singapore Government), SS Shipping decided that it had to improve efficiency and 
service in order to survive. CEO John Ongseco said, 'We had to offer better 
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services yet keep control over our costs. If anyone requires sea transport, we want 
us to be the first name that comes into their minds.' Of the two shipping concerns, 
SS Shipping appears to be better-placed in terms of managerial skills to expand 
rapidly and react to changing market conditions. John Ongseco remarked, 
We have a criterion that the company will be professionally run. What 
happened was that when we started we had five members of the family 
who had line functions, now there are only two. The rest are 
professionals. I got very good people, then I sent them to good schools 
for their Masters degrees and so on. 
SS Shipping embarked on two different tactics to ensure its survival. First, it 
entered into a strategic alliance with two smaller competitors. John Ongseco 
explained that the objectives of being competitive and of realising economies of 
scale were foremost considerations for all three participants. It was simply unwise, 
he re_iterated, to compete with each other along the same routes: Another objective 
was to be able to capture a bigger share of the cargo market. The three companies 
combined were already the biggest in the passenger market. The long-term strategy 
of the alliance was to become a global logistics company. 
SS Shipping's second tactic was to list on the Philippine stock exchange. It 
took advantage of what was a buoyant capital market in the early 1990s to embark 
on an initial public offering, raising funds of approximately 2 billion PhP. The 
company had a projected revenue growth rate of 11 per cent. 
Its competitor, GG Shipping, was managed by members of the Lim family, 
including CEO George Lim, his wife, two sons, his two brothers and their families . 
Speaking about the advantage of having family members to manage the company, 
George Lim said, 
Look at this former shipping company, it was very big but the owner 
did not have his own people to manage it, so he hired people from 
outside. They robbed the company until it went bankrupt. 
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Like SS Shipping, GG recognised the need to improve efficiency, lower 
costs and upgrade equipment. GG accomplished this by relying on bank financing, 
partly through its equity investment in a Chinese-Filipino bank. When queried 
about the possibility of raising funds through a stock market listing, Mr. Lim did not 
show any interest in this approach. SS Shipping approached him when the former 
was considering the strategic alliance option, but Mr. Lim refused the offer. He 
reasoned that the cultures and approach to business of the two companies were 
different. If he joined the alliance, GG would lose its identity as a family-run 
organization. 
. The deregulation of the shipping industry thus brought · different responses 
from these two shipping companies. Facing the same uncertain operating 
environment, they recognised similar resource needs, primarily those of finance and 
technology, but the two companies took completely different routes. 
The retail trade sector is another area that the Philippine government 
deregulated. A Bill has been proposed to enhance competition in the domestic 
market, partly by allowing foreign equity into retail businesses. The proposed 
scheme allows for 100 per cent foreign ownership if the paid-in equity capital totals 
100 million USD, and less than 100 per cent equity for capital less than 100 million 
USD. Two bills (HB No. 648 and 969) aim to decrease the required paid-in capital 
for foreign investments from USD 500,000 to USD 150,000. The amendment will 
also remove the prohibition of 100 per cent foreign ownership of industries engaged 
. _ in import and wholesale activities (Businessworld 1995). In response to this, some 
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foreign retailers such as Wal-Mart from the U.S. have made preliminary 
investigations into the Philippine market. Others have entered into agreements with 
local partners in opening retail outlets such as shoes (Naturalizer and Rockport of 
the U.S.) and clothing (Esprit, Benetton and Liz Claiborne). 
KK Stores was, for several decades, the dominant player in the Cebu 
department store industry. In 1995, the entrance of a Manila-based competitor 
(Shoemart) into the Cebu market caused KK Stores to rethink its business strategy. 
The new entrant constructed the first shopping mall in the city and initially forced 
KK to adopt a 'reactor' strategy (Miles and Snow 1978). In addition, the prospect of 
foreign entrants into KK' s market looks certain. 
Triggered by growth motives and the threat of new entrants, KK Stores 
decided to focus on its core competency. It also started to expand southward. CEO 
Wallace Tan envisaged the company as the pre-eminent merchandiser in the Visayas 
and Mindanao region. The company needed a reliable supply of goods but also 
highly skilled staff due to its rapid growth. KK Stores' core competency was in the 
merchandising business, as stressed by Wallace Tan. It was not interested either in 
subcontracting or the production of house brands. Several important aspects of 
research and development were therefore passed on to its suppliers. This was one 
key external resource which KK was dependent upon. 
The perspective of a new entrant is provided by China Construction 
Company's entry into the Philippine construction market. The company had the 
technology, which attracted numerous prospective local partners. The company 
needed market information and local staff to succeed in the local market. Redding 
(2000, 49) observes that these alliances are occasioned by the 'fertile combination of 
needs that are complementary'. 
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Increasing power of suppliers 
The increasing power of suppliers in the retailing industry had an immediate 
impact on the nature of business credit. KK Stores' CEO recalled 
I remember before, in '86, we were able to get credit for most of the 
supermarket items; easily thirty days or ninety days. Right now almost 
fifty per cent of the items, especially Nestle, Philippine Refining 
Corporation, Colgate, those heavyweights, they can hardly give you 
credit anymore. 
One reason for this shift was that demand for certain brand goods was 
increasing so that more and more retail outlets found it imperative to stock these 
items. There were even brief periods of shortages of products such as bathing soap 
and toothpaste. Suppliers responded not by increasing prices, but by shortening the 
credit period. This period declined by about half, from an average of thirty days to 
fifteen days. According to Wallace Tan, most supermarkets have had to pay in 
- . 
advance to obtain cash discounts. This discount became the profit margin. He said 
We get a _ discount of four per cent [for cash advance], that's our 
margin. I believe if you pay COD [cash on delivery], it's two per cent; 
that's your margin. If you pay after fifteen days, which is the 
maximum credit period, you don't get anything, you have to sell at 
cost. 
This shift in power has affected KK' s financial needs and influenced the 
initial capital requirements for any other company wishing to start up in the industry. 
A more liberal credit environment decreased a firm's need for outside financing, for 
even if it sold at cost price, the generous credit period enabled one to earn at least 
some return on the sales proceeds that were parked in a temporary account. With 
tighter credit conditions, firms with inadequate working capital often found 
themselves having to borrow funds from banks to meet the payment terms of the 
now more powerful suppliers. 
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To start a business in the supermarket industry in the 1990s necessitated 
much more capital than several years previously. Mr. Tan ,estimated that it would 
take at least a hundred times more capital to go into the supermarket business now 
than when their business started ( about fifty years ago). In the past, businessmen, 
whether Chinese or Filipino, would have been able to start a grocery business by 
using their own savings, borrowing from family and friends or pooling funds in a 
partnership. Because the capital amount needed in the 1990s was much greater, the 
traditional, more informal sources were no longer viable as a source of substantial 
financing. For existing and new businesses, financial resources have become a more 
crucial resource. What were the avenues for acquiring this capital? For KK Stores, 
the main source was still the banking institutions but it was considering listing on 
the stock exchange to raise funds. 
Increasing power of buyers 
In the textile industry, the bargaining power of MM Textiles' buyers has 
been increasing. According to Jose Yu, the CEO, this was caused in part by the 
increase in the number of entrants. One sign of increasing buyer power was the fact 
that most of the major department stores were passing on more and more of the costs 
associated with selling its merchandise to the supplier. In most cases, suppliers had 
to provide their own display shelves which were manufactured according to the 
store's specifications, as well as paying for a salesperson at the store. The 
department store segment of :tvnv1' s buyer network has increased in popularity 
because of the change in the shopping habits of the urban population. There is an 
increasing preference to shop in more comfortable air-conditioned shopping malls 
where the department stores are located. Twenty years ago, Mr. Yu recalled, there 
were major shopping streets in downtown Manila. Shops along A venida Street or 
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Divisoria sold a variety of goods and competed against each other. One street 
became known for textile goods, while another was known for craft supplies. 
The three consequences of increasing buyer power are that: (a) costs of 
selling have increased due to department stores passing on inventory monitoring and 
stock display functions to the seller, (b) the terms of credit have lengthened to twice 
the previous terms and ( c) stores have been purchasing more and more of the goods 
on consignment. The latter refers to the practice of stores ordering goods on credit 
and returning unsold goods after a certain period of time (usually 90 days). Costs to 
a supplier like MM included the credit period for the sold goods, inventory costs for 
unsold goods and the risk of returned goods becoming out-of-fashion. 
Both MM Textiles and AA Plastics were experiencing increased pressure 
from foreign competition, as cheaper imports flooded the market due to decreased 
tariff rates. In the case of MM Textile, its aim was to manufacture for the domestic 
market. It did not export its textiles directly, but some garment exporters purchased 
material from them. Management had emphasised the technical aspects of 
production to the neglect of marketing. AA Plastics' CEO, on the other hand, 
acknowledged her weakness in international marketing skills. To remain 
competitive in the international market, the firm was seeking accreditation with the 
International Standards Office (ISO). 
Rivalry among existing competitors 
The increase in competition in the textile industry also exerted pressure on 
credit terms. 'Anyone with a few sewing machines can set up their home business,' 
Jose Yu, MM's CEO remarked, 'Somebody with a few million pesos can go into 
fabric manufacturing.' MM did not have a strong brand name, causing Jose Yu to 
reason that its products were not necessities in contrast to food or toiletry products. 
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He remarked that they were able to offer thirty days' credit terms to buyers a few 
years ago. The past two years have seen this term stretch out to sixty, and even 
ninety, days. These longer credit terms were the result of competitors in the textile 
industry trying to edge each other out by offering more attractive terms for buyers. 
There was also not much product differentiation. Some local manufacturers have 
attempted to establish their own brands or operate their own retail outlets but with 
mixed results. This situation has exacerbated MM' s needs for financial resources, 
for it has to match its competitors' credit terms. 
FF Food was established twenty years ago with one shop in the business 
district of Makati, Metro Manila. Jonathan Co's vision was for FF to grow to 200 
stores by the year 2000 and to list the company on the Philippine stock exchange not 
long after that. The company had created a successful brand name and concept for 
the domestic fast food market but needed several key resources to expand the 
business. These resources included financial capital and access to property in 
strategic locations. It had expanded through a mix of both company-owned and 
franchised stores. Considerable financial resources were required to establish 
company-owned stores. The funds were traditionally sourced through the company's 
retained earnings and bank financing. The establishment of stores required either 
outright purchase of real estate property or entry into a long-term lease with the 
property owner. For franchised stores, prospective franchisees were put through a 
screening process to determine their suitability. Franchisees provided the capital and 
FF provided the business, technology and raw materials. As a smaller player in the 
fast food market, FF had to be more generous in its requirements of prospective 
franchisees. The major player in the market is able to stop granting franchises and 
open its own stores because of a successful listing on the stock exchange. FF could 
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not do this due to constraints on funds and on its access to store locations. As will be 
seen in Chapter 6, however, this constraint has resulted in benefits to FF. 
FF had built a large manufacturing plant in Manila to manufacture its food 
products centrally. Using modem equipment, it manufactured noodles, bread, 
Chinese buns, sauces, and dumplings in its plant. These were fast-frozen and then 
delivered to the food outlets. It also sold noodles and sauces to the supermarkets. 
The raw material supplies that FF needed were of a generic nature; what 
were more important to the company were the logistics and value-adding aspects of 
the supplier relationship. The dependence on suppliers to provide more value-added 
services allowed FF to decrease its investments in processing plants, storage 
warehouses, and even delivery vans. CEO Jonathan Co explained that he would 
rather subcontract most of the processing activities to the suppliers and adapt the 
just-i_n-time system. 
5.4 Summary 
Organizations are interdependent with environments in a number of senses 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Scott 1992). Environments directly affect 
organizational outcomes, which in turn affect subsequent perceptions and decisions. 
Moreover, environments supply the materials and ingredients of which organizations 
are composed (Scott 1992, 149). 
The crucial role played by the environment in an organization's development 
is one of the patterns that clearly emerged from the case studies. It is both an 
influence on business and a source of resources. The environment influences a 
firm's strategic decisions. The repercussions of government policy were discussed 
in the previous chapter. Other firms in the market also affect a firm's decisions. For 
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some of the taipans discussed in the previous chapter, political favours conveyed 
some advantages to their business activities. The case study- firms, however, did not 
recognise political influence as a crucial resource for them. 
What would make it necessary for a business to seek IORs? This chapter has 
presented a model of how a business determines the need for external resources. 
Notable shifts signalled through the macro environment precipitate changes in the 
organization's strategy. A critical factor for the case study firms has been the 
government's changing policies towards the ethnic Chinese. The permission to 
apply for citizenship had far-reaching consequences for business development. With 
citizenship came the possibility of owning property in their own names and entry 
into industries reserved only for Filipino citizens. 
The intermediate environment also triggered numerous events that 
influenced the firm's strategic direction. Porter's (1980) competitive forces model is 
a useful framework for analysing these triggers. These forces are more applicable to 
ongoing businesses. The special case of businesses starting up was also discussed. 
The resource needs of a business starting up and the subsequent stages of growth 
and diversification were distinctly different. Initial capital requirements for start-ups 
were not onerous and the technical needs were not complex. 
The next stage for case study firms was their expansion into new areas. 
Because most of these activities involved manufacturing, technology requirements 
became more complex and were often unavailable in the Philippines. Many were 
also accessing new markets, either expanding outside the major Philippine cities or 
overseas. AA Plastics and JJ Chemical were two firms that were significant 
exporters. Table 5.5 depicts the competitive forces and summarises the strategic 
reactions and corresponding resource needs for the case study firms. 
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Table 5.5. Competitive forces, strategic reaction and resource needs 
Strategic reaction Resource needs 
Competitive Expand Expand into Upstream Seek Finance Technology 
forces into new new and alliance 
markets products or downstream with others 
services linkages 
Threat of X X X X X 
new entrants 
Increasing X X X 
power of 
buyers 
Increasing X X 
power of 
suppliers 
Rivalry X X X X 
between 
existing 
competitors 
The organization-environment fit is a process as well as a state: the 
organization seeks to align itself with its environment and to arrange resources 
internally in support of that alignment. It has been argued that successful 
organizations achieve strategic fit with their environment and support their strategies 
with appropriately designed structures and management processes. Less successful 
organizations typically exhibit poor fit externally or internally or both (Miles and 
Snow 1984, 10). 
The basic premise of resource needs analysis is resource dependence theory. 
The key to organizational survival, according to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), is the 
ability to acquire and maintain resources. If organizations were in complete control 
of all the components necessary for their operation, then this problem would be quite 
simple. However, no organization is completely self-contained: rather it is 
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embedded in an environment consisting of other organizations. The organization 
depends on those other organizations for the many resources that they themselves 
require. How do organizations acquire resources from their intermediate 
environment? The next chapter turns to this question. 
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Chapter 6 
The Strategies and Nature of Business Relations 
This chapter aims to answer two main questions: 'With whom do Chinese 
firms enter into relations?' and 'How do they choose who to do business with?' In 
addition, three supplementary questions will also be addressed: Does trust matter? 
Does reputation matter? Do asset specificity and small numbers bargaining come 
into consideration? 
In terms of the diagram depicting the process of IOR formation, this chapter 
proceeds to the second stage: strategies and nature (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1. A diagram depicting the process of networking · · 
Antecedents Strategies and Outcomes 
nature 
• • 
• Why network? • With whom? • Short-term 
• Why with this • Long-term 
particular firm? 
Kay (1993) refers to a firm's 'architecture' as one of the primary sources of 
its distinctive capabilities. By architecture he means the network of relational 
contracts within, or around, the firm. This study is primarily concerned with the 
firm's external architecture, or its relationship with suppliers, customers and other 
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external agents, rather than its internal architecture, or its relationship with 
employees. 
How do Chinese companies manage their need for exchange relations? In 
the grounded theory tradition, the process of managing is an action/interactional 
strategy that is composed of two important elements (Strauss and Corbin 1990). 
First, strategy is processual and evolving in nature. The discussion in this chapter 
accentuates the process of evaluating business partners to highlight this process. 
Second, action/interaction is purposeful and goal oriented. In this case, these IOR 
strategies are undertaken to meet the particular company's need for resources and 
skills. 
While the need for resources may initially determine the nature of relations 
with_ other firms, it must not be forgotten that relations continually unfold. Several 
factors influence the manner in which relations evolve. Among these are the 
expected and unexpected outcomes, or met and unmet objectives, after the 
relationship is undertaken. This aspect will be the focus of Chapter 7. For now, it is 
sufficient to keep in mind that the nature of relations discussed in this chapter is not 
static. 
This chapter discusses the nature of relationships structured along two 
dimensions: activity links and resource ties (Hakansson and Snehota 1995). Activity 
links refer to the technical, administrative or commercial activities of a company that 
are connected to those of another. Resource ties focus on the various resource 
elements (which include technological, material or knowledge resources) that are 
shared between two companies (this is sometimes referred to as a dyadic 
relationship). 
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It comes as no surprise that all case study firms considered a few ties to be 
their most important, or core, relations. This finding is similar to Hakansson and 
Snehota's (1995) observations for Swedish companies. They discovered that most 
industrial companies had a few buyers ( or customers) and suppliers that accounted 
for the major part of their total sales and purchases. These relationships were 
decisive for the performance of these firms. The ten largest customers and ten 
largest suppliers accounted for more than two-thirds of the total sales and purchases 
in two out of every three companies in the 100 Swedish companies studied. 
In this chapter, the firms' relations are discussed and organized in terms of 
the nature of their customers ( or buyers) and suppliers, as shown in Table 6.2. 
These are arrayed according to Williamson's (1975) small numbers bargaining 
condition as a dimension for comparing cases. Well-defined customers (small 
numbers) versus diffuse customers are based on the nature of the company's 
principal business activity. For example, industrial companies such as MM Textiles 
have well-defined and easily identifiable customers while mass-market companies 
such as KK Stores have a widely diffused customer base. 
Table 6.2. Case studies according to the nature of customers and suppliers 
Well-defined customers Diffuse customers 
( small numbers) 
Well-defined suppliers • AA Plastics • FF Food ( small numbers) • JJ Chemical 
• MM Textiles 
• SS Sawmill 
• China Construction 
Diffuse suppliers • GG Shipping (mixed) • KK Stores 
• SS Shipping (mixed) 
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Figure 6.1 is a graphical representation of the discussion of the case study 
firms and their IOR counterparts. The case study firm is the unit of analysis. The 
firm's relationships with each partner category ( suppliers, customers and other 
partners) are described in the next section. 
Figure 6.1 Case studies and IOR counterparts 
Other alliances 
(technology, 
finance) 
6.1 Well-defined suppliers, well-defined customers 
Companies that belong to this category mainly deal with industrial products. 
AA Plastics sells acrylic plastic products to industrial processors while JJ Chemical 
supplies industrial end-users and intermediate processors. MM Textiles 
manufactures some consumer products (such as men's and ladies' shirts) but does 
not sell directly to consumers. It sells on a wholesale basis to retailers. 
AA Plastics 
Buyers. AA did not sell its products directly to end-users, but relied on five 
exclusive distributors for domestic distribution and four foreign trading firms for 
export sales. Domestic sales accounted for 70 per cent of its revenues. The 
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domestic distributors, in turn, sold the products to manufacturers of lighting and 
signage products, point-of-sale displays and other plastic products. AA was one of 
only two companies that manufactured high-quality acrylic plastic in the Philippines 
and had yet to meet a domestic manufacturer as a strong competitor. 
No one distributor accounted for more than twenty per cent of AA's sales 
and all of them were related in one way or another to Chang Eng. His brother and 
sister owned one distributorship each. A sister-in-law was the third distributor while 
the fourth was a cousin. The fifth, while not a relative was a compadre ( sworn 
brother) of Mr. Chang, as the latter is the godfather to one of the former's sons. 
Long-term commitment between AA and its distributors was both desired 
and the reality, according to Wilma, General Manager of the company and Mr. 
Chapg' s only daughter. The average duration of the relationships was twenty years 
and Wilma expected these to continue indefinitely. 
Transactions with distributors depended to a great extent on oral agreement 
and tacit understanding. No written contracts were used and all orders were placed 
over the phone. While the use of informal procedures affords flexibility, rapid 
response and low initial cost, it was not without its drawbacks. Wilma explained: 
Sometimes it is difficult to do things over the phone. Like I would 
take an order, then the customer rings back and changes things. Or 
they might say, 'This is what we ordered but your company produced 
the wrong quantity.' We produce to exact specifications and if there is 
a misunderstanding like this, what am I supposed to do with our 
products? 
Suppliers. AA had a long-standing relationship with a machinery company 
in Taiwan from whom it purchases machinery. AA also depended on this company 
for machinery parts and repairs from time to time. It did not require the equipment 
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supplier to provide regular serv1c1ng, however. So long as the machinery was 
installed properly and runmng smoothly, AA was able ·to perform the regular 
maintenance on its own. 
Its major recurrent purchases were those of chemicals, the main suppliers of 
which were Chinese-owned trading companies. AA dealt with four trading 
companies. The chemicals required were all imported, with a standardised 
classification system for quality. The choice between purchasing from one supplier 
or another, therefore, hinged on two factors: the availability of the material and 
pnce. 
The procedures followed for purchasing were as informal as the sales 
procedures. As a result, similar problems of misunderstanding surfaced. Wilma 
recounted one incident: 
There was one time I asked for the price of a certain chemical from 
Robert [the sales manager for a Chinese chemical trader]. He told me 
it was 24 pesos a kilo. So I ordered a thousand kilos from him. When 
the · invoice came it was for 28 instead of 24 pesos per kilo. The 
problem was that he said that he quoted the higher price to me, but I 
remembered agreeing on another. 
Wilma hoped to address this problem by implementing the International 
Standards Office (ISO) standards. Conforming to ISO standards required most 
transactions to be put into writing. Therefore, there had to be written confirmation 
of orders, sales and delivery. Wilma remarked that convincing their suppliers and 
buyers to change their ways to conform to the new system would not be easy. Now, 
she gratefully acknowledged, buyers would have no choice but to complete purchase 
orders and suppliers would likewise have to send confirmed sales contracts after 
these standards were put into place. In addition, their production processes would 
__ have to be documented and quality control procedures put into writing. 
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Technology. Initial technology was provided by the Taiwanese partner 
because Chang Eng had no previous experience in this line -of business. While this 
type of technology can now be easily purchased, this still entailed a large capital 
outlay. Such an outlay could not necessarily be justified because the domestic 
market was not large enough to sustain more manufacturers. This capital 
requirement functioned as a barrier to new entrants into the market. Rather, imports 
from Malaysia and Taiwan were AA's main competition. 
Summary. The initial need for technology stemmed from the fact that 
Chang Eng had no experience in the manufacturing process of acrylic plastic. The 
current crucial network was the distributor network, both for domestic and 
international sales. Both sets of distributors were long-term associates and all local 
distributors were linked to the Chang family through strong ties. None of the 
domestic distributors had previous experience in the industry but the international 
distributors were established international trading companies. 
JJ Chemical 
JJ Chemical was a family company managed by Eusebio Wu, the younger 
brother of the founding Wu brother, Honorio. Important management positions in 
accounting, finance, marketing, human resources and planning were held by family 
members, including Eusebio's nieces and nephews. Johnny, Honoria's eldest son, 
was in charge of marketing. The company's major products were activated carbon, 
com oil and mosquito repellent coils. It also operated a rice and corn mill. 
Nippon joint venture. JJ Chemical's most important business relationship 
was with Nippon Trading Company, one of the largest trading companies in Japan. 
JJ has a joint venture with Nippon for the manufacture of activated carbon. How 
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this partnership began and why it has lasted for more than twenty years are two 
important issues to investigate. 
According to Johnny Wu, JJ had been exporting coconut shell charcoal since 
the mid 1960s. Japan was one of the major importing countries and Nippon one of 
the largest buyers. It was Nippon that came over to Cebu in 1973 and proposed the 
joint venture. When this occurred, the two parties had been doing business together 
for almost ten years. However, this was not equivalent to stating that there was 100 
per cent trust, only that the parties had a previous working relationship and knew 
each other's reputations. The implications of the difference between trust and 
reputation will become clearer in the section on trust. The Wu family managed the 
business in Cebu, with the assistance of one Japanese plant manager and three 
Japanese technical staff. 
What were the motivations of each party? In the case of JJ Chemical, 
Nippon was their major buyer before the venture. Nippon had access to the 
technology to process coconut shell charcoal into activated carbon and wanted to 
find a local partner to manufacture the finished product in Cebu, since labour costs 
were cheaper than in Japan and the raw materials were abundant in the Philippines. 
The final agreement saw Nippon contribute fifty per cent of the capital, in the form 
of equipment and technology, while JJ contributed the other half, including the land 
and buildings on which the present manufacturing plant stood. The venture had 
already been in existence for twenty years and Johnny foresaw it continuing 
indefinitely, so long as both parties derived benefit from the arrangement. 
Buyers. JJ and Nippon marketed the products together. In the early years of 
the venture, Nippon was responsible for most of the international marketing 
activities. 'They were more experienced in this area,' Johnny recalled, 'So for the 
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first five years it was really a learning stage for us. They did most of the marketing 
then, but now it's 50-50.' 
Johnny was responsible for domestic marketing, selling the products to a mix 
of industrial customers, the majority of which were mining companies. These 
companies used activated carbon to remove impurities from mined gold, a less 
expensive and less polluting process than mercury. As part of his duties, Johnny 
travelled to mining sites across the Philippines to consult with the customers' 
technical staff. He saw this as an important way of cementing relationships with the 
customers; they not only shared information, but were also able to evaluate product 
performance together. Industrial customers had specific requirements and JJ tailored 
its production to their specifications. His visits enabled discussions about these 
requirements as well as any complaints about the product and suggestions for 
improvement. Competition in the industry was not based solely on price. 
'You know, there are five producers of the same product in the Philippines, 
so we win or lose based on product quality. The gold mines say that our prices are a 
bit higher than others, but they still continue to buy from us because we can support 
them through our better quality control,' Johnny emphasised. 'We have more than 
twenty grades of carbon, depending on how the product will be applied. Sometimes 
our competitors fall short of supply, but we can guarantee our customers a steady 
supply. That is important too.' 
How did JJ decide whether to sell to a certain company or not? Before JJ 
made a decision to accept or reject an order, Johnny and another manager paid visits 
to the buyer to meet and talk to the other party in person. Johnny explained that they 
preferred to go to the top level in order to know the management and their 
_ requirements before accepting a new order. 
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JJ Chemical relied on written contracts or oral agreements, depending on the 
situation. Its industrial customers wer_e large companies with established operations, 
so there was a certain confidence on the part of JJ that these companies would 
honour their obligations. JJ Chemical considered the company's size and type of 
operation and prepared a written sales contract for each order. For some smaller 
companies or ones that preferred not to have written contracts ( often for tax evasion 
purposes), orders were done verbally. In Johnny's opinion, however, a written 
contract would not be any good if the buyer refused to pay and set out to be 
deliberately dishonest. The company seldom resorted to legal action to solve 
problems in business, a finding similar to that for Taiwanese business (Tu 1991 ). 
The problem that Johnny encountered with buyers was not default 1n 
payments, but delay in payments. Although sales contracts specified a credit period 
of thirty days, the buyers usually extended this to sixty and even ninety days. He 
didn't consider this dishonesty, but rather a case of 'bending the rules'. 
Suppliers. JJ Chemical developed its own purchasing network by 
establishing numerous buying stations in key centres in the Visayas and Mindanao 
regions. According to Eusebio Wu, JJ' s CEO, the best quality raw materials came 
from the Mindanao region because of the fertile soil. He often visited the buying 
stations as well as their branch office in Davao City, which served to coordinate all 
these stations in Mindanao. These stations were staffed by JJ employees, who were 
tasked with purchasing coconut shells from hundreds of farmers in the surrounding 
area. 
While the price paid for coconut shell was an important consideration for 
farmers, JJ' s long experience in the industry was another factor that affected the 
negotiations. The relationship established became important because the farmers 
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often had to be paid in advance. The farmers could then use the money to purchase 
tools and equipment, and the company was ensured of the supply when harvest-time 
arrived. 
Finance. At the start of the venture, Nippon and JJ each contributed an 
equal share of the capital in equipment, land and cash. Now that the business was 
growing, finance was sourced from bank borrowings, not additional equity. When 
asked how they chose which institution to do business with, Johnny remarked that 
they compared the various terms and conditions proposed by different banks and 
chose the one which offered them the best terms. The company has established a 
certain reputation and credibility with the banking community and did not find it 
difficult to obtain needed loans. 
Redding (1995) found that strategic alliances between Chinese firms in the 
Southeast Asian region and Western or Japanese firms demonstrated a valuable 
combination of: (a) Chinese enterprise in handling local labour forces, distribution 
systems and government relations and (b) Japanese or Western expertise in 
technology or world marketing. This is certainly the case with JJ Chemical. 
Nippon's expertise in technology and international marketing was combined with 
JJ's local labour force and raw materials procuring system. In addition, the taipans' 
alliances with foreign companies were highlighted in Chapter 4. 
Chinese joint venture. The Wu family was involved 1n another joint 
venture, this time with some of the residents of Honoria's hometown in mainland 
China. This venture was formed in 1992 to produce mosquito repellent coils for the 
Philippine market. The circumstances behind the formation of this venture could not 
have been more different from that of its venture with Nippon. It began when 
__ Johnny's father, Honorio, returned to China in the early 1980s to invite people from 
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his hometown to invest in Cebu. Some of them decided to manufacture mosquito 
repellent coils and contributed machinery to the venture. 
Mosquito repellent coils were a good product fit for the Wu family. The coils 
used a by-product of coconut shell charcoal as the principal raw material. However, 
five years later the venture had not even made a profit, which prompted Johnny to 
remark that his father entered into the business for sentimental, rather than profit, 
reasons. 'They [ the Chinese partners] contributed machinery, but this was old and 
slow,' he said. 'This venture might be profitable for them, because they are 
managing it, but for our part we have not yet seen a cent. ' 
While it may seem odd that a successful business family would enter into a 
business that had little hope of making a profit, the maximum financial exposure for 
the family was at most five million PhP, which was not a big amount for them. The 
venture with Nippon was substantially larger and JJ had more at .stake in ensuring its 
success. Upon closer scrutiny, the Chinese venture was more of a political rather 
than economic move. Honorio was a well-known local Chinese leader in Cebu and 
was also well-respected in his home town in China. The venture was seen to bring a 
certain prestige to the family while at the same time establishing a good reputation 
for them in China. 
In summary, the most critical relationship for JJ Chemical was the joint 
venture with Nippon. For JJ, this venture was a source both of technology and 
access to international markets. The firm sacrificed profits in the first few years, 
realising that its partner was making a larger profit from the venture. The Wu family 
was determined to learn from this venture. It also took the opportunity to add value 
to the raw materials that they were previously exporting in an unprocessed state. 
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From Nippon's point of view, JJ's supplier network was a competitive advantage for 
the venture. 
MM Textiles 
MM's first product was textile fabric, when Yu Eng Lit and his sons were 
inspired to produce import substitutes. It now produced both woven and knitted 
fabric. Its joint venture was formed with two Chinese-Filipino young men. The 
family ventured into fabric dyeing and finishing in the early 1990s. 
Buyers. MM' s network of customers had gradually evolved during the last 
twenty years. Some were important in its earlier years of operation but less so 
today. Its first network of customers was composed of small retailers of textiles and 
variety stores within a limited geographical area. These were located around the 
Chinatown area in Manila, mainly on Rosario, Juan Luna and Divisoria Streets. The 
majo_rity of stores were Chinese-owned and were all known to--the Yu family from 
the days when the latter were textile traders themselves. Therefore, when they first 
set up their textile factory, the first customers were these Chinatown traders. 
As the shopping patterns of the urban residents of Metropolitan Manila 
changed to reflect a shift towards department stores and shopping malls, MM' s 
customer network for its garments reflected this shift. While the Chinatown 
merchants were not abandoned totally, department stores were accounting for an 
increasing share of total sales. From selling 100 per cent of its products to the 
wholesale and retail merchants of Chinatown at the beginning, Jose Yu estimated 
their share to be down to about 20 per cent. Department stores accounted for 30 per 
cent of sales, while sales agents contributed 50 per cent. 
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The basis for procunng orders from the department stores was the 
presentation of samples to their purchasers. One day a week was allocated to certain 
products. On Thursdays, for instance, MM's sales representative displayed their 
new garment samples to the purchasers at say, Landmark Department Store in 
Makati. There was no direct contact between owners of these businesses and the 
process was formal. The decision to make a purchase was, according to MM's sales 
representative, dependent upon the purchaser's knowledge of what styles were 
fashionable and the past sales history of the products. When the purchaser was 
unsure of the product, they may still place a trial order and treated it as a 
consignment purchase. In this way the department store bore no risk if the product 
did not do well. In a climate of intense competition among garment manufacturers, 
MM' s sales representative said the message of the stores about consignment 
purchasing was 'take it or leave it'. If suppliers were unwilling to sell this way, 
competition was high and there were other suppliers to take their place. 
MM Textiles had a network of about a dozen sales agents. They were not 
employed by the company, but operated independently and in competition with each 
other to sell the company's products to institutional customers. To illustrate, a 
certain hotel required the supply of linen and put out a notice for tender. Various 
firms and agents submitted bids for this requirement, including two of MM' s sales 
agents. Product specifications were set out and the final decision was made on 
price. MM Textiles quoted the same price to both agents and it was up to them to 
submit their own bids after adding their own profit. In fact, they did not know that 
they were bidding against each other. 
Suppliers. MM's purchases from suppliers can be divided into recurrent and 
one-off transactions. It had ten suppliers for its major raw material requirements. 
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The major raw material requirements included cotton and polyester yam, chemicals 
and packaging materials. Cotton and polyester accounted for 80 per cent of the total 
annual purchases of its textile manufacturing division, while chemicals and dyestuff 
accounted for 90 per cent of purchases for its fabric dyeing and finishing division. 
There were several suppliers of cotton and polyester thread in Manila, but 
their quality and price varied. The primary criterion for purchasing decisions was 
price, but MM did not purchase from companies with whom it was not familiar. The 
suppliers were Chinese-owned firms, with one exception. That exception was an 
Indian yam manufacturing company that was relatively new to the market. Before 
MM decided to purchase from this firm, Jose Yu toured the manufacturing plant of 
the company and got to know the management. Quality was as important as the 
price, because inferior yam caused increased costs during the manufacturing 
process. It took time to load the yam onto the looms and po?r-quality yam often 
broke, disrupting the operation of the loom. Frequent starting and stopping of the 
loom resulted in time wastage and consequently higher labour costs. 
Technology. Machinery and equipment were all imported either through a 
local agent or directly from Germany, Taiwan or Japan. Attendance at trade shows 
was one important avenue for learning about the latest manufacturing technologies. 
Jose Yu and his brother had good contacts within the textile industry and could find 
out what kind of machinery their competitors are using. How did they do this? A 
Filipino sales agent for machinery spare parts paid a visit to Jose Yu one morning 
while the researcher was present. The agent informed the researcher that in his spare 
time he ran a business buying and selling used machinery. He then proceeded to 
inform Mr. Yu about the used machineries that were available and their prices. He 
also inquired whether Mr. Yu was selling any of his equipment. This agent was a 
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fount of information regarding MM competitors' factory set-ups and the availability 
and market value of used machinery. 
In the course of their business careers, Jose Yu and his brother have visited 
other textile manufacturers in the Asian region. On one occasion, while evaluating 
the performance of a certain machine from Germany, they were given the 
opportunity to visit a textile plant in Malaysia to observe how the equipment 
functioned. Jose Yu indicated that while this machinery had output estimates, it was 
always prudent to see it in action in tropical climates. MM arranged the financing of 
new capital purchases from local banks, in loans denominated in US dollars or 
Philippine pesos. 
The company had no formal alliances with technology providers, but it 
reguJarly bought parts from two Japanese and two Taiwanese companies. The initial 
need for new manufacturing technology was through outright purchase of 
machinery. The suppliers of the new machinery provided technical training to the 
Yu brothers. Jose Yu and his brothers have trained in Europe, Japan and Taiwan. 
Competitors. Cooperation between competitors is more common than is 
usually supposed. One example is the car industry. When an order is too large or 
difficult for a single firm to carry out, it may subcontract part of it to a firm with 
whom they would normally compete (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). This was 
observed in MM Textiles' case. 
Such subcontracting was observed in the fabric dyeing and finishing business 
of MM Textiles. The company performed its own dyeing and finishing for its 
woven fabrics, but also accepted outside orders from other manufacturers for fabric 
finishing. An urgent order might come at a time when the plant was operating at full 
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capacity. When this occurred, MM did not refuse the order but accepted it and 
subcontracted the job to a competitor to fulfil. Sometimes the company revealed its 
identity to the competitor but other times it assumed a fictitious company name in 
the purchase order. However, the identity of the original buyer was always closely 
guarded. 
In summary, this case illustrates the use of both strong and weak ties in 
forming IORs. MM's older buyer network has broken down because of declining 
sales. The newer network of department stores and boutiques represented formal 
contracting without particularistic ties. The most important information that the 
company sought was that related to the competitive environment, market prices for 
raw materials, and business news about its buyers and suppliers as well as the 
general business community. The main sources for this information were the 
family's social and business network as well as formal sources such as trade shows. 
The company's strategy for addressing declining sales in textiles was to diversify 
downstream into garments via a joint venture. When the garments business began 
getting highly competitive, it then diversified upstream into textile finishing. 
6.2 Well-defined customers, diffuse suppliers 
SS Shipping 
SS Shipping was ranked in the top five companies in the shipping industry 
and in the top 150 corporations of the country, based on gross revenues, in 1995 . 
The founder, John Ongseco, was born in the Philippines in 1910 and sent to China 
for a few years to study. His father operated a chartered boat service to transport 
cargo and passengers in Cebu. Unfortunately, he perished in a boat accident, 
leaving John to fend for his younger brothers and sisters. 
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During the Second World War, John bartered currency, dried fish, sugar and 
cigarettes. After the war, he started his transport business with one ship like his late 
father. By the 1950s, fifteen ships were flying his banner and, with continued vessel 
acquisition, SS was serving 24 domestic ports with a 1400 workforce by the early 
1990s. Its total assets by this time totalled two billion PhP. 
SS Shipping pursued a strategy of upstream and downstream integration by 
providing container facilities and services, as well as freight forwarding and trucking 
to provide customers wide access to a broad range of services. By introducing faster 
and more luxurious passenger vehicles, the company set a higher standard of quality 
for domestic water transportation and was able to attract a new set of customers who 
would otherwise not have considered using sea transport. 
Freight revenues accounted for sixty per cent of total gross revenues while 
passenger sales accounted for forty per cent in 1994. The company's basic cargo 
service was a pier to pier service, with the shipper delivering the cargo to the 
company at the port of origin and the consignee collecting the cargo at the port of 
destination. The company, however, contracted for trucking services with more than 
twenty trucking companies, including its own trucking company, which enabled it to 
provide door to door, door to pier and pier to door distribution services as required 
by its customers. 
All of the company's vessels were used in its cargo operations. The majority 
of the cargoes carried by the company from Manila to the provinces consisted of 
consumer items and finished goods, while the bulk of cargoes transported to Manila 
from the provinces comprised agricultural products and livestock. 
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Freight charges and passenger rates charged by inter-island shipping 
companies were established by each shipping company in reference to the tariff 
structure imposed by the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA). SS Shipping's 
cargo rates were determined primarily by reference to the type of cargo carried (in 
accordance with MARINA classification), the distance of the route, and either the 
volume or the weight of the cargo to be carried, depending on which would result in 
a higher tariff. Trucking rates charged to customers were determined by reference to 
the Domestic Shipowners Association (DSA) prescribed rates. 
The company's passenger ships offered a range of accommodation that 
typically comprised premium first and second class accommodation, and third or 
economy class. Passenger rates were determined by the class of accommodation and 
the distance to be travelled. First and second class rates for liners have been 
deregulated and the company was free to determine these rates. Third class, or 
economy rates, like basic cargo rates, must be set by reference to prescribed 
MARINA rates. 
Buyers. SS had two sets of customers. The first consisted of industrial 
customers who availed themselves of its cargo services. This set was well-defined 
and each company was identifiable. The second set was composed of passengers 
and was a diffuse and numerous group. Cargo customers' choice of which carrier to 
use was based on routes and frequency. Long-time customers were granted credit, 
but new customers did not have this privilege. The company advertised in various 
media targeting the passenger segment, including newspaper, television, radio and 
magazine advertising. Sales and marketing were conducted through its network of 
branches and sales agencies, most of which were situated at ports serviced by the 
company's vessels. 
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Equipment suppliers. SS has historically purchased most of its vessels 
from Japanese shipowners. These vessels were generally between 11 and 20 years 
old when acquired and were then renovated and refurbished in the Philippines before 
deployment. The company financed approximately eighty per cent of its vessel 
acquisition costs through peso loans from local banks payable over five to seven 
years with interest at market rates. 
The company has a technical tie-up with a Norwegian consultancy company 
to develop training programs for its officers and crew. This training venture was 
intended to provide employees with new skills, enhance their existing skills and 
keep them up to date with developments in national and international shipping. 
The company owned and leased a variety of types and sizes of containers and 
oth~r equipment for use in its cargo operations, including forklift and top loaders, 
yard tractors and trailers. As of the end of 1994, SS owned . 78 per cent of the 
containers in use while the rest were leased. It believed the primary benefits of 
leasing a portion of its containers were ( a) the ability to respond rapidly to changes 
in shipping demand and imbalances in trade routes and to meet seasonal needs and 
(b) the opportunity to expand trade routes and market share without making a long-
term financial commitment. The company leased containers from eight lessors. 
Strategic alliance. SS entered into a strategic alliance with two smaller 
shipping companies in the early 1990s. The decision was triggered by indications 
that the government would be opening the local shipping industry to foreign 
investment and, hence, greater competition. 
One shipping company was owned and managed by a Chinese family and 
excelled at servicing short routes to and from Cebu. The other was owned and 
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managed by a Spanish family and was highly computerised. While the CEO, John 
Ongseco, admitted that the process of merging three companies into one was 
difficult, the benefits outweighed the teething problems. One of the problems of 
integration was the difference in the cultures of the organizations, John continued. 
However, the basic problem of the management team had been resolved, he 
revealed, with himself as CEO, and a representative each from the two other families 
as vice-presidents. 
GG Shipping 
In sharp contrast to the management style of SS Shipping, GG was a family 
owned and managed company. The company began as a partnership between two 
Lim brothers, Lim Po and Lim Wan, who were immigrants from China. The initial 
capital came from the profits that the two brothers had saved from previous 
businesses, in particular agricultural trading. In the early 1979s, the two brothers 
parted ways to form their own shipping companies with their own families. Lim Po, 
the older brother, started GG Shipping together with his two sons. George Lim, the 
eldest, is Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of GG Shipping. 
Finance. Finance for business operations and capital investment was 
generated internally and through banks. However, the family was seriously 
considering listing their company on the stock exchange. According to George, 'If 
you go public, other people invest [their money] so borrowing from the bank will be 
minimised.' 
Shipping was a capital intensive business because a large amount of funds 
was required for the purchase of ships, according to Mr. Lim. An alternative to 
outright purchase was leasing but in the case of GG, they preferred to purchase all of 
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the ships with the aid of bank financing. They purchased used ships from overseas, 
particularly Japan and Eastern Europe. 
Customers. GG Shipping has decided to concentrate on the cargo and 
passenger business and reduce the emphasis on their agricultural trading business. 
Shipping prices were set in reference to government guidelines, as discussed 
previously. Companies within the industry effectively competed on service and 
equipment. Mr. Lim believed that their advantage lay in their personalised service, 
as reflected in the way customers and guests were received in the office. 
Due to their focus on passenger service, it became necessary to establish a 
wide network of ticket outlets around the country to make purchasing tickets 
convenient. These outlets were a mixture of company-owned and independent 
ageJ)cies. The decision as to which ownership structure to implement depended on 
whether GG had a suitable person in the area to manage the outlet. With an agency, 
GG incurred higher costs, in the form of commissions on sales. However, Mr. Lim 
said that it was easier to manage an agent. The agent earned income based on sales 
commissions, so there was an incentive for them to increase sales. This 
performance-based incentive encouraged the agent to conduct their own local 
marketing activities, such as advertising, in an attempt to increase turnover. 
Staff. As to the management team, it was a different story altogether to SS 
Shipping. There was a clear preference for family members. The advantage of 
having their 'own people' (zi Ji ren) managing the business, according to George, 
was that it speeded expansion. By 'own people' he meant family members 
exclusively. Without their own people, he continued, they would be cheated left and 
right. 
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George Lim believed that customers should have easy access to the officers 
of the company and designed the layout of their headquarters in Cebu City to reflect 
this outlook. The layout can be described as open and although there were private 
offices for the officers, all of them occupied desks in the main open area together 
with the rest of the staff. Desks were arranged in accordance with the organizational 
hierarchy: receptionists and clerks were placed in the front area while officers were 
closest to the back wall and furthest from the reception area. Mr. Lim explained that 
he encouraged this open type of layout to enable customers to have free access to 
anyone in the company. 'In fact,' he remarked, 'I try to answer my own telephone.' 
Summary. GG's expansion and growth strategy was highly dependent on 
the availability of family members as trusted managers. This was in contrast to SS 
where only two family members were in the management team and no other family 
members were employed in the firm. George Lim characterised GG as a traditional 
Chinese family firm, efficiently and conservatively run. There was much emphasis 
on informality and accessibility of managers to buyers and suppliers, as the office 
layout anecdote illustrated. He also valued long-term ties and offered flexibility in 
payment terms to loyal customers. 
6.3 Diffuse customers, well-defined suppliers 
FF Food 
From a single shop in 1985, FF Food had developed into a network of more 
than one hundred outlets by 1997. It started building its network of franchises in 
1989. The company began as a partnership between two businesspeople 
contributing their own resources and skills. Jonathan Co had the experience and 
skills in running a Chinese noodle shop while Stephen Yu possessed substantial 
financial capital and experience in the fast food industry. Jonathan assumed the 
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position of CEO of FF Food while Stephen remained a silent partner. While 
acknowledging the importance of this initial partnership to ,business success, other 
relations were harnessed by Jonathan for subsequent growth. According to him, the 
firm's internal and external architecture were equally important in ensuring success 
in the marketplace. 
Suppliers. Its relations with suppliers and franchisees were crucial in 
securing consistent growth. There were two general types of suppliers for a food 
outlet. The first consisted of equipment manufacturers and importers. The 
equipment was a mixture of locally manufactured and imported equipment. 
Freezers, for instance, were imported but other equipment such as deep fryers, 
burners, working benches and countertops were sourced from various manufacturers 
in Manila. Jude Ngo, a supplier of stainless steel counter and kitchen fixtures 
remarked that KK was their biggest customer, and that they have been doing 
business with each other for ten years. 
When queried about the ethnic background of the owners of these 
companies, Jonathan was surprised to note that they were all from a Chinese 
background. 'Well, we did not deliberately choose the suppliers because of their 
background,' he remarked. 'Many of them I knew from when I was managing a 
Chinese restaurant. We buy from them because they can deliver the quality we 
require at the right price.' 
The other type of supply for a food outlet was the raw material (food 
ingredients) needed to produce the menu items. A typical FF outlet offered a range 
of noodle and rice dishes, steamed buns and a small selection of desserts. The food 
ingredients were of a generic, non-asset specific nature. Chickens, for example, 
were sourced from the two biggest corporations in the Philippines, Magnolia 
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Corporation and Vitarich. 'Their quality is more or less the same,' Jonathan said, 
'so it doesn't make much difference from which compariy we buy our chickens 
from. The price is what we consider.' This was, however, not the case with other 
types of food ingredients. 
Suppliers of wheat flour, pork, beef, and seafood were mainly small and 
medium sized family owned businesses. Aling Emilia, a supplier of vegetables, 
recalled that she first sold vegetables to FF in 1985 when it had one outlet. The 
volume was a few kilos a day. Now, she delivered 2,000 kilos of different 
vegetables to the company each day. She happily declared, 'As long as they are 
growing, we are also growing. They are a very good customer. That is why I am 
loyal to them.' 
This network of suppliers was gradually built up through personal referrals 
from existing suppliers. It was important to ensure that the company got the best 
quality products and, in the case of meat products, disease-free as well. Quality was 
a crucial factor as the company was embarking on a rationalisation of its purchasing 
system. As part of its strategic plan, it was passing on most of the food processing 
activities to its suppliers. Instead of delivering whole chunks of pork, Jonathan was 
experimenting with letting the suppliers cut the pork into specified sizes and 
marinating them. He explained that he was trying to adapt the Japanese just-in-time 
system to his business. 'In this way,' he rationalised, 'we don't have to hire so 
many people. We just farm out most of the activities to our suppliers. We don't 
even have to make big investments to expand our warehouse.' 
Franchisees. At the outset, the two partners had already decided to use the 
franchising system as FF's growth strategy. As the main franchisor, FF not only 
received an upfront franchise fee, but generated on-going revenues from its royalties 
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based on the sales revenues of the outlets. Not all of its stores were franchises; 
about 20 per cent was company-owned. 
Jonathan contrasted their approach to another local franchise business, 
FoodWorld. The latter's decision to build its own stores rather than franchising 
them was a function of its financial standing at a certain point in time. During 
periods when FoodWorld had abundant financial resources, it simply stopped 
granting franchises and built its own stores. The opposite occurred during times of 
low levels of financial resources. When it listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange, 
FoodWorld refused to grant new franchises for at least six months because it was 
flush with cash. In the case of FF, Jonathan viewed franchising from a different 
perspective. It was a function, Jonathan stressed, not of the financial standing of the 
company, but of its desire for growth. He illustrated this by an anecdote about one 
of its newest stores in Pampanga. 
Florencio Ramos owned a piece of property in one of the most popular 
shopping areas of Pampanga and was scouting around for a food franchise. He 
approached FoodWorld but it had already stopped granting franchises at that time. 
Turning to FF Food instead, both parties reached an agreement whereby Ramos 
owned fifty per cent of the business and FF the other half. 'See,' Jonathan 
exclaimed, 'if we could not have reached a compromise, we would not be there. 
Now it is one of the highest grossing stores in the province and the only fast food 
franchise in that shopping complex. FoodWorld missed their chance.' For him, it 
was more important to seize the opportunity and be more flexible in negotiating. 
Franchising is an example of the plural firm: it is both a hierarchy and a 
relational network. The choice of this mechanism is a function of the vagaries of 
__ circumstance, for example an idea for a new site or the need for cash or qualified 
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managers (Bradach and Eccles 1989). The franchised chain is not strictly a firm but 
a network of firms (Grandori and Soda 1995). 
Internal architecture. While the main focus of this research is on the firm 's 
external architecture, in the course of discussion Jonathan brought up the importance 
of his key employees. His core management team, all Filipinos, played a key part in 
the success of the firm. Aside from this core team, the company employed a large 
pool of casual labour in the food factory and food outlets. The length of the 
employment contract was less than one year. This practice allowed optimum 
flexibility in staffing, as the company was free to reduce or increase the numbers at 
short notice. The downside to this was the need to train new casuals on a regular 
basis. 
6.4 - Diffuse customers, diffuse suppliers 
KK Stores 
KK Stores' important external relationships included its set of customers, 
suppliers, and banking institutions. Wallace Tan, President and CEO, identified 
their core business as merchandising through the department store concept. In a 
typical store, one found departments such as ladies shoes, ladies wear, cosmetics, 
toys, kitchen items and so on. A supermarket was usually located on the ground 
floor of a multi-storey building owned by the company. Customers were 
characterised as being diffuse. Though its customers were an important set of 
partners, there was no one-to-one relationship between the two parties . KK 
classified its customers into broad socio-economic groupings, and tagged the A-B 
class as the upper class and the C-D class as the middle and lower ( or mass-based) 
class. 
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Suppliers. Relations with suppliers had evolved by an interesting process, 
as a result of which the routines for transacting had been institutionalised. Mr. Tan's 
words were illuminating in this area: 
Right now, in my position, I hardly know our suppliers because they 
are changing while most of those who were close to us, their children 
are taking over. Some of them merge, change ... so I hardly know them 
anymore. 
Not all suppliers were Chinese, but the majority were. According to Mr. 
Tan, most had dealt with the company for more than twenty years and some even for 
two generations. Suppliers were a mixture of foreign multinationals, Chinese and 
Filipino companies. 
What was the nature of KK's relations with suppliers? KK's strategy was to 
focus its efforts on what it saw as its core competency, the merchandising of 
cons1.µ11er goods. This strategy drove the company's actions with suppliers. It did 
not manufacture any of the goods it sold, unlike some competitors who had joint 
ventures with garments manufacturers and subcontracting arrangements for the 
manufacture of house brands. Mr. Tan affirmed that 
We are concentrating on our core business. I feel that we are quite 
strong in retail and merchandising. We know our trade and we are 
quite efficient. When you go to manufacture, the focus is very, very 
different. 
As a result, KK relied on its suppliers to provide market research and product 
development. He emphasised, 'What we don't do well, others can do better.' This 
arrangement was generally limited to fashion items, in particular ladies fashion and 
shoes. Suppliers had to keep tabs on what was happening in their particular product 
specialisation, domestically and internationally. They took note of new fashion 
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developments overseas and adapted those designs that they considered appropriate 
for the local market. The manufacturers subsequently ·presented their product 
offerings to the purchasing team of KK Stores, who in turn decided which items 
would be suitable for certain branches. 
KK operated a large number of stores in the southern part of the Philippines, 
with department stores and supermarkets in Davao, Iloilo, Cagayan de Oro and 
Cebu. Mr. Tan stated with pride that they had developed a fine-tuned purchasing 
system. Each store possessed its own purchasing team, which focused on selecting 
items that it believed were suitable for its particular location. An example was 
cotton T-shirts. Two different KK stores in Cebu that were ten kilometres apart 
might order completely different mixes. The 'uptown' stores ordered larger sizes in 
pastel colours while the 'downtown' store bought smaller sizes in brighter colours. 
'The skill of our purchasers has to be so specialised and fine-tuned to local demand 
because of the high cost of transporting goods from one location to another,' Mr Tan 
explained. 'Like our store in Davao, if they want to move stock here that has 
remained unsold for some time, it will cost five per cent ( of the price). Mistakes can 
add a lot to the cost.' 
Finance. In the case of the retailing industry in general and KK stores in 
particular, e~isting financial practices were a result of the interplay between buyers 
and suppliers and their relative strength or power. One of the significant changes in 
the last decade, according to Mr. Tan, was the increase in the initial capital required 
for business. 'In fact,' he stressed, 'it seems to me that the capital needed has 
increased by at least a hundred times more. So one can no longer depend on capital 
from one's friends or family or even suppliers' credit.' 
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A decade ago, most supermarket items could be bought on thirty or sixty 
days' credit. For retailers, goods were purchased on credit and so there was no 
immediate need to use the sales proceeds to pay the suppliers. These proceeds could 
then be used for other purposes, such as earning interest revenue by investing them 
in the money market. The current situation had changed dramatically. Now almost 
fifty per cent of supermarket items, especially well-known brands such as Nestle and 
Colgate, had to be purchased with cash. Some supermarkets had been known to pay 
in advance to secure a discount. That discount became the profit margin. For 
instance, a store might get a four per cent discount for paying in advance: that was 
its margin. Payment upon delivery translated to a two per cent discount. Waiting 
for fifteen days to settle the account, the maximum credit period, did not earn any 
discount. Stores found it difficult to make a decent profit margin because if they 
marked up on cost, customers would go elsewhere. A store in this situation had to 
very well sell at cost. 
6.5 Strategies and nature of IORs 
With whom? 
The literature on Chinese business networks emphasises the predominance of 
ties with one's own family members. In contrast, this study uncovered something 
different. The case study firms' IORs with their strong kinship ties were the 
exception, not the rule. Nevertheless, a pattern emerged in terms of the nature of 
resource need and the choice of partners. Resource need was, in tum, influenced by 
a firm's stage of development and strategy. Initial capital was important for the 
firms investigated. The amount was almost always not very large, but the hindrance 
to a new business start-up was that it was unable to borrow from financial 
institutions. The new business did not have assets to serve as collateral, nor did it 
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have a track record to show the banks. Hence, the role of family and friends in 
providing initial capital was highly important. At the very least, one could use 
strong kinship ties to serve as loan guarantors or credit references. Controlling for 
industry, the stage of a firm's development affected the source of resources for the 
following reasons: 
• The scale of resource need was normally small at the start-up stage. 
• There was uncertainty at the start-up stage due to a firm's lack of 
reputation and performance record (hence, it could not access 
financial institutions). For these reasons, family ties were essential. 
• The nature of resource need was different at different stages of 
development. Therefore, source of resources was also varied. 
A person's guanxi is thus highly relevant in the discussion of the choice of 
business relationship, especially in the early stages. The term guanxi refers to 
relationships or social connections built on pre-existing relationships of classmates, 
people from the same native-place, relatives and superiors or subordinates in the 
same workplace (Yang 1989, 41). In Chinese societies, the most common shared 
attributes for building personal networks are locality (native place), kinship, co-
worker, classmate, sworn brotherhood, surname and teacher-student (King 1994). 
To characterise the Chinese approach to social relationships, Fei Xiaotong 
(1992, 65) used the image of 'ripples formed from a stone thrown into a lake, each 
circle spreading out from the centre becomes more distant and at the same time more 
insignificant'. Within this mode of association, the society is composed not only of 
discrete organizations, but of overlapping networks of people linked together 
through differentially categorised social relationships. Yan (1996, 4) discusses three 
local categories in each person's network of guanxi: 
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• A personal core of close relatives: one's immediate family and close 
agnates and affines such as siblings, first cousins and wife's siblings. 
• A reliable core of good friends and less close relatives who can 
always be counted on for help. The distinction between personal core 
and reliable zone is not always clear cut, because best friends may be 
regarded as closer than relatives and thus enter into the core of one's 
personal connections. 
• An effective zone of relatives and friends in a broader sense. This 
normally embraces a large number of people and is more open to 
recruitment. 
In social network theory, the equivalent of guanxi spheres is the contrast 
between strong and weak ties. A person's acquaintances (weak ties) are less likely 
to be socially involved with one another than are his or her close friends (strong 
ties). Thus the set of people made up of any individual and his or her acquaintances 
comprises a low-density network ( one in which many of the possible relational lines 
are absent), whereas the set consisting of the same individual and his or her close 
friends will be densely knit (many of the possible lines are present) (Granovetter 
1983, 201-202). An added dimension is that the individuals are usually members of 
multiple social networks and their ties can connect clusters. Such cross-linkages 
give clusters access to external resources and provide the structural basis for 
coalitions. At the same time, internal linkages allocate resources within a cluster 
and provide the structural basis for solidarity (Wellman 1983). 
On the surface, one can argue that business relations can be established with 
anyone at all. If there is a choice, and everything else is equal, one will indeed 
prefer to deal with a kinsman or a person with whom one has something in common, 
or with whom one is at least acquainted (DeGlopper 1972). Still, networks are not 
exclusive: rather, ethnic Chinese are using their ethnic identities and values for their 
_ own benefit. Investment in China is done for economic advantage rather than for 
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reasons of their ethnic affection (Chen 1996, 7; Yeung 2000, 83-84). Wong (1991) 
found that small factory owners in Hong Kong depended heavily on particularistic 
connections to get business orders. Highly personal methods such as introductions 
and recommendations by former employees, friends and relatives were used, and 
impersonal channels such as advertising and sales promotion were seldom resorted 
to. The case studies indicate that both personal and impersonal channels are used to 
obtain orders. This is reflected in all the cases, as highly competitive environments 
necessitate going beyond one's particularistic connections. 
The findings of the present study accord with other studies on Chinese 
business activities in Southeast Asia. A study of small-scale entrepreneurs in 
Singapore found that local and international trade through kinship links are rather 
untypical of Singaporean Chinese traders. Only four out of twenty three trading 
firms surveyed maintained local or international trade relations with kinsmen 
(Menkhoff 1991, 16). This study of Singaporean Chinese trading firms found that 
dialect or territorial solidarities, kinship or family connections are not per se a strong 
basis for Chinese trading networks and external economic dealings. The majority of 
the overseas trading partners of the respondents were non-kinsmen. This finding is 
contrary to others who have tried to identify the underlying 'secrets' of Chinese 
business connections in terms of far flung, global family and kinship ties (Menkhoff 
1991, 202). Likewise, Wong (1988) concludes that kinship does not play an 
important role in regulating the external business transactions of Hong Kong 
Chinese enterprises. It has even been suggested that kinship reciprocity may under 
some circumstances curb the autonomy and freedom of the transacting actors 
(Menkhoff and Labig 1996). 
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Personal ties can furnish some clues as to who a businessman's potential 
partners might be, but a firmer basis for analysis is one of this study's core concepts: 
resource need. Complementarity of resources is a predictor of network formation 
(Grandori and Soda 1995). This study takes the underlying economic transaction as 
the first point of analysis, rather than looking at the nature of a businessperson's ties 
as the first consideration. When an economic basis for an IOR has been established, 
how then do businesses choose with whom to transact? The next section deals with 
this issue. 
Trust and reputation 
Is trust a precondition for exchange? Or is it possible to engage in a 
transaction without the presence of trust? The companies in the study evaluated 
other firms in terms of the latter's reputation with a view to gauging initial trust or 
distrust. The reasons why companies may not have full trust in their business 
relations were because: 
• A large number of important business relations were not with those 
with whom the businessmen had strong ties. Initially, they may not 
have had sufficient experience with their partners to evaluate trust. 
• The choice of partners was not infinite ( small numbers bargaining), 
but the situation of some choice is discussed below. This was 
because it was not always possible to choose partners whom they 
trusted, as in the case of JJ Chemical. 
• It was possible not to have trust, but not possible to have IORs with 
strangers. 'One does not do business with people one does not know' 
(De Glopper 1972, 304). In cases of distrust, safeguards were built 
into the relationship. 
How was trust evaluated? Interfirm trust is incrementally built as firms 
repeatedly interact (Gulati 1995, 92). Familiarity is a precondition of trust but not 
identical with it. The case of JJ Chemical's joint venture with Nippon highlights the 
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observation that trust is not necessarily a precondition for IOR. Reputation is. JJ's 
evaluation process hinged on three points of reference: · a common tie, tangible 
evidence, and company reputation. Armstrong and Yee's (2001) study of ethnic 
Chinese business in Malaysia also found that an organization's reputation influences 
interaction between industrial buyers and sellers. 
A common tie represented a similar point of reference between a company 
and another party. This can take the form of a reference from someone whom the 
businessperson knows. New buyers coming to MM Textiles' office always 
attempted to establish their credibility by introducing themselves in relation to 
someone MM Textiles' officers knew. All this was done in the hope of getting 
discounts on the prices and, eventually, establishing a credit line with the firm. 
MM' s first customers were its former competitors in the textile trading business. 
In order to gauge the reliability of a company, MM Textiles and SS Sawmill 
looked for tangible evidence such as the other party's shopfront or office premises 
and assets such as machinery, equipment and transport equipment. When MM 
Textiles' John Yu was setting up the company's first set of textile retailers, he would 
go to the Divisoria area almost every day. At the same time as he was trying to sell 
his company's products, he was also investigating his potential buyers and observing 
each store's location relative to its competitor, the shop size, and merchandise 
stocked. 
The company's reputation, apart from owner's reputation, was another point 
of evaluation. Where were the sources of information for evaluation? This was 
where the businessman's social ties came into play, as he could obtain information 
about other businesspeople through business association meetings, as well as 
hometown meetings and social gatherings. John Yu was president of his hometown 
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association, as was his father before him. Often, John was the first person to know 
about the business difficulties of a member of the association, as the member would 
use the association as a source of financial assistance. It should not be assumed that 
one completely trusted one's guanxi sphere. Pragmatically, however, it was easier 
to evaluate the trustworthiness and reliability of one's strong ties. 
Personal reputations and prior relations are important factors in explaining 
the formation of ties. Knowing the people and knowing their capabilities (firm 
reputation) are two prime considerations. The first is a social relations aspect and 
the second an economic aspect. Mutual economic advantage is necessary but not a 
sufficient rationale. An obvious incentive is the primary economic exchange, 
defined as the economic value of the annualised economic transaction. The more 
important economic dimension, however, is the growth of the transaction as an 
incentive. Within this second phase is a trial period which enables the development 
of trust. Two key dimensions within this trial period are the institution of rules and 
procedures that introduce into the exchange a predictable structure and a basis for 
performance and monitoring that provide stability and efficiency and the evolution 
of clear expectations within each alliance (Larson 1992). This second phase is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
6.6 The essential network 
The core group of crucial customers and suppliers to the case study firms is 
what this research terms the essential network. Larson's (1992) research into 
smaller companies found that they used a limited but dense network of exchange 
relationships as vehicles for growth. 
What qualifies a partner to be included in this network? The first is the 
volume of business activity accounted for. In the case of buyers, it is the volume of 
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sales revenue. For suppliers, it is the total purchase volume. What about finance 
and technology partners? It is the importance of their contribution to the firm's 
strategic direction and growth. This group changes, however, as the business 
environment in which the companies operated changes. In the case of JJ Chemical, 
a customer (Nippon) became a joint venture partner. In another, MM Textiles, a 
certain group of customers declined in importance while another group took their 
place. 
AA Plastics stood out because it was the only case study firm with its 
essential network composed of close family members. The firm's manager 
emphasised the strong trust that existed within the network, yet she was strongly 
pushing for improved formal documentation of transactions with suppliers and 
buyers. JJ Chemical's critical partner was with a foreign company and both parties 
had made asset-specific investments in the activated charcoal plant. A special 
factory was built to produce an industrial product that had specialised applications in 
cigarettes, water filters and minerals processing. 
MM Textiles had an essential buyer network composed of agents, 
wholesalers, and its garments joint venture. The firm also used its competitors as 
alternate sources of services for textile finishing, a unique situation that can be 
explained through economic reasoning: the company desired to keep its customers 
happy even if this meant sharing some profits with competitors. 
Both SS Shipping and GG Shipping's essential network were composed of 
industrial customers but SS had the added strength of an alliance behind it. FF Food 
had a key set of suppliers and it was increasing its dependence on them by assigning 
even more functions to these suppliers. Finally, KK Stores also had a key set of 
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long-time suppliers. It also relied upon certain financial institutions for capital 
projects such as shopping mall development. 
The essential network is the sum total of a firm's strong bonds. Bond 
strength is defined as the 'capacity to withstand a disruptive force' (Easton and 
Araujo 1989, 101). This strength does not equate to longevity or complexity; these 
are surrogates for bond strength but not strength itself (Easton and Araujo 1989). 
The dimension of frequency refers to transactions and to the mobilisation of 
relations, and must be distinguished from the criterion of durability, applied to roles. 
Some role relations may remain latent for years without withering away (particularly 
those defined in close kin terms) whereas others, such as those of friendship, may 
call for continual mobilisation if they are to persist. Also, high frequency of contact 
does not necessarily imply high intensity in social relationships (Barnes 1972, 18). 
Weak bonds can also be important in three types of situations. First, 
infrequent purchase: where there is no regular contact between organizations, it is 
likely that strong bonding does not exist. Nevertheless, key technical decisions 
made at a particular point ( e.g. capital equipment decisions) may tie the 
organizations together for long periods, at least economically and technically, 
though other evidence of strong bonding 1s absent. This was the case for JJ 
Chemical. 
Second, small volume purchases would tend to suggest weak bonding. 
However, where these purchases are essential in terms of technical features, quality 
or delivery, strong bonding can and does occur. 
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Finally, some firms choose not to develop strong bonds despite obvious 
contextual benefits from doing so. They may prefer flexibility to economy (Easton 
and Araujo 1989). 
The entire core relations of the firms studied exhibited what Uzzi (1997) 
terms embedded exchange. Characterised by informal ties rather than explicit 
contracts, these relations exhibited thick information exchange of tacit and 
proprietary know-how. These companies' strategies manifested elements of 
satisficing rather than maximising on price, as there was a demonstrated reluctance 
to shift from one partner to another, except in cases where the product was of a 
generic, non-asset specific nature. However, the utility of these embedded relations, 
and the resulting depth of exchange and learning, were ultimately dependent on the 
company's ability to provide coordinating devices within the firm in order to 
promote knowledge and learning from the relationship. The next chapter discusses 
this issue. 
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Chapter 7 
Consequences of Relations 
The core concept that resulted from the data analysis is resource need as an 
impetus for forming interorganizational relations (IO Rs). Chapter 5 discussed the 
resources needed by the case study firms. Chapter 6 proceeded to elaborate on how 
the firms gained access to these resources. This chapter addresses two questions: 
What are the outcomes from access to resources? How do IORs change over time? 
Outcomes of IORs are discussed in this chapter in terms of tangible and 
intangible benefits and costs. Tangible benefits are strategic and financial: 
generating additional profits, improving market share, and sustaining competitive 
-
advantage. Intangible benefits are learning or knowledge-based such as acquiring 
specific skills and competencies (Kogut 1988; Parkhe 1991) or simply learning how 
to learn from collaborations. Intangible outcomes are more difficult to quantify and 
usually manifested over a longer period of time. The discussion then proceeds to 
encompass opportunism within IORs. How do firms try to prevent or reduce the 
possibility of exploitation within their relationships? Finally, what changes are 
observed over time? Four important areas are examined: the level of trust, 
dependence and power asymmetry, cost reduction and quality issues, and exit 
(termination). 
7.1 Tangible outcomes 
The strategic importance of a network arrangement is that it allows a firm to 
specialise, enjoying the benefits of specialisation, focus and size. The other 
activities are then farmed out to members of the network. By farming out activities, 
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a firm can lower its costs for those activities it keeps inside, because it can reap 
economies of scale and develop distinct competences (Jarillo 1988, 36). The 
tangible outcomes from IORs are grouped under the four categories of (a) 
economies of scale, (b) economies of scope and synergy, ( c) economies of 
specialisation and experience and ( d) other factors. 
Economies of scale 
Economies of scale were manifested by the case study firms through 
achieving the same ends with fewer resources or producing the same unit at less 
cost. There are economies of scale in some interval of output if the average cost is 
decreasing there (Eatwell, Milgate, and Newman 1994). SS Shipping's strategic 
alliance enabled the company to achieve increased efficiency, as the CEO explained: 
When you see a duplication or triplication of schedules nationwide 
among the three of us, we only have so much market. So even before 
the liberalisation, I'd already been talking to my colleagues. 
After the alliance, the three partners operated at their combined volume with 
lower total costs. The savings came from three sources. First, the alliance was able 
to obtain leverage from suppliers due to greater purchasing volume. Second, instead 
of three separate sales branches in Cebu, their base of operations, these were 
combined into one. Similar streamlining was done for branches in other parts of the 
country. Third, they were able to cut their land-based workforce by half, from 1000 
to 500 employees. 
Networks capture economies of scale for their associated firms (Jarillo 1988; 
Johanson and Mattsson 1987). Strategic alliances are characterised as 'resource 
pooling coalitions' aimed at the provision of common services (Grandori and Soda 
1995; Johannisson and Monsted 1997; Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995). 
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The strategic alliance of SS Shipping was also motivated by survival. The 
argument for the decision was that if these three companies· -could not compete with 
foreign entrants in terms of efficiency and service, then they would lose market 
share, eventually going out of business. Indeed, it can be inferred from Chapter 
five's resource needs analysis that survival was a long term goal for many firms' 
IOR decisions. Another outcome of IORs was that they permitted firms to widen 
their range of activities without increasing their size. 
Economies of scope and synergy 
Economies of scope can be the basis for the formation of agreements for the 
joint utilisation of equipment or know-how (Teece 1980). In this context, alliances 
allow organizations to extend their range without increasing in size (Redding 1994, 
80). By forming cooperative relationships, companies are able to share equally in 
the costs and benefits of market research and development ar:id gain expertise in 
other needed areas (Alter and Hage 1993). From a resource dependence perspective, 
small firms in Scandinavia use networks to complement their own limited resources 
(Johannisson and Monsted 1997). Another benefit is that IORs allow firms to avoid 
making investments in up-to-date machine tools (Jarillo 1988; Lorenz 1988). 
The ability to forge upstream and downstream linkages was the first 
important outcome of extending a firm's scope of activity, but equally significant 
was the fact that IORs enabled firms' diversification to unrelated activities. MM 
Textiles entered into a joint venture to manufacture garments with two young 
businessmen whose fathers John Yu knew. This venture allowed MM to diversify 
into downstream activities by producing finished products for the domestic 
consumer market. In this case, it also permitted the efficient pooling of resources. 
Both parties contributed what were idle assets at that time to the venture. MM' s 
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partners contributed a piece of property for the factory site. MM had about a dozen 
pieces of garment-manufacturing equipment (sewing machines, buttonholers), 
repossessed from a customer who had defaulted on his payments. Equally important 
was that the joint venture utilised raw materials (textile fabric) produced by MM. 
This reinforces Redding's (1994, 80) observation that Chinese firms' network 
alliances enable them to transcend the limitations of their own small scale. 
Could MM not have established the garment business by itself? John Yu 
acknowledged that his firm was limited by managerial capacity, as there were not 
enough family members to spare to manage the new venture. Hence, the decision to 
network rather than internalise was not only taken on the basis of costs. The 
company left the management of the venture to its two partners, with one of John 
Yu's brothers being the company's representative to liaise with the partners. 
JJ Chemical's joint venture with Nippon Trading was built on JJ's access to 
coconut raw materials and Nippon's access to technology and international 
marketing channels. The economic outcome was extremely positive, and JJ 
experienced excellent sales growth after entering into the venture. In its joint 
venture, China Construction (CC Construction) contributed technical know-how 
while a local partner was responsible for hiring local workers and arranging 
subcontractors. The former also contributed the heavy capital equipment. 
If economies of scope enable organizations to pool resources and extend 
their range of activities, the third tangible outcome pertains to the benefits that 
accrue to an organization as a result of its concentration on and development of its 
core competency. 
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Economies of specialisation and experience 
If a diversified corporation can be conceptualised as a large tree, then the 
trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units, and 
the leaves, flowers and fruit are end products. The root system that provides 
nourishment, sustenance and stability is the core competence. Core competencies 
are the collective learning in the organization and represent its ability to coordinate 
diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technology (Prahalad and 
Hamel 1990). The ability to concentrate on one's core competency is an important 
pillar supporting the economies of specialization argument in favour of business 
networking. Economies of specialisation and experience have been cited as an 
important factor in explaining why, even in the presence of significant 
interdependence, a network of separate firms may be superior to an integrated 
enterprise (Eccles 1981 ). 
Firms in the network enJoy the added flexibility of not having fixed 
commitments to activities that are not essential to them (Jarillo 1988). Dunning 
(1995, 468) terms this a 'concentrate on critical competency' response. The 
flexibility and focus that result from networking rather than integration can be 
extremely powerful competitive weapons, especially in environments experiencing 
rapid change (Jarillo 1988). Networks are, therefore, ' lighter on their feet' than 
hierarchies (Powell 1990). 
An important outcome of being able to enter into IO Rs is that this frees up an 
organization's internal resources and enables it to concentrate on its core activities. 
KK Stores deliberately pursued a strategy of concentrating on merchandising. By 
passing on the functions of product research and development to suppliers, Wallace 
Tan of KK Stores commented that ' this may be close to an ideal arrangement'. 
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Product manufacturers knew their industry best, he continued, having at their 
fingertips up-to-date information about latest fashion trends and product 
availabilities. By allowing suppliers to take on R&D, KK did not need to allocate 
resources to keep tabs on product developments in so many product areas, thus 
freeing resources to enable it to concentrate on its core competencies. 
Price was not the only basis for exchange. A more important aspect of the 
relationship was the provision of value-added services by KK' s suppliers. Could the 
company purchase similar products from other suppliers? Certainly for products 
which did not depend on brand appeal, the company could switch from one supplier 
to another. However, KK and its core suppliers exchanged more than the product; 
they exchanged intangible services as well. These included R&D and flexible 
payment and delivery arrangements. They also shared the advertising expenses and 
other selling costs (such as the cost of special display stands in the department 
stores). 
John Ongseco saw the alliance of SS Shipping with the two other shippers as 
benefiting from the skill complementarity of the three participants. He remarked 
We are good in the long haul, while Jim's company is good in the 
shorter runs. The Ramirez family contributed their skill in 
computerisation. 
Furniture exporters in Cebu used an elaborate system of subcontracting with 
each firm specialising in a particular item. Rattan furniture, for example, could 
comprise different materials: wrought iron legs, leather arms, and so on. Different 
firms, many of these home-based, specialised in manufacturing these components 
and ensured good quality while keeping costs down (Tan 1996). 
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Other factors 
Other outcomes in the firm's IORs provided comp·etitive advantages to the 
case study firm by reducing costs or allowing access to certain resources. Corruption 
costs were reduced by CC Construction because it aligned with local companies. 
Many case firms' IO Rs allowed them access to credit, supplies and markets. 
In the case of CC Construction, the joint venture with a local partner was a 
cost-effective way of dealing with corruption in the construction industry. From a 
political point of view, a local company would be charged less in terms of bribes and 
kickbacks than a foreign company, as the general manager of CC Construction 
explained. 
Another benefit is preferential treatment in terms of product supplies. This 
occ~ed with SS Sawmill, who gave its five core buyers first choice of lumber. 
This kind of arrangement became quite valuable in times of supply shortage. 
Wong's (1995) study of subcontracting in Singapore found a similar ranking 
of suppliers, with the higher ranked suppliers usually given higher order volumes 
and higher preference for new contracts involving higher value-added contributions. 
In times of business downturn, the lower-ranked suppliers tended to be affected first 
while the higher-ranked suppliers were better protected. 
SS Sawmill ' s main log supplier gave price protection to the company as a 
wholesale distributor. If a supply shortage occurred, no special preference was 
given to various distributors. They competed among themselves on the basis of the 
amount of cash upfront that they could put forward. The analysis of resource needs 
in this study has identified suppliers as important business partners and preferential, 
ranking behaviour as another dimension of the supplier-buyer relationship. 
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Access to credit was another advantage that participants in an IOR benefited 
from. Credit was never given to strangers, but on the other hand not all regular 
customers had lines of credit. The previous chapter discussed the process of 
evaluating creditworthiness. The clear economic benefit from being able to 
purchase goods on credit was that the buyer was able to (a) do a bigger volume of 
business and (b) use proceeds of his own sales somewhere else while payables were 
not yet due. 
Credit is not the same as provision of financial capital. Credit is hidden and 
is not immediately noticeable or evident as an important source of finance. This 
practice of using credit to expand one's business without resorting to borrowing has 
been noted since Spanish times (Chapter 3). 
FF's flexibility in terms of ownership arrangements has enabled the company 
to achieve a rapid rate of growth. From one store in 1985, it had 140 stores in 1997 
and 200 in year 2000. The example of opening its store in Pampanga illustrated how 
FF was able to reap first-mover advantages. It was the only fast food type outlet in 
the area and enjoyed high sales growth. 
One exception to the mutual advantages that IORs usually provided was JJ 
Chemical's joint venture with Chinese partners to manufacture mosquito coils. In 
this case an unsuccessful venture was kept going, even though it was 'inefficient'. 
Does this make sense economically? If one looks at it from a short-term point of 
view, this appears to be an unwise economic decision. From a longer term point of 
view, the 'failure' of the joint venture would reflect badly on the reputation of 
Honorio Wu, who was responsible for inviting the Chinese investors to Cebu. As 
noted in Chapter 2, one could argue that the primary motivation for maintaining the 
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arrangement was not to make a profit. The economic loss was acceptable 1n 
exchange for providing prestige and political credit to the family. 
7.2 Intangible outcomes 
Intangible outcomes refer to results that are not easily quantifiable, but can 
be observed nonetheless. These include joint problem-solving, information 
exchange and learning. Powell (1990) argues that networks are particularly apt for 
circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information. The most 
useful information is rarely that which flows down the formal chain of command in 
an organization, or that which can be inferred from shifting price signals. Rather, it 
is that which is obtained from someone whom one has dealt with in the past and 
found to be reliable. Information that comes from someone one knows well is 
trusted best. Kaneko and Imai (1987) suggest that information passed through 
networks is 'thicker' than information obtained in the market, _and 'freer' than that 
communicated in a hierarchy. Networks, then, are especially useful for the 
exchange of commodities whose value is not easily measured. Such qualitative 
matters as know-how, technological capability, a particular approach or style of 
production, a spirit of innovation or experimentation, or a philosophy of zero defects 
are very hard to place a price tag on (Powell 1990). 
Joint problem solving 
Joint problem solving is quite common and very important but often goes 
unnoticed. It involves suggestions and technical advice from clients and the 
introduction of improvements to business processes (Uzzi 1997). Day-to-day 
problems between MM' s fabric dyeing and finishing department and customers 
were often jointly resolved. At one stage, the researcher noticed that MM's dyeing 
and finishing department was having difficulty producing virgin white fabric: it was 
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coming out yellowish. With the help of MM's chemical supplier, different 
formulations were tested and the water temperature adjusted until the right colour 
emerged. MM's laboratory staff had instruction manuals to mix the dyestuff, but the 
head technician explained that these formulae did not always work in practice. 
Other variables such as water temperature, water quality and residues affected the 
end result. MM' s chemical supplier had over thirty years' experience in the industry 
and had helped MM produce the difficult colours such as white and blue. 
GG Shipping's CEO prided himself on his company's reputation for 
flexibility. Customers expected personalised service, which, from Mr. Lim's point 
of view, translated to problem-solving on a case-by-case basis. This was an 
effective way of relating to the customer, he stressed, because he or she was able to 
speak to the managers personally. 'Joint problem solving' in this case pertained to 
pricing flexibility, delivery arrangements, scheduling and prioritising, and even 
negotiations on credit terms. 
The objective of mutual benefit was also demonstrated in the relationship 
between FF Food and one of its dessert suppliers. Having started as a home-based 
business, the dessert manufacturer had encountered quality control problems. She 
had packed various dessert ingredients (red beans, coconut slivers) in glass jars, but 
the stores had found broken glass inside the bottles. FF' s solution was not to exit 
from the relationship but to work with Mrs. Lopez, the owner of the business, by 
experimenting with various packaging materials and different container designs to 
ensure that the contents would be free from contamination during the delivery 
process and storage period. The effort and time expended by FF went uncosted; FF 
did not bill the supplier for its assistance nor did the supplier charge FF any 
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additional costs for experimentation. Both parties developed a plastic package 
together that solved the problem. 
JJ Chemical's relationship with one group of buyers, the mining companies, 
likewise illustrates the benefits of joint problem-solving. Johnny Wu paid regular 
visits to the mining sites and conferred with the managers regarding their product 
requirements. This was a way to increase dependency of the users, because price 
was not the only basis for exchange. Service was also important, in this case JJ' s 
commitment to manufacture the activated carbon according to the miners' 
specifications. Johnny has to demonstrate his company's willingness and ability to 
manufacture according to the technical specifications as well as the willingness to 
adjust production schedules according to demand. 
Information exchange 
Information is important in doing business (Ben-Porath 1980). It is 
especially valued in highly uncertain business environments, which can be 
characterised by the (a) difficulty of finding reliable information, (b) speed at which 
things change, and (c) impenetrability of local networks (Redding 1995, 65). There 
are, according to Ben-Porath (1980), advantages of scale in the use of information. 
In addition, the identity of whoever transmits or shares information is important in 
evaluating it. These elements may increase the returns to cooperation based on 
personal contracts. 
One's IORs can provide a businessperson with several types of market 
information, ranging from local demand and supply conditions to information 
regarding one's buyers, suppliers and competitors. The sawmill manager declared 
Because we have been in operation for a long time and are quite a big 
player, market signals reach us through phone calls from various 
agents and customers. If a customer is looking for a particular type of 
wood, it's an indication that there is a shortage or tight supply of this 
particular stock. · 
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This type of information is valued because it is not readily available, and 
users demand quick information for rapid decision making. The benefits in non-
economic terms for the firm are fast cycle time to market, improved quality, high-
quality decision making and improved competitiveness (Smith, Carroll, and Ashford 
1995). Indeed, the accounting manager at SS Sawmill made it a habit to check 
prices every morning by phoning around. She revealed that their own selling prices 
were adjusted according to the supply and demand conditions in the market. 
The process of deciding whether to accept or reject a new buyer or supplier 
was often based on personal sources of information. One's IORs played a crucial 
role in the provision of information to assist in this decision, or what Uzzi (1997) 
terms 'expert rationality'. What kind of information was exchanged? The most 
common was information about other companies, which served as the basis for 
credit evaluation and sometimes imitation ( of business strategies). Although credit 
rating agencies existed in the Philippines at the time of this research, they were of 
limited use as they only covered the largest companies. Certainly the case study 
firms believed that the agencies were often unreliable and that their information was 
out-of-date. Information was also exchanged in the areas of government policies 
and regulations affecting business activities, such as foreign exchange guidelines, 
import controls and industry deregulation. 
MM Textiles evaluated its new customers based on information gathered 
from other companies in the industry. The usual procedure was for the sales 
manager, Mrs Yu, to ask the prospective buyer or supplier to provide referrals from 
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other companies he or she had previously done business with. Mrs. Yu also tried to 
get the views of the sales agents. If she did not get favourable feedback from these 
sources, she then decided against doing business with the person. However, if the 
person represented a large and well-known company, she tended to accept the order 
but started with a small transaction. 
More rapid flow of information stems from relationships of trust and mutual 
dependency. In the textile industry of Japan, for example, news of impending 
changes in final consumer markets is passed more rapidly upstream to weavers and 
yam dyers; and technical information about the appropriate sizing or finishing for 
new chemical fibres is passed down more systematically from the fibre firms to the 
beamers and dyers (Dore 1983). 
Learning 
_ Learning 1s broadly defined as 'the ways firms build, supplement and 
organize knowledge and routines around their activities and within their cultures, 
and adapt and develop organizational efficiency by improving the use of the broad 
skills of their workforces' (Dodgson 1993, 377). The case study firms deliberately 
pursued learning as an objective in IO Rs. 
There are two general types of learning associated with the case studies' 
IORs. The first pertains to learning new things, such as entering new markets 
(Osborn and Hagedoom 1997) and learning a new process or acquiring new 
technology. The second is learning to innovate and improve processes. 
CC Construction's joint venture with Local Construction Company (LC 
Construction) was primarily to learn about the local Philippine construction market. 
CC Construction recognised that entering into a joint venture with a local Chinese 
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partner was the quickest way to achieve this goal. CC Construction was a large 
construction company owned by the government of China, with operations in almost 
every country in Southeast Asia. 
In addition to the need to learn about a new market, CC Construction was 
also keen to become familiar with Philippine business culture. How did the 
company learn? Teams of professional managers and engineers were assigned to 
projects, with the Country General Manager overseeing project performance. 
Projects in the Philippines have included highways and bridges, and the firm was 
planning to go into real estate development by constructing housing subdivisions. 
CC Construction's joint ventures were on a per-project basis. It began with joint 
ventures with LC Construction. After two years in the country, it was also entering 
into contracts with Filipino-owned companies. This was because, the CC 
Construction's country manager remarked, Chinese firms wer~_ 'too clever' in the 
negotiations, and CC Construction ended up with very tight profit margins. 
Learning occurs in joint ventures by developing competencies and 
borrowing/developing/lending new ideas (Hobday 1990; Lorenzoni and Baden-
Fuller 1995). Learning is a dynamic concept and is undertaken to improve 
competitiveness, productivity and innovation in uncertain technological and market 
circumstances. In fact, it is argued that the greater the uncertainties, the greater the 
need for learning (Dodgson 1993). 
JJ Chemical's joint venture with the Japanese company enabled JJ to acquire 
knowledge about international marketing strategies. This came at a cost: the 
sacrifice of short-term profit. Johnny Wu reflected: 
I'm sure that in the first five years, they made a lot of money. Because 
they handled all the marketing and we had no knowledge about 
activated carbon, we did not know how to sell. So for the first five 
years, it was a learning stage for us. All marketing was done by them, 
so I'm sure they made a lot of profit. 
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This quote reflects the long-term view of JJ Chemical, one that was echoed 
by other case studies. The firms were willing to forgo short-term profits in 
anticipation of long-term gains. This was true even when the firms were aware that 
the other party gained more advantage at the beginning of the venture (power 
asymmetry). Twenty years after the joint venture was established, JJ did not know 
the Japanese market because it was not able to directly participate in Japanese 
marketing. However, it has been able to successfully export to new markets in 
Europe, the US and Australia. How did JJ learn? Marketing was the responsibility 
of Johnny Wu, and learning was limited to him. His marketing team was quite 
active in the domestic market but international marketing was all done by himself 
and Nippon. 
AA Plastics knew that its Taiwanese partner was reaping commissions from 
purchasing machinery on the firm's behalf, but needed the technology that this 
partner could bring to the new venture. MM Textiles likewise had to give in to a 
Taiwanese businessman's request for minority equity in the dyeing business, as he 
had the expertise to set up the factory. MM Textiles eventually bought out his share 
in the venture. 
The discussion so far has centred on the positive outcomes from IORs. The 
next section focuses on the possibility of opportunism within IORs. 
7 .3 Opportunism 
Opportunism is defined as 'self-interest seeking with guile' (Williamson 
1991, 92) What makes one opportunistic act different from another? What is the 
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difference between delaying payments ( extending credit period) and absconding? 
Why would JJ Chemical tolerate delayed payments (of mining companies) and 
uneven profit sharing with Nippon Trading? Are these not opportunistic acts of the 
other parties? 
Among the case study firms, it could not be said that perfect trust existed 
within their IORs. Nevertheless, all safeguards in the world will not be enough if 
another person deliberately sets out to be dishonest (Johnny Wu). Businesses also 
avoided legal recourse, unless they wished that the tie be permanently severed. 
Misunderstanding and errors can occur from informal transactions. As 
discussed in the case of AA Plastics, errors occurred with both suppliers and buyers. 
This did not represent opportunism, but rather mistakes and misunderstandings 
arisipg from the attribute of agreements. In the case of suppliers, errors occurred 
most often in the areas of price and quantity, as most orders w.ere placed over the 
phone. With their buyers, the disagreements occurred with quantity and delivery 
agreements. 
The methods by which case firms evaluated their business partners were not 
fool-proof. There were several cases of default payments by buyers. MM Textiles 
has faced several cases of buyers behaving opportunistically, in terms of absconding 
on payments. To illustrate with an example, there was a Filipina businesswoman 
who purchased fabric from them and paid in cash at the outset. After about a dozen 
transactions, she asked for a credit line, which was granted by the credit manager, 
Lilian. Being a prompt paying customer, the businesswoman eventually amassed a 
liability of approximately 3 million PhP. Her cheques then started to 'bounce' (be 
dishonoured) and it was only at this point that the manager was aware that 
something was wrong. The businesswoman eventually vanished and the shop she 
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was operating from emptied. What was MM's recourse? Cooperation between MM 
Textiles and other firms was observed when this crisis occurred. Lilian proceeded to 
inform other businesses that she had a customer who was dishonest. The firms she 
informed were MM's supplier firms. She did not include competitor firms, because 
she said they would be in competition to confiscate the defaulter's property. 
Nonetheless, Lilian was not able to recover the full amount. She was able to 
repossess a used delivery truck and a few sewing machines, but these were not 
enough to cover the loss. 
But what did this episode imply for MM's credit evaluation system? In 
hindsight, Lilian reflected that she probably ought to have checked the 
businesswoman's background more carefully and avoid extending a large amount of 
credit in a short span of time. 'Everyone's doing it though', she continued, 'so if we 
do not give credit, we will lose out on the sale.' 
Case study firms predominantly relied on credit evaluation systems that 
incorporated information from their personal ties, but the final decisions varied 
between the firms. MM Textiles appeared to have the highest default rate as a 
percentage of revenue. SS Sawmill had a low rate (less than 5 per cent of revenue), 
as they required cash payments from new customers. For those who have credit 
accounts, the company used the Chinese sales representative to monitor their 
business condition. SS Sawmill's manager remarked about credit: 
If I decide to give credit to a customer, I usually start with a small 
amount after asking around about this businessman. What will give 
me added confidence is if he had a shop front. It will be more difficult 
for him to abscond in this case. 
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MM's contact with credit customers was more sporadic. For service 
businesses such as the two shipping companies, the outstanding amounts were not 
very large, as these involved service charges for shipping and haulage, for instance. 
KK Stores and FF Food both sold on a cash basis. JJ Chemical also had a low 
default rate, as Nippon Trading accounted for most of the activated carbon sales. 
AA Plastics had a low default rate, but payments were often delayed. 
Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller (1995) talk of trust and reciprocity as 
complements, not substitutes, to other obligations. The Benetton clothing company 
does not use legal contracts in Europe; rather it relies on unwritten agreements. 
This, it claims, focuses everyone's attention on making expectations clear. It also 
saves a great deal of time and expense. 
One of the ways in which positive behaviour is encouraged is to ensure that 
the p~ofit-sharing relationship gives substantial rewards to the partners. None of the 
central firms that Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller studied seeks to be the most profitable 
firm in the system; they are happy for others to take the bulk of the profit. In 
Benetton, a retailer may find his or her capital investment paid back in three years. 
In Corning, some partners have seen exceptional returns. This seemingly altruistic 
behaviour, however, does not mean that the rewards to the central firm are small 
(Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller, 1995). 
In a study of local subcontracting networks established by multinational 
' 
corporations in Singapore, Wong (1992) concluded that spillover benefits confirm 
the importance of informal, non-contractual processes that accompany business 
relationships. One deterrent factor on short-run opportunism is the likely adverse 
effects it has on reputation in the long run. The existence of spillover benefits 
suggests another important deterrent factor to opportunism: the foreclosure of future 
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opportunities of gaining information/know-how access through the subcontracting 
relationship. Three factors reduced the probability of opportunism for the case study 
firms: outcome interdependence, risk spreading and social control. 
Outcome interdependence. Outcome interdependence can be a solution to 
opportunism, since its structure influences the accompanying behaviours and results 
in particular attitudes and approaches to exchange (Axelrod 1984; Jones 1993). 
Conflict research suggests that positive goal interdependence Goint payoff) increases 
productivity, the exchange of ideas and information, and emphasises mutual 
interests (Jones 1993). These lead to cooperative behaviour and the establishment of 
trust and cohesion among participants in the exchange. 
A type of non-legal sanction is the most obvious: both business units 
invqlved in the exchange desire to continue successfully in business and will avoid 
conduct that might interfere with attaining this goal. 'One is concerned with both 
the reaction of the other party in the particular exchange and with his own business 
reputation (Macaulay 1963, 63)'. Buyers can withhold part or all of their payments 
until sellers have performed to their satisfaction. If a seller has a great deal of 
money tied up in his performance that he must recover quickly, he will go a long 
way to please the buyer in order to be paid. Moreover, buyers who are dissatisfied 
may cancel and cause sellers to lose the cost of what they have done up to 
cancellation. Furthermore, sellers hope for repeat orders and one gets few of these 
from unhappy customers. 
A situation of mutual dependence and mutual self-interest was created by JJ 
Chemical and its suppliers of com by-products. Honorio and his brothers had 
developed a machine adapted to local conditions for com milling, the idea taken 
from Taiwanese machinery they had imported. The brothers were clever enough to 
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modify the design and produced their own equipment for the Cebu market. After 
selling this machine around the province, the brothers requested these mills to sell 
the com by-product back to JJ. This clever arrangement resulted in a long-term IOR 
between JJ and its suppliers. The mills were dependent on JJ for technical support 
and, in turn, JJ was assured of a stable supply of cornmeal. 
The interdependence of outcomes is also illustrated 1n the relationships 
between Chinese wholesalers and European trading houses during the Spanish era 
discussed in Chapter 4. Credit was given by the trading houses to Chinese 
merchants in exchange for these merchants supplying the Europeans with 
agricultural commodities. The situation with the case study firms was similar. 
Many had exclusive arrangements in exchange for protection, as in the case of AA 
Plastics' five exclusive distributors who were not allowed to sell any other products 
on the understanding that the company would give them exclusive distributorship. 
Risk spreading. To avoid one-sided dependence, an organization may wish 
to restrict interaction with a given party by extending its networks, as in the case of 
split sourcing (Thorelli 1986). Buyers can place orders with two or more suppliers 
of the same item so that default by one will not stop the buyer's assembly lines 
(Macaulay 1963). Multinational companies in Singapore appear to practice multiple 
sourcing to insure against over dependency on one subcontractor (Wong 1992, 35). 
Yeung (2000, 79) also concludes that Chinese family firms managed risks by 
minimising commitments and maximising flexibility. This study also found risk 
management through multiple sourcing a common practice among case firms, even 
though they repeatedly stated that they had long-term relationships with their buyers 
and suppliers. 
217 
The sawmill industry was plagued with high uncertainty, changing 
government regulations, and fluctuating demand and supply· -conditions. SS Sawmill 
had longstanding relations with several Chinese log importers and was able to 
leverage one against the other in search of lower prices or, in times of high demand, 
larger quantities of supplies. MM Textiles purchased from two yam suppliers on a 
regular basis because quality was important and these suppliers were reliable. 'Of 
course,' Jose Yu reiterated, 'if we had a problem we would shift suppliers. But as 
long as we are happy with the service, we will not change our suppliers.' 
Social control. Belonging to a community discourages opportunism, 
because if one behaves dishonestly, one's reputation may be destroyed within that 
community. Is opportunism averted because the benefits of being part of the group 
outweigh the benefits of opportunism (shadow of the future)? 
Social control mechanisms act as constraints on opportunism (Jones 1993). 
These mechanisms include the development of collective and metanorms through 
peer or mutual monitoring to enforce these norms (Axelrod 1984), reputational 
effects, and exclusion (Jones 1993). These social controls allow for the effective use 
of relational contracts under conditions of uncertainty with asset specific 
transactions. Moreover, recurring relations provide the context in which norms and 
expectations develop to govern the relationships. Thus, asset specific investments 
do not have to be housed within a firm to protect them (Jones 1993). Self-interest 
curbs opportunism (Eccles 1981 ). Opportunism is attenuated by the likely adverse 
effects it has on reputation in the long run. Reputation and identity can therefore 
function as controls (Larson 1992). 
Why do Chinese businesses prefer to do business with each other? IORs 
with non-Chinese have been noted, but the majority of longstanding ties in this 
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research were still with people of the same ethnic background. The predominance 
of Chinese business networks can be attributed to their sharing of a common set of 
unwritten rules and the ability to be identified as a group, as seen in Chapter 4. This 
observation does not only apply to Chinese communities, but can also be seen in 
other immigrant societies (Koreans in the United States and Jewish diamond traders, 
for example). The common denominator is the ability to identify persons belonging 
or not belonging to the group and mechanisms for regulating behaviour within the 
group. To illustrate, there is a tendency for most businesses in the Philippines, 
whether Chinese or Filipino, to under declare income. Hence, one cannot assess the 
true financial picture of a business from financial statements. There is a self-interest 
motive to keep business within themselves since there will be mutual protection 
(less chance of snitching to authorities, for example). 
It should be clarified that the social control mechanisms are not deliberately 
regulated. This notion is in contrast to Miles and Snow's (1992) arguments that key 
managers in partner firms may function in the role of 'caretakers' who engage in 
nurturing and disciplinary behaviour. When a firm exploits its position in the grid -
for example, by obtaining some short-run gain at the expense of its actual or 
potential partners- the caretaker's challenge is to point out the dysfunctional effects 
of such behaviour and teach the offending firm how to behave more appropriately 
for the common good (Miles and Snow 1992, 17). This is theoretically reasonable 
but not feasible in practice, at least not with the case firms studied. 
7.4 Change over time 
As an organization contracts with another for a length of time, familiarity 
and knowledge about the other increases. This does not necessarily equate to 
increasing trust. It does mean, nonetheless, that the other is able to predict its 
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partner's actions more accurately. Over time, one partner can also become more 
dependent on the other (power asymmetry). Costs (including transaction costs) can 
also decrease. Finally, IORs may come to an end ( exit). 
Level of trust 
The emotive terms used in relation to the ethnic Chinese case are equally 
observed in relation to the French. An 'incomplete contract' indicates that the initial 
agreement serves as the reference point and adaptations will have to be made. Time 
and experience are elements in deciding whether or not to trust (Lorenz 1988). 
A remarkable development from FF's IOR with its dessert supplier was that 
the latter handed over her recipes to FF so it could manufacture the product in Cebu. 
How was this possible? FF was expanding into the southern part of the Philippines 
and .required a substantial amount of regular dessert supply. Mrs. Lopez, however, 
was I?.esitant to establish a manufacturing facility outside of Manila. She could only 
manage the business in Manila. FF then arranged, for a small fee, for Mrs. Lopez to 
set up a manufacturing facility in Cebu. Included in this arrangement was her 
training of the production staff and disclosing her recipes for the various sweet 
products. Mrs. Lopez put her business at risk with this action: FF could decide to 
manufacture all the dessert requirements on its own now that it had possession of the 
recipes. Yet she trusted the company to abide by the agreement that production 
would only cover Cebu. 
Trust can also become institutionalised. Wallace Tan of KK Stores said 
Right now, people in our position [ of CEO] hardly know our suppliers. 
Fifteen years ago, I knew all our suppliers, but right now I hardly know 
our suppliers because they are changing and most of the ones who are 
very close to us, their children are taking over, so I hardly know them 
anymore. 
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Wong ( 1991) argues that familism found in Hong Kong is impermanent. 
Since sons are equal heirs in a Chinese family, there is an inherent tendency towards 
segmentation in the life cycle of the family. As the family is not a permanent entity, 
family reputation is likewise short-lived. The Chinese family does not furnish a 
secure basis for long-term business trust to be maintained. Therefore, entrepreneurs 
are fully aware that trustworthiness is essentially tentative and transient, and 
personal trust has to be continually renewed. 
An increased level of trust was demonstrated through increased capital 
investments. FF Food suppliers made capital investments in food processing 
equipment over time, thus increasing these suppliers' dependence on the firm. 
Dependency and power asymmetry 
FF Food's relationships with its suppliers have changed over time. These 
suppliers were chosen through personal connections and referrals from staff. 
Gradually, the functions of its suppliers began to change. From supplying generic 
products such as flour, meat and vegetables, these businesses began to take on more 
of the processing activities at the initiative of FF Food. FF would negotiate with the 
pork suppliers to supply pre-cut pieces. Later on, it decided to provide them with 
marinade sauces and asked these suppliers to invest in marinading and packaging 
equipment. These developments resulted in increasing reliance and dependency on 
its suppliers. Another company supplied FF with pre-mixes (spices mixed according 
to certain formulas). FF aimed to deliver these pre-mixes to meat suppliers and let 
them assume the marinading function. 
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Cost reduction and quality 
The long term character of case firms' IO Rs permitted a gradual 
improvement in efficiency based on cooperation between supplier and buyer. One 
interviewee gave an example of a Manila-based subcontractor who was contracted 
by a Japanese company to manufacture golf bags for 10 USD but could only do it 
for 11 USD. The Japanese accepted this but stipulated that the subcontractor would 
have to aim for 10 USD after a season. He eventually was able to lower costs 
through technical assistance from the Japanese company. 
Do IORs foster long-term efficiency or inefficiency? A business consultant 
(Tan, 1996 personal communication) who was interviewed said that 'you are making 
one assumption: that what you do now you will continue to do in the future. This is 
not what is happening anymore. Change is happening all the time. While the 
relationship may be a long-term one, the product may be short-term. When a 
business becomes inefficient, both parties lose.' 
Eccles (1981) found that nearly all contractors 1n the U.S. construction 
industry periodically 'tested the market', either through formal competitive bidding 
or simply by asking other builders what prices they were paying for subcontractors. 
Builders also spoke of being approached by subcontractors who would offer very 
low prices as an incentive to the builders to give them an opportunity to work for 
them. Builders were cautious in accepting these offers, due to concerns about 
quality and experiences in the past when a subcontractor had started to raise his 
prices once he thought he was firmly established. MM's Jose Yu regularly checked 
cotton prices, not only domestically but also internationally. Haggling was a 
common practice among case study firms. AA Plastics' manager haggled with 
different suppliers of chemicals on almost every order. 
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A by-product of the system of relational contracting is the emphasis on 
quality (Dore 1983, 475). According to the relational contract ethic, it may be 
difficult to ditch a supplier because, for circumstances for the moment beyond his 
control, he is not giving you the best buy. It is, however, perfectly proper to ditch 
him if he is not giving the best buy and not even trying to match the best buy. The 
single most obvious indicator of effort is product quality. A supplier who 
consistently fails to meet quality requirements is in danger of losing even an 
established relational contract. 
For Benetton, a leading garment manufacturer based in Italy, the benefits of 
stable inter-firm relations with subcontractors included flexibility in production and 
reduction in commitment to maintaining stock (because manufacturing was akin to 
Japanese just-in-time system) (Belussi 1993). Over time, there was pressure on 
suppliers to reduce costs and increase quality. 
Subcontracting relationships, according to a business consultant interviewed, 
1s an illustration of mutual dependence (Tan 1996). 'If I depend upon you for 
orders, I will have to be focused on what exactly you need and try to attend to 
everything you want. Since I do not want to lose you, I will try my best to be 
honest.' Communication becomes more open the longer the relationship proceeds. 
One result is the custom of 'cosuto daun' (cost reduction) (Sako 1992, 229) in 
Japanese subcontracting. This results from expectations by customers of continuous 
cost reduction due to learning-by-doing and rationalisation. A relationship that does 
not appear to be the most efficient in terms of production costs to begin with, may 
gradually approach or even surpass least cost alternative in the future . Dore' s 
(1983) findings in regional production networks suggest that embedded actors 
satisfice rather than maximise on price and shift their focus from . the narrow 
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economically rational goal of winning immediate gains and exploiting dependency 
to cultivating long-term, cooperative ties. 
Finally, transaction costs reduce over time for IOR partners for two reasons 
(Ben-Porath 1980). First, rules or norms are established for their exchange 
relationships. Second, the expectation of continuing exchange has a favourable 
effect on the behaviour of parties (shadow of the future) . 
Exit 
Exit refers to the termination of a business relationship. When does a 
company eliminate or change IOR partners? In the case of AA Plastics, the 
implementation of ISO practices will change its transacting practices, but not its 
relationships. In contrast, SS Sawmill broke its ties with one major supplier, a large 
Filipino-owned company, due to the poor quality of its supply. AA Plastics bought 
out its two other initial partners, including the Taiwanese technical partner. MM did 
the same with its Taiwanese investor and partner in the dyeing business. None of 
~ 
these cases resulted from partner conflict, though. Exit per se therefore does not 
connote a negative outcome if both parties gain from the relationship. 
7.5 Summary 
The conditions for the existence of stable networks are the same as the 
conditions for the existence of organizations. These conditions are that it must be 
effective and it must be efficient. An organization is effective if it achieves the 
desired end. It is efficient if it does so while, at the same time, offering more 
inducements to the members of the organization than efforts they have put into it 
(J arillo 1988, 36). 
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The basic condition for efficiency is that the gain to be accrued by being part 
of the network is seen as superior, over the long term, to, the profits that can be 
obtained by going alone ( or by establishing short-term, changing relationships) 
(Jarillo 1988). Efficiency is defined as the relationship between expenditure of 
resources and results (Hodge and Anthony 1988, 299). Hodge and Anthony (1988, 
297) explain that 'to be efficient means to get the most of whatever goal an 
organization wishes to pursue. An organization can be effective but not efficient. 
Organizational effectiveness is a condition in which a focal organization, using a 
finite amount of resources, is able to achieve a stated objective(s), as measured by a 
given set of criteria.' 
The examination of tangible and intangible outcomes demonstrates both 
elements of efficiency and effectiveness. In many cases, the consideration of 
effectiveness seems to have propelled the case study firms to enter into IORs. At the 
beginning, a firm's youth and small size limit its alternatives. Through historical 
analysis, however, one appreciates the changes in the IORs. The ability to achieve 
economies of scale and specialisation contributes to efficiency gains. Likewise, 
learning outcomes provide cost improvements. 
For the case study firms, mutual economic advantage was necessary but not a 
sufficient rationale for long-term IORs. An obvious incentive was the primary 
economic exchange, defined as the economic value of the annualised economic 
transaction. This was demonstrated in Chapter 5. The growth of the relationship 
served as an added incentive. Within this second phase was a trial period which 
enabled the development of familiarity. Two key dimensions within this trial period 
were the institution of rules and procedures that introduced into the exchange a 
predictable structure and a basis for performance and monitoring that provided 
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stability and efficiency and the evolution of clear expectations within each alliance 
(Larson 1992). 
The exchange process is not only a learning process but also an adaptation 
process for the case study firms. Adapting is important because it strengthens 
bonds, making them more endurable, and affords space for change in relationship 
and mutual orientation (Johanson and Mattsson 1987; Lax and Sebenius 1986). 
Therefore, interorganizational relationships typically involve much more than just 
the contractual business exchange process itself: significant resources are invested in 
developing the relationship (Wong 1992). 
A network is economically feasible because the specialisation of each 
supplier makes the final total cost lower. It can be sustained because long-term 
economic bonds lower transaction costs. A 'fairness' in the sharing of the value 
added is achieved through valuing the relationship itself, which makes it easier to 
solve specific problems (Jarillo 1988, 39). 
The argument that relational and reputational concerns direct exchange 
interactions rather than impersonal standards or authority relations (hierarchies) or 
price competition (markets) (Jones 1993, 11) has not been supported in this study. 
The findings in this study indicate that price has an equally influential role as that of 
social control. Sako's (1992) study of Japanese networks likewise finds that price is 
just as important as relational concerns, something often overlooked because of the 
assumption of the hierarchy and market continuum. 
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Chapter 8 
The Paradox of Chinese Networks 
8.1 Trust and cooperation 
Low trust is said to characterise Chinese society (Fukuyama 1995; Redding 
1995; Wong 1988) yet the 'strength of weak ties' theory argues that it is one's weak 
ties that enable access to outside resources (Granovetter 1973). This paradox is the 
central focus of this concluding chapter. It is presented because its solution ties 
together the salient elements from the previous chapters. These elements include ( a) 
the dichotomy of trust and distrust, (b) the reasons behind IORs and (c) the 
sustainability of long-term cooperation. This chapter presents evidence from the 
case studies and the literature to demonstrate how and why IORs can exist and thrive 
within what some researchers characterise as a low trust community. 
Chinese society, Fukuyama (1995) argues, is an example of a familistic 
community in which the primary avenue to sociability is family and the broader 
forms of kinship, such as clans. He asserts that familistic societies frequently have 
weak voluntary associations because unrelated people have no basis for trusting one 
another. Chinese societies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and China are cited as 
examples, but this economic culture can also be seen, he continues, within the 
minority Chinese ethnic enclaves in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. France and Italy also share this characteristic. Although familism is not 
as pronounced in either society as in China, there is likewise a deficit of trust among 
people not related to each other. In contrast, high-trust societies such as Japan, 
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Germany and the United States are inclined toward spontaneous sociability and 
possess dense layers of intermediate associations. 
Spontaneous sociability refers to the capacity to form new associations and 
to co-operate within the terms of reference established (Fukuyama 1995). The result 
of this spontaneity is a wide range of intermediate communities, distinct from the 
family or those deliberately established by governments. For example, Fukuyama 
observes that the United States has a dense network of voluntary organizations such 
as churches, professional societies, charitable institutions, private schools, 
universities and hospitals. 
Fukuyama's (1995) low-trust/high-trust comparison leads him to conclude 
that social capital and the proclivity for spontaneous sociability have important 
eco1_1omic consequences. He observes that the typical firm size in the United States 
and Germany is significantly larger than those in Italy and France. In Asia, Japan 
and Korea have large firms and highly concentrated industries while firms in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong tend to be much smaller. He argues that there is a relationship 
between high-trust societies and the ability to create large, private business 
organizations. In addition, as technology and markets change, societies well 
supplied with social capital will be able to adopt new organizational forms more 
readily than those with less. Family businesses have traditionally populated the 
economies of low-trust societies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, France and Italy. In 
these societies, Fukuyama continues, the reluctance of non-kin to trust one another 
has delayed and, in some cases, prevented the emergence of modem, professionally 
managed corporations. 
Firm size does not appear to have serious consequences for a nation' s ability 
to grow and prosper at an early stage of economic development. However, 
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Fukuyama argues that firm size does affect the sectors of the global economy that a 
nation can participate in and may in the long run affect overall competitiveness. He 
hints at the possibility that the constraint to creating large-scale organizations will 
harm the long-term growth potential of countries like China and Italy. Fukuyama 
makes a crucial assumption in his analysis: that large corporations are more 
advantageous than small ones due to the size differential. 
Fukuyama's (1995) analysis presents a compelling paradox because many 
explanations of ethnic Chinese prosperity hinge on 'Overseas Chinese business 
networks' that transcend national borders and depend on personal contacts (East 
Asia Analytical Unit 1995; Goldberg 1985; Hiscock 1997; Redding 1993; Tanzer 
1994). Redding (1995) describes Chinese firms as typically small scale with 
relatively simple organizational structures and as family-owned and controlled. The 
typical Chinese firm, he continues, is also focused on one product or market and 
emphasises centralised decision-making, with heavy reliance on one dominant chief 
executive. In addition, Chinese family businesses appear to have enormous 
difficulty in making the transition from family to professional management, a step 
that Fukuyama (1995) contends is necessary for the enterprise to institutionalise 
itself and carry on beyond the lifetime of the founding family. 
The key feature of the traditional centralised organizational structure is the 
ability of one person to retain control. Because of this constraint, the average firm 
size is small. However, two responses allow the size limitations to be transcended. 
The first is a careful strategic choice of business field and the second is networking 
(Redding 1995, 64). Fukuyama (1995) also acknowledges that Chinese firms can 
develop the equivalent of scale economies through family or personal ties with other 
small Chinese firms through networking. 
229 
In contrast to Fukuyama's (1995) proposition, Williamson's transaction cost 
theory (1975) makes a different argument: firms internalise due to transaction costs 
brought about by the threat of opportunism. When there is high distrust, firms 
internalise activities due to the high cost of monitoring other firms. Therefore, when 
there is high distrust in the business environment, transaction cost theory predicts 
larger, not smaller, firms. This prediction directly contradicts that of Fukuyama's. 
The paradox of low trust and networking remains. For how can 
entrepreneurs network if it is claimed that they distrust others? What are the 
implications of the research findings, including the Essential Network framework, 
for this paradox? The next section summarises evidence from the research findings 
and the literature, demonstrating that trust does not have to be a precondition for 
cooperation. Fukuyama's (1995) low-trust argument is treated with caution. The 
findings from the case studies show that the Essential Network is not with one's 
strong ties (i.e. those whom one trusts the most). 
Once a firm engages in an IOR with another, however, what sustains this 
cooperation? Section 8.2 compares essential versus strategic networks by using the 
case of Chinese versus Japanese firms. Section 8.3 ties Chapters four to seven 
together by outlining the conditions for sustained cooperation between Chinese 
firms and their business partners. These four conditions were first proposed together 
in a study of Japanese firms by Edwards and Samimi (1997). 
Trust 
Fukuyama' s main argument is that Chinese societies have low trust: non-kin 
are reluctant to trust one another. These societies, therefore, have smaller average 
firm sizes. Such societies also experience a delay in the emergence of modem, 
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professionally managed organizations. In contrast, people in high trust societies are 
able to create large, private business organizations more easily. 
While Chinese enterprises in the Philippines are predominantly small and 
medium sized, there is an increasing number of large organizations. These include 
several of the largest domestic banks (Metrobank, Allied Bank), large conglomerates 
owned by the taipans (Henry Sy, John Gokongwei Jr, Lucio Tan), and large shipping 
companies (two of the case study firms). Interestingly, Redding (1995) counters that 
smallness may be a strength, as it offers flexibility and quick decision making. 
Networking is also one way that Chinese firms overcome their small size. However, 
if Fukuyama does perceive a high sense of distrust in Chinese society, how can 
networking ever come about? The concept of 'trust' will first be discussed. This 
section will also show why trust is not a precondition for cooperation. 
Gambetta (1988, 217) defines trust as follows: 'When we say we trust 
someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability that 
he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high 
enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.' Barney 
and Hansen ( 1994) define trust as 'the mutual confidence that no party to an 
exchange will exploit another's vulnerabilities.' 
To further refine the definition of trust, consider the three types outlined by 
Sako and Helper (1998, 388): contractual, competence and goodwill trust. 
• Contractual trust: will the other party carry out its contractual 
agreements? 
• Competence trust: is the other party capable of doing what is says it 
will do? 
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• Goodwill trust: will the other party make an open-ended commitment 
to take initiatives for mutual benefit while refraining from unfair 
advantage taking? 
It is the 'goodwill' type of trust that is referred to when the term is used here. 
Therefore, to be more precise, it is goodwill trust that is not necessarily a 
precondition of cooperation. Rather, the preconditions lie partly in the objective 
circumstances, and partly in the accumulation of knowledge with reference to 
mutual interests and the potential satisfaction of those interests through cooperative 
behaviour. The understanding that mutual interest makes defection costly enough to 
be deterred increases the probability that the other party will not act in a harmful 
way (Gambetta 1988, 226). 
The evolutionary approach suggests that trust is better understood as a result 
rather than a precondition of cooperation. Trust would exist in ·societies and groups 
that are successful because of their ability to cooperate, and would consist in nothing 
more than trust in the success of their previous cooperation. Trust does not operate 
to trigger cooperation, but comes about simply by a set of fortunate practices, 
random at first, and then selectively retained (Gambetta 1988, 225). 
In a study of the film industry in the U.S., Jones (1993) finds that both 
opportunism and trust are present. Trust does not precede establishing cooperative 
relations. Social control through embeddedness rather than trust oversees exchanges 
in network organizations. Networks are not unique because they have more trust 
and less opportunism than market transactions; rather, they have developed social 
institutions and structures which support recurring and relational exchanges (Jones 
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1993, 72). Trust and reciprocity are complements, not substitutes, to other 
obligations (Lorenzoni and Baden-Fuller 1995). 
Lorenz's study of small and medium engineering firms in France also shows 
that firms avoid too much reliance on trust. Two interesting empirical results arise 
from this study of French engineering firms. The first is that there is extensive use 
of safeguards by client firms (buyers) to minimise the possibility of being the victim 
of opportunistic behaviour and hence the need to rely on trust. As the Italian saying 
goes, 'It is good to trust but it is better not to trust'. Client firms solicit tenders and 
may also split an order between subcontractors. Subcontractors, on the other hand, 
diversify their clients in order to reduce the risk of dependency (Lorenz 1988). 
Given that the organization's vulnerability derives from dependence on single 
exchanges, the most direct solution is to develop an organization which is dependent 
on a variety of exchanges and less dependent on any single exchange (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). 
The idea that trust might follow rather than precede cooperation is reinforced 
by work in game theory, including that of Axelrod (1984), which shows that even 
where trust is very limited and the chance of communication very slim, cooperation 
may still evolve if other conditions obtain. One of these conditions is that the parties 
know they are locked in this situation for a long period, the end of which is 
unknown (Gambetta 1988, 226). Swedish studies find that sharing of technical, 
organizational, commercial or market information leads to adaptiveness, and it is 
this success that builds trust (Alter and Hage 1993). 
The evidence for non-reliance on goodwill trust from the case study firms is 
their avoidance of over-dependence on one network partner. The practice of 
splitting orders among several suppliers reduces the risk in case a supplier defaults. 
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MM Textiles even resorts to purchasing from competitors. The firms do not extend 
business credit without careful investigation, even if the customer is known to them. 
JJ Chemical's credit manager visits the site of mining companies not only to get 
acquainted with the management of its potential customer, but also to observe their 
.operation, the technology used, and the number of staff. 
The strategy that Gambetta (1988, 229) proposes is where one sets his or her 
sights on cooperation rather than trust. In other words, the onus is on promoting the 
right conditions for cooperation, relying above all on constraint and interest, without 
assuming that the prior level of trust will eventually be high enough to bring about 
cooperation on its own account (Gambetta 1988, 229). This is the solution to the 
paradox. 
If firms do not rely on trust before they cooperate, then how do businesses 
engage in IORs with each other? There are four conditions that enable Chinese 
businesses to enter into IORs. Before these are discussed, the concept of strategic 
networks is contrasted with the Essential Network concept developed by this 
research. 
8.2 Essential and strategic networks compared 
Chapter 6 identified the sum of the case study firms ' close interdependent 
relationships with other firms as representing their Essential Network. Edwards and 
Samimi's (1997) characterisation of strategic networks has similar features to the 
case study findings. Recall fron1 Chapter 2 that, when faced with the prospect of a 
new activity or product, firms have the option of undertaking the activity themselves 
(internalisation) or contracting to others (subcontracting). The primary requirement 
for the emergence of a strategic network is a remarkably high level of cooperation 
among member firms. Such cooperation is observed in the case study firms' IORs. 
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In both strategic and essential networks, transactions between member firms 
incorporate substantial scope for contingency losses. However, Edwards and 
Samimi (1997) argue that when faced with the risk of losses, member firms in 
strategic networks do not respond by implementing protection measures ( such as 
internalisation or decomposed subcontracting) to reduce their exposure to such 
losses. Such a finding is in sharp contrast to case study firms' behaviour as 
observed in the field and discussed in Chapter 7. The case study firms do implement 
protection measures when dealing with members of their essential network. Table 
8.1 contrasts the two types of networks along three parameters. The Japanese case is 
presented in the next section to illustrate the conceptualisation of strategic networks. 
Table 8.1. Essential and strategic networks compared 
Level of cooperation 
Scope for contingency losses 
Protection measures 
Strategic networks in Japan 
Essential network 
High 
High 
Yes 
Strategic network 
High 
High 
No 
Edwards and Samimi (1997) argue that a strategic network is a rare form of 
business organization. The exogenous circumstances that are almost invariably 
required to stimulate the formation of strategic networks cannot be prescribed. Is it 
indeed a rare form? 
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The authors point to Japan to illustrate the formation of strategic networks. 
According to them, Japan in the 1950s provided one instance where the business 
environment was conducive to the formation of strategic networks. Two factors in 
the business environment were important. The first was government interventions 
and priorities, especially where they influenced the allocation of Japan's then 
extremely scarce resources: funds for investment and foreign exchange. The second 
factor was surges in demand. 
The Japanese government used numerous interventions to assist preferred 
industries in the 1950s. Three contributed significantly to the emergence of vertical 
keiretsu. These were policies related to: (a) foreign exchange allocations, (b) 
production by foreign firms in Japan and ( c) technology transfer from abroad. The 
combination of these policies indicated to firms like Toyota that they could benefit 
more from forming their own supplier network than they could from remaining a 
stand-alone firm. Government policies effectively required that investible funds 
available from market sources be used for the building of factories and the purchase 
of production line equipment and machinery, not for takeovers. Moreover, faced 
with exploding demand, the major companies had priority uses (scaling up, 
modernisation) for their own limited access to investible funds. From the mid-
1950s, there was a scramble by these major producers to form links between 
themselves and as many of the small scale, craft-based industrial workshops as they 
required. These workshops had the experience and skilled manpower to put into 
place the technology transfer mandated by government policies. In this respect, they 
supplemented the major firm's resource base (Edwards and Samimi 1997). 
The surge in demand in the 1950s arose from the Korean War and the 
resulting demand for trucks and military equipment. This was followed by a 
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sustained rise in demand in Japan for a wide range of industrial and consumer goods. 
Major firms in these fields realised that they risked losing market share if they 
continued to attempt to extend the range of parts and components they themselves 
produced. The process of internalisation and of transferring necessary technology 
from abroad was protracted and tied up significant amounts of scarce skilled 
manpower and capital. An alternative was for the major firms to focus more on 
assembly activities, and to encourage the many small and medium scale industrial 
workshops to join them and supply different components and parts (Edwards and 
Samimi 1997). 
According to Edwards and Samimi (1997), Toyota's strategic network 
gained advantage over competitors in America because it was relieved of two major 
transaction costs: those linked to internalisation and decomposed subcontracting. In 
addition, successful networks developed intragroup understandings that led to 
significant reduction in both interfirm coordination costs and direct production costs. 
Essential networks of the Philippine Chinese 
In comparison with the Japanese case, this study suggests that circumstances 
favourable to the formation of essential networks among the ethnic Chinese in the 
Philippines arose during the 1960s and 1970s. There were three that have been 
pivotal: ( a) a common business history and background; (b) government 
nationalistic policies towards the Chinese; and ( c) national economic development 
policies. Their common business history and the Philippine government's 
nationalistic policies against the Chinese banded the community together and, to a 
large extent, kept information within the group. When the government introduced 
import-substitution policies, skilled Chinese flocked into small and medium-scale 
manufacturing, creating a criss-crossing network of relationships among end-product 
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manufacturers and support industries. These support industries included suppliers of 
packaging materials such as bottles or plastic containers, printing services and 
machinery parts. 
The business history of the Philippine Chinese was discussed in Chapter 4. 
Many Chinese migrants shared the common experience of starting small and 
growing into medium and large enterprises. Their businesses are also almost all 
family-owned and managed. Limlingan (1986) documents Chinese business 
practices in the Philippines and highlights two unique strategies. The first is the low 
margin/high volume strategy of concentrating on price as a means to increase market 
share. The second is the use of business credit (including the issuance of post-dated 
cheques) to expand one's business. 
In the Philippine Chinese case, surname and village associations were 
significant in the earlier periods and later on, alumni associations and Lions and 
Rotary Clubs incr~ased in importance (See 1997). Most of these Chinese-based 
organizations perform social rather than economic functions (Carifio 2001). See 
(1981) observes that clan associations mainly help to preserve Chinese identity 
rather than protect the livelihood of its members. Members of family and clan 
associations may have unofficial business ties with each other but business activities 
are not part of the official activities of clan associations. These associations rarely 
give help to improve one's livelihood, such as providing jobs or business credit. 
Any assistance of this nature is done at the personal level. However, they do support 
those affected by misfortunes such as fire or long illness and provide scholarships to 
children of needy clansmen. Omohundro (1981) finds among the Chinese in Iloilo 
that clan and family associations provide an informal network that reinforces 
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business links among the Chinese, but agrees with See that these associations do not 
officially perform business functions. 
According to Carifio's (1998) research, even the Federation of Filipino-
Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FFCCCI), established in 1954, has 
not played a distinctive role in facilitating assistance to Chinese business. Instead, it 
primarily serves as a channel through which the Philippine government transmits 
and implements policies concerning the Chinese. 
The second circumstance, the policies of the Philippine government towards 
the Chinese, was discussed in Chapter 4. The chapter described how the 
nationalisation movement attempted to push the Chinese out of areas where they had 
economically thrived. They were accused of controlling the economy, unscrupulous 
economic activities and of illegal pursuits. Between the end of the Second World 
War _and 1975, the Filipino Chinese suffered from a strong sense of political 
vulnerability and insecurity (Carifio 1998). Li (2000) points out that when legal 
protection is weak, personalised obligation and reciprocity step in to provide what 
the legal system fails to provide. This also explains why informal networks were 
important to Chinese communities where they faced racial discrimination as a 
minority, since their marginal social status also resulted in their being peripheral to 
the legal system and other social institutions (Li 2000). The granting of Philippine 
citizenship to the Chinese by President Marcos in 197 5 provided some stability and 
political security to the community. 
Third, national economic development policies favouring import-substituting 
industrialisation (ISI) encouraged a large number of Chinese entrepreneurs to enter 
manufacturing. This eventually led to a large pool of manufacturers in textiles and 
the various supporting industries (yam, dyeing services and tools). 
- - ----
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The next four sections outline the conditions for sustained cooperative 
networking. The conditions are discussed in relation to Chinese commercial history 
in the Philippines ( chapter 4) and the research findings ( chapters 5 to 7). 
8.3 Conditions for sustained cooperation 
Four conditions need to be fulfilled for sustained cooperative interaction 
within strategic networks (Table 8.2). These relate to (a) payoff structures, (b) end-
game conditions, ( c) social embeddedness and ( d) tit-for-tat mechanisms. First, the 
payoff structure for each member firm from group cooperation needs to consistently 
exceed the benefit that any network member may obtain from pursuing its own 
dominant strategy in preference to the group's strategy (Edwards and Samimi 1997). 
There is no need to assume trust between the players: the use of reciprocity can be 
enough to make defection unproductive. Altruism is not needed: successful 
strategies can elicit cooperation even from an egoist (Axelrod 1984). 
Table 8.2. Four conditions for sustained cooperation 
Payoff 
structures 
• Every participant 
benefits, but 
payoff structure is 
asymmetric (no 
strict one-to-one 
reciprocity) 
End-game 
conditions 
• Relationship 
without a clear 
end-point 
• Long-term 
outlook 
Embeddedness 
• Ability to regulate 
business partner's 
behaviour 
• Partner's identity is 
important 
Tit-for-tat 
mechanisms 
• Punishment 
and reward 
mechanisms 
need to be 
credible 
Second, network member firms need to view the game being played as one 
without a clear end-point. For cooperation to prove stable, the future must have a 
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sufficiently large shadow. Hence, the probability of a next encounter between the 
same two individuals must be great enough to make defection an unprofitable 
strategy (Axelrod 1984). 
Third, business relationships need to be supported by a corresponding 
network of social relationships (Granovetter 1985). Finally, satisfactory tit-for-tat 
response mechanisms need to be developed and understood by each party. These 
final two conditions require some assumptions about the individuals and the social 
settings (Axelrod 1984, 174). Two are particularly salient: (a) that an individual be 
able to recognise another player and (b) that an individual can remember his or her 
prior history of interactions with this player. 
These four conditions permit the formation of essential networks. The 
essential network model also addresses the paradox of Fukuyama's (1995) line of 
reas<?ning: that Chinese society is characterised by low trust and yet networking is so 
prevalent. Ultimately, these conditions are interrelated: common interest is 
reinforced by end-game conditions and tit-for-tat mechanisms can be more 
effectively enforced within a community (embeddedness). 
Payoff structure and common interest 
The concepts of payoff structure and common interest originate from game 
theory. The payoff structure under common interest assumptions favours 
cooperation in a repeated game (Edwards and Samimi 1997, 508). In effect, the 
common interest objective makes the long-term incentive for mutual cooperation 
greater than the short-term incentive for defection (Axelrod 1984). 
The logic that leads to cooperation in repeated transactions is non-zero-
sumness. The asymmetric payoff structure is what makes the game non-zero sum: 
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one player's gain is not cancelled out by the other player's loss. The essential 
feature of non-zero-sumness is that, through cooperatiofr or reciprocation, both 
players can be better off. Non-zero-sumness is, by itself, not enough to explain the 
evolution of reciprocal altruism. Even in a non-zero-sum game, cooperation may 
not necessarily make sense. It depends on the prevailing social environment. 
The common interest condition is manifested in the case study firms in two 
ways: (a) the benefits and costs associated with IORs are not completely quantified 
and (b) no strict one-to-one reciprocity or exchange ( asymmetric benefits) is evident. 
Chinese business relations are described as explicitly predicated on economic 
validity and mutual self-interest. DeGlopper (1972) argues that simple economic 
rationality and functional specificity suffice to explain much of the pattern of 
economic relations in Lukang (Taiwan) but that they are not the only forces at work. 
The importance of particularistic ties is seen in problems of_ credit, of access to 
restricted or limited supplies or markets and of partnerships (DeGlopper 1972). 
Yao Souchou (1987) quotes a Singaporean Chinese businessman who 
explained that he engaged in particularistic transactions because he had to. 
Reciprocity is clearly underpinned by common self-interest: a combination of self-
perception, cultural norms and economic pragmatism defines the nature of the 
transaction. The significance lies not so much in the guanxi sentiments but rather in 
the structural differences in the relationships involved. Control of the desired goods 
is the objective. Indeed, transactions take place in a set of relationships that was 
characterised by a vertical structure of unequal access to a resource, which in this 
case is money (Yao 1987). 
For the case study firms, the goal was to obtain resources to achieve their 
strategic business objectives. Resources are widely defined to include financial 
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resources as well as technology and access to supplies and markets. The company's 
strategic decisions and stage of development as well as environmental factors affect 
such resource requirements. Environmental factors outside an organization's control 
are constantly changing and may require incremental or major strategic adjustment. 
The next subsection illustrates the payoff structure and common interest concepts 
with reference to the case study firms. 
Stage of development. The objective of this subsection is to illustrate how 
the common interest perspective is manifested within the case study firms' IORs. 
Aspects of non-quantified benefits and asymmetric exchange are discussed. Strong 
ties are heavily relied upon in the early stages of development because business 
start-ups face tremendous uncertainty. The better-established businesses extend 
assistance to Chinese entrepreneurs they know. Many new entrepreneurs are former 
employees of these established businesses. Common interest, as a precondition for 
sustained cooperation, is necessary, although resource needs evolved as the case 
study firms grew and developed. 
Personal ties appear to be more important in the early stages of a firm's 
development than when it is more established. At an early stage, the firm has 
virtually no reputation or track record and experiences a highly uncertain financial 
standing. A businessman's strong ties play a salient role here and the case study 
firms used them as sources of tangible and intangible benefits. Tangible benefits 
include start-up capital while intangible benefits include being their guarantors of 
credit or character references. Pre-existing networks of relationships enable small 
firms to gain an established foothold fairly quickly. Li (2000) observes that, 
generally, firms that are relatively small tend to rely more on family members to run 
the business. He argues, therefore, that the size of firms has a bearing on the use of 
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personal connections. However, this research has found that in addition to the size 
of the firm, the industry that the business operates in also has an impact on the 
reliance on personal ties. Menkhoffs (1996) study of small traders in Singapore 
supports this finding. He discovers that the nature of business activities and 
resource needs influence one's networking. These antecedents of business relations 
were covered in chapter 5. 
The need for resources changes as the firm grows and finds the need to 
expand its market access and venture into new fields. This finding is consistent with 
Carroll's study of Filipino and Chinese entrepreneurs in the Philippines. In his study 
of these entrepreneurs, Carroll (1965, 149) concludes that the main problem in 
getting started in business changes from financing to dealing with government and 
later, to technology and training requirements and that it changes according to the 
prevailing climate of entrepreneurship. This was demonstrate~ with respect to the 
case study firms in Chapters 6 and 7. The strategies of the firms varied, ranging 
from those that focused on core competencies (KK Stores, FF Food, SS Shipping 
and GG Shipping) to those that grew through diversification into unrelated activities 
(11M Textiles, CC Chemical). Notwithstanding these differences, the reliance on 
weak social ties becomes more pronounced as companies grow larger. The emphasis 
on some 'tie' is important, as one recalls DeGlopper's (1972) remark that 'one does 
not do business with strangers'. IORs between Chinese and non-Chinese firms 
follow this principle. SS Shipping's alliance with two other shipping companies 
( one Chinese, one Spanish-owned) stemmed from the company knowing these other 
two players from many years of doing business in Cebu. 
The economic rationale is paramount. Access to resources and skills was the 
common interest. Chapter 5 outlined the case study firms' needs for resources, 
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which ranged from capital to technology and raw materials. The changes in their 
IORs over time were revealed in Chapter 7. The pursuit ·of common interest was 
reflected in the firms' long-term commitment within the Essential Network 
framework. The firms expected that these relationships would grow for mutual 
economic gain. The total alliance between SS Shipping and the two smaller 
shipping companies was a defensive reaction against the threat of new entrants. The 
alliance also fulfilled individual firm needs by allowing each participant access to 
the partners' strengths in marketing, logistics, and technology. The effectiveness of 
the common interest objective is closely tied to the next condition for long-term 
cooperation, that of end-game conditions. 
End-game conditions 
The second condition for stable cooperation is that network member firms 
need to view the game being played as one without a clear end~point (Edwards and 
Samimi 1997). The majority of IORs in the case study firms were long-term and 
ongoing. These IORs began with the exchange of goods and services, but became 
more complex and multi-layered as time passed. Consequently, future benefits were 
neither exactly known nor easily quantifiable. One can see that this condition is 
intimately tied to the common interest condition. The existence of common interest 
incentives contributes to making the game open-ended. What makes this outcome 
possible? Two observations support this condition for the Chinese case: (a) the 
emphasis on future orientation which places importance on learning, an outcome 
which does not occur immediately but takes place in the medium to long-term and 
(b) the defined boundaries of the group. Illustrations from the case study firms are 
discussed and the two observations noted above are elaborated in the next section. 
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For the case study firms, the actual duration of most IORs was long-term 
(more than ten years) and the intended duration was long-term (end-game 
condition). The growth of the relationship and the long-term benefits from such 
growth are important findings, as shown in Chapter 7. For instance, many of KK 
Stores' suppliers had been doing business with the company for at least two 
generations. Because well-established companies of at least ten years' operation 
were used for the case studies, the examinations of changes to IORs as well as the 
exploration of business conflict and mistakes were possible. Both were 
accomplished and demonstrated in Chapter 7. Adjustments over time were also a 
significant discovery. The common interest here is a long-term outlook; it is the 
interest in continuing in business for the long-term, in part because there are limited 
occupational choices available to the Chinese. There is also a belief within the 
Chinese community that there are higher financial rewards for being in business 
rather than in paid employment. 
Long-term orientation. Why do entrepreneurs have a long-term outlook? 
Could it be that long-term arrangements can be relied upon in certain countries (such 
as in Japan or Chinese societies) more than in other economies (Dore 1983)? The 
preference for relational contracting (where there is no one-to-one exchange) cannot 
be separated from the players' long-term future orientation. Entrepreneurs who 
experience a short-term loss associated with sacrificing a price advantage have the 
assurance that one day they can 'call off the same type of help from their trading 
partner (Dore 1983, 468-470). 
Keister' s (2002) study of business groups in China found that while cost is 
an important determinant in exchange, environmental uncertainty matters even 
more. Specifically, to minimise long-term cost rather than minimising current price, 
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firms opted to trade with others that would be stable trading partners. The cost of 
searching for new trade partners are particularly high in developing markets, where 
potential partners are scarce and information about their track records is limited. 
In the case of Chinese entrepreneurs in the Philippines, participation in open-
ended relationships is possible because future compensation can be relied upon. 
Long-term relations benefit both parties because one can evaluate a partner's 
reliability over time. As customers, firms need to have reliable suppliers who are 
able to deliver as promised and meet quality standards. As suppliers, firms also 
desire to transact with reliable customers, who are able to pay their accounts. 
Finally, ongoing relationships permit learning to occur. 
Long-term orientation is an attribute that has been observed in certain Asian 
co~tries. Hofstede (1984) cites a Chinese values questionnaire that was composed 
and distributed by Chinese social scientists to male and female students in 18 
countries and two regions. The statistical analysis yielded four dimensions, three of 
which were similar to Hofstede's (1980) earlier findings from his study of IBM 
employees. These were: Power Distance, Individualism/Collectivism and 
Masculinity/Femininity. The fourth was a dimension the researchers labelled 
'Confucian Dynamism' to show that it deals with certain principles from Confucius' 
philosophy. Its positive pole reflects a dynamic, future-oriented mentality, whereas 
its negative pole reflects a more static, tradition-oriented mentality. Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Japan and South Korea held the top positive positions in the 'Confucian 
Dynamism' scale, which reflected the high importance placed on values oriented 
towards the future (perseverance and thrift) (Hofstede and Bond 1988, exhibit 3). 
The next high scores were found for Brazil, India, Thailand and Singapore (Table 
8.3). 
247 
Table 8.3. Confucian dynamism dimension score for twenty countries and 
two regions in the Chinese values survey 
Confucian Dynamism 
Country Index Rank 
Australia 31 11-12 
Brazil 65 5 
Canada 23 17 
Germany (F.R.) 31 11-12 
Great Britain 25 15-16 
·Hong Kong ·. '. ., -:96 .· · .. , 
, .. , 
,·, .. 
'' 
,. .:.,.' . . . .. 
. , 
,. ' ; ., • ;· .. . , .. .-; , , . ,1· ' ·'; ·- ... 
" 
.-
., 
India 61 6 
Japan ·so · · 
' ' 3 " . . .• . ' .. 
'. 
. ,.--
Korea·:/ · 75 4 '. 
" 
Netherlands 44 9 
New Zealand 30 13 
Pakistan 0 20 
Philippines 19 18 
Singapore 48 8 
Sweden 33 10 
Taiwan . '87 2 
Thailand 56 7 
United States 29 14 
~egion . ' 
East Africa 25 15-16 
West Africa 16 19 
Source: Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond, 'The Confucius connection: From cultural 
roots to economic growth,' Organizational Dynamics 16, no. 4 (1988). 
There is, of course, much contention about attributing certain behaviours and 
outcomes to Confucianism. Li (2000) points out that as a broad philosophy, 
Confucianism promotes many values, including the ones that happen to be important 
to guanxi formation. 
However, it also has others that are not supportive of business undertakings . 
Wang Gungwu (1991) argues that traditional Confucian values were not particularly 
sympathetic to merchant activities, and that Confucian philosophy in fact placed 
merchants at the lowest level of the four-tier social stratification system, after the 
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scholars, peasants and artisans. It is clear that using the term 'Confucianism' is 
fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, 'Confucian Dynamism' is cited here simply to 
illustrate the contrast between a more future-oriented society from one which is 
more static and traditionally oriented. 
Embeddedness 
The first condition for stable networks, payoff structure and common 
interest, ties together the findings in chapter 5, which discussed the antecedents of 
IORs. The second, end-game conditions, draws from the analysis in chapter 7 and 
emphasises long-term orientation and open-ended relationships as contributing to 
sustainability of IORs. The third condition is embeddedness. 
The evolution of cooperation requires that individuals have a sufficiently 
large chance to meet again so that they have a stake in their future interaction. 
Cooperation, once established based on reciprocity, can protect -itself from invasion 
by less cooperative strategies. The ability to recognise the other player from past 
interactions and to remember the relevant features of those interactions is necessary 
to sustain cooperation (Axelrod 1984). The third condition, embeddedness, is an 
important mechanism for developing this ability. Under circumstances where it is 
important to evaluate the reputation of a potential business partner and regulate his 
or her behaviour, the concept of social embeddedness is imperative. 
Identity becomes highly important when there is uncertainty about the 
quality of the object of exchange and terms of the transaction and when transactions 
are not consummated instantaneously (Ben-Porath 1980, 7). In this situation, there 
is a need to evaluate the reputation of partners. A common identity engenders 
concern for each other's outcomes and thus, mutual trust. Being members of 
industry associations or of social, ethnic or political groups can put normative curbs 
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on organizational behaviour through generally accepted norms of behaviour and 
through fear of being ostracised socially (Bhattacharya, Devinney, and Pillutla 
1998). This section covers the conceptual definition of embeddedness through the 
two dimensions of horizontal and vertical ties. The outcomes that result from 
embeddedness are then discussed. 
Granovetter (1985) defines embeddedness as the proliferation of links 
resulting from mutual obligations. By this definition, embeddedness is closely 
related to the concept of guanxi. As previously discussed, the term guanxi refers to 
webs of interpersonal connections, or social networks, which the Chinese are 
believed to have developed wherever they reside because of their strong attachment 
to the family. However, the use of guanxi as a conceptual tool to understand 
business networks is limited because the usage of this term is very broad. There is 
little agreement over the conceptual and actual boundaries of the term and its use is 
often imprecise (Li 2000). The findings that relate to embeddedness from this 
research are, hence, more usefully characterised along the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions of ties. A useful framework for horizontal comparison is the dichotomy 
of strong and weak ties developed by Granovetter (1973). 
Horizontal embeddedness. Personal ties often serve as bridges to other 
business partners, and the 'strength of weak ties' theory (Granovetter 1973) is salient 
here. Granovetter (1973, 1361) explains that most intuitive notions of the strength 
of a tie should be satisfied by the following definition: the strength of a tie is a 
combination of the amount of time, emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual confiding) 
and reciprocal services that characterise the tie. Weak ties are more likely to link 
members of different small groups than are strong ties, which tend to be 
concentrated within particular groups. 
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In Granovetter's (1973) research on how American blue-collar workers find 
out about jobs, the natural a priori idea was that those with whom one has strong 
ties are more motivated to help with job information. Contrary to this, Granovetter 
contends, is the structural argument that those to whom one is weakly tied are more 
likely to move in circles different from one's own and will thus have access to 
information different from that which one receives. The results from his study 
validate the structural argument: of those finding a job through personal contacts, 
83.3 per cent of these contacts are classified as the job seeker's weak ties. 
This research supports Granovetter's (1973) theory and finds that very few of 
a business owner's strong personal ties form part of his or her Essential Network. 
The majority of Essential Network ties are with one's weak ties, with the exception 
of AA Plastics, whose five key distributors are either the owner's relatives or 
townmates. 
Within the Philippine Chinese business community, strong horizontal ties 
refer to an individual and his close associates with whom the individual interacts 
most intensely and most regularly and whom he regards as his social equals. This is 
equivalent to Granovetter's (1985) concept of strong ties. A person's extended 
network consists of the same individual plus those with whom he has less intense 
and less frequent relations and whom he does not necessarily regard as his equals 
(Barnes 1972, 14 ). These particularistic ties among the Chinese community fulfil 
two critical functions (Wong 1991 ). They: 
• provide a firmer basis for confidence within the network. Members 
of the group can access information to evaluate each other's credit-
worthiness. They can also exert greater control over those who do 
not conform by invoking communal sanctions; and 
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• furnish a justification for discrimination. People with common ties 
belong to a moral community with shared rights and obligations, so 
that it is legitimate to keep economic benefits · within the network. 
Vertical embeddedness. A businessperson can also be vertically embedded. 
For example, Confucian values emphasise the relative importance of ordering 
relationships by status and observing this order. Hierarchical dualities and 
interrelatedness lie at the heart of the Chinese conception of being human. In 
Confucian teaching, the stability of society is based on unequal relationships 
between people. The wu fun or 'five relationships' are composed of ruler/subject, 
father/son, older brother/younger brother, husband/wife, and older friend/younger 
friend. These relationships are based on mutual, complementary obligations: the 
juni~ff partner owes the senior respect and obedience; the senior owes the junior 
partner protection and consideration (Hofstede and Bond 1988). _. 
Modern application of these five relationships in the Philippine Chinese case 
appear to be based on the distribution of unequal economic power rather than on 
moral or ethical obligations. In terms of the business hierarchy in the Philippines, 
wealth and the size of one's business interests matter more than seniority or family 
connections. As seen in Chapter 4, this hierarchy involves the owners of the largest 
conglomerates ( or the taipans) at the top level, followed by owners of large and 
medium-sized enterprises in the middle tier. Small business proprietors comprise 
the bottom level. What then are the effects of horizontal and vertical embeddedness 
in practice? 
Effects of embeddedness in practice. Behaviour is closely embedded in 
networks of interpersonal relations (Granovetter 1985). The 'undersocialised' view 
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argues that clever institutional arrangements make it too costly to engage in 
opportunism. In contrast, the 'oversocialised' view maintains that generalised 
morality is a social mechanism that discourages opportunism. The embeddedness 
argument is slightly different again. It emphasises the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance 
(Granovetter 1985). The use of personal ties can be observed in many societies and 
communities. 
Diamond merchants illustrate the case where transactions based on oral 
contracts are possible in part because they are not atomised from other transactions 
but embedded in a close-knit community of merchants who monitor each other's 
behaviour closely (Ben-Porath 1980). Li's (2000) account of the Canadian business 
establishment also reveals a close-knit circle of business elites. Li (2000) argues 
that there appears to be little difference between Chinese diaspora tycoons and 
W estem corporate power brokers in the way they use contacts and connections to 
advance business interests. The similarity indicates that the use of personal 
connections is universal in the corporate world and not unique to ethnic Chinese 
culture. 
A study of U.S. firms' relations with investment banks shows how pre-
existing ties between companies and the interpersonal ties of company employees 
influence subsequent cooperative relations. Financial officers report that their firms 
use non-market ties (such as family, business, college and professional school ties) 
to reduce uncertainty and ensure satisfactory performance when assembling the 
financing for a deal (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz 1993, 54). This does not 
necessarily imply that non-market ties lead to inefficiency, because there is 
accountability for performance (as the section on tit-for-tat mechanisms will show). 
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The use of interpersonal ties might even lead to reduced risk (because one does 
business with people whom one knows can do the job). Sako and Helper (1998, 
388) refer to this as having competence trust, where the other party is capable of 
doing what it says it will do. 
Ethnic bonds played a crucial role in nineteenth-century banking in Europe. 
In an international profession that depended on the closest mutual confidence, the 
dispersion of certain persecuted or disfavoured groups with common values and 
ways of life to cement them from within, and common pressures and prejudices 
imposing unity from without, was a positive advantage. However, one should not 
overestimate the importance of ethnicity. As Swedberg's (1990, 270) study showed, 
ethnic bonds might help a firm to establish itself, but in the long run it is usually 
profit and pragmatism that count. 
Outcomes of embeddedness. The previous section -discussed a visible 
outcome of embeddedness, that of the choice of business partners. Another outcome 
is institutional isomorphism. Uncertainty is a powerful force that encourages 
imitation. When organizational technologies are poorly understood, when goals are 
ambiguous, or when the environment creates uncertainty, organizations may model 
themselves on others. An example of how institutional isomorphism occurs is when 
American corporations implement (their perception of) Japanese models to cope 
with productivity and personnel problems in their own firms (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). In the case of the top level of the Chinese business hierarchy in the 
Philippines, what is observed is a similarity of their business structures and industry 
participation. They have a core activity (i.e. retailing, manufacturing), but usually 
add to this a property development arm and equity in a financial institution (usually 
a bank or insurance company). Institutional isomorphism is observed in this 
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business community, with a mixture of cooperation between some conglomerates 
and competition against each other (Carino 2001). 
To summarise, the two-dimensional conceptualisation of embeddedness is 
useful in portraying how businesspersons' links to others affect their actions. In 
practice, the use of personal connections is observed not only within Chinese 
business but also in other business communities. A visible outcome is, of course, 
the choice of business partner. Another is a similarity in institutional structures 
among certain business groups. Finally, embeddedness enables tit-for-tat 
mechanisms, the topic of the next section, to be carried out. 
Tit-for-tat mechanisms 
The final condition for sustained cooperative interaction is that punishment 
and _ reward mechanisms need to be credible (Edwards and Samimi 1997, 494). 
Henc_e, tit-for-tat mechanisms that are understood by each · party need to be 
developed. This condition is intimately related to embeddedness. Axelrod (1984, 
60) argues that it is easier to maintain the norms of reciprocity in a stable small town 
or ethnic neighbourhood. In game theory, tit-for-tat is defined as the strategy of 
cooperating with one's partner and then doing whatever the other player did on the 
previous move (Axelrod 1984, 113). If the business partner cooperates, then the 
player also cooperates. If the business partner defects, the player responds likewise. 
Tit-for-tat is an equivalent given in retaliation (Axelrod 1984). 
The effectiveness of tit-for-tat is also closely related to end-game conditions. 
Mutual cooperation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the 
present. This is because the players can each use an implicit threat of retaliation 
against the other's defection. However, the threat is effective only if the interaction 
lasts long enough (Axelrod 1984, 126). 
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Tit-for-tat mechanisms as observed in the field were discussed in chapter 
seven. The Chinese firms practise tit-for-tat that functions· ·through embeddedness. 
A consequence for a business that does not live up to its word is the damage to its 
reputation. It is not common practice to resort to litigation, an observation that 
Macaulay (1963) also notes in U.S. firms. In the unfortunate event that a buyer 
defaults on a payment, MM Textiles tried to seize whatever property it can. If it 
waited to bring legal action against the buyer, the manager remarked, it would be too 
late and it would not be able to recover anything at all. Instead, news about the 
buyer's actions was disseminated around the business community, with the 
consequence that the buyer would find it very difficult to do business with other 
firms in the future. Needless to say, this buyer would not be able to access business 
credit in future. 
In order to avoid or minimise defaults occurring, the case study firms spread 
their risks. This strategy can be seen as an indirect tit-for-tat action: firms spread 
their risk because they have experienced defaulters. The practice of using multiple 
suppliers was widely observed in the case study firms. This was done not 
necessarily to seek the lowest price, but to control the risk of delivery or quality 
problems. Collaboration and alliances with competitors (such as the case of SS 
Shipping) were other avenues for risk-sharing. 
To summarise the discussion on the four conditions, repeated games promote 
cooperation for players who participate. Embeddedness in a social and business 
environment, where reputation counts, promotes cooperation for players who are 
involved. Common interest contributes to open-ended games, which in turn 
promotes cooperation for self-interest. The fact that tit-for-tat mechanisms can be 
256 
effective, due to embeddedness, end-game conditions and common interest, prevents 
opportunism. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The findings from the fieldwork are presented in a networking process 
framework. This framework begins with the antecedents of interorganizational 
relations (IORs) and then considers their nature and outcomes (chapters 5 to 7). 
This study finds that the firm's 'essential network' is composed of its most valuable 
set of partners, which can be its key customers or major suppliers or both. This 
network enables a firm to access resources, including technology, finance, supplies, 
and marketing channels. Nevertheless, the findings need to be analysed in the 
context of Chinese business history in the Philippines ( chapter 4). 
Informal agreements are the primary devices behind networking. 
Businesspeople often prefer to rely on a person's 'word of honour' in a brief letter or 
a handshake, even when the transaction involves exposure to serious risks, according 
to Macaulay (1963). The creation of exchanges is done on a fairly noncontractual 
basis; adjustments of such relationships and settlement of disputes are even less 
formal. Indeed, a common observation from the case studies is the reliance on oral 
agreements for orders. MM Textiles' purchaser would ring their yam supplier and 
order a few thousand US dollars' worth of cotton yam over the telephone. The 
warehouse manager signed the delivery receipt that accompanied the goods as 
evidence of receipt. However, this document only contained information on item 
and quantity and omitted price details. A sales invoice would sometimes be sent by 
the supplier, but the researcher observed that the delivery receipt frequently became 
the basis for paying. 
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Informal contracts and oral agreements are not always the ideal, however. 
AA Plastics saw this as a less than optimal arrangement for three reasons. The first 
was the risks that were associated with defaults or disputes; these risks increased 
with the size of the transaction. Second, no protection was offered for mistakes, 
especially when was no documentary evidence, such as written contracts and 
invoices. Third, the practice did not comply with the international standards 
regarding accounting controls that the firm needed to follow. 
AA's dilemma between using formal and informal contracts is also observed 
in Taiwan. Until the 1970s, formal contracts were not used between businessmen 
who knew, and had a basis for trusting, each other; instead, business deals were 
made on the basis of verbal agreements. Within Taiwan, the potential damage to 
one's reputation for trustworthiness was sufficient sanction to make the system 
work. The increased use of contracts came by the 1980s with government insistence 
on formal contracts for tax purposes. Despite this, businessmen still checked the 
reputation of the other party before signing because they felt the costs in time, 
money and energy to take a contractual matter to court outweighed any damages that 
might result. Personal relationships are, therefore, still regarded as important (Schak 
2000). 
A pragmatic approach to networking is observed in Taiwan. In Lukang, 
Taiwan, entrepreneurs maximise their autonomy and their ability to take advantage 
of any opportunity that comes their way by: (a) insisting on their freedom to do 
business with whomever they choose; (b) maintaining strict secrecy about the details 
of their financial affairs and their intentions; and ( c) spreading their debts and 
obligations as widely and as they safely can (De Glopper 1972, 326). Large 
businesses in Taiwan are also pragmatic in the way they utilise networks in making 
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joint investments or cultivating political connections: almost any kind of network is 
used if it is useful (Numazaki 1991). 
The economic achievement of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is a result of the 
ability of the Chinese to draw upon the strength of their socio-cultural resources to 
adapt to the ever-changing political and economic conditions of their respective 
national societies as well as the global political economy. The Chinese are also 
concerned with long-term economic relations intertwined with the complicated 
network of credit relations (Tan 1992). The four conditions for sustaining IORs are 
the 'glue' that make it possible for flexible and informal connections. 
The typical large Chinese business enterprise in Southeast Asia is a 
diversified family-owned conglomerate headed by the founder-patriarch and his 
immediate descendants. It is tempting to see ethnic cultural characteristics 
embedded in this enterprise form. Nevertheless, it is at least equally likely that 
environmental conditions dictate this form - specifically the underdevelopment of 
markets and the consequential importance of relationships (Keister 2002; Lim 1996, 
62). In economic terms, added value is the difference between the value of a firm's 
output and the cost of the firm's inputs. One way that value is added is by 
developing a set of relationships which others are unable to make (Kay 1993). 
These relationships then become the competitive asset of the firm which is leveraged 
to provide new business that is likely to be in different sectors, given relatively small 
markets and rapid growth (Lim 1996, 62). 
In contrast to Weber's (1951) argument, traditional Chinese culture lacks 
neither the motivation nor values for economic performance. The economic 
achievement of the Chinese in Southeast Asia demonstrates that motivation and 
values can activate the orientation towards economic success only in a larger society 
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whose economic and administrative systems are not detrimental to business 
development and where there is room for economic expansion. The ability to adapt 
to a changing situation and to organize efficiently by drawing upon the strengths of 
kinship, social organizations and other forms of personal contacts are important 
reasons for Chinese economic success (Tan 1992, 11). 
In the end, a robust and realistic view of alliances and networks could very 
well be built on a foundation of dualities: 
• They are temporary mechanisms and long-lasting relationships. 
• They are cooperative and competitive weapons. 
• Each is unique, but they often share similar properties. 
• They have intended purposes, yet their emergent benefits may be 
more important. 
8.5 Limitations of the research 
A common concern about case studies is that they provide little basis for 
scientific generalisation (Yin 1994, 10). Indeed, the case studies completed in this 
research do not represent 'samples' in the statistical sense. The researcher's goal 
was to expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate 
frequencies ( statistical generalisation). 
With statistical generalisation, an inference is made about a population on 
the basis of empirical data collected about a sample. This commonly occurs when 
surveys are used. However, case studies are not sampling units. Rather, individual 
case studies were selected as a laboratory investigator selects the topic of a new 
experiment (Yin 1993, 31). Under these circumstances, the aim is analytic 
generalisation, in which the previously developed theories about inteorganizational 
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relations are used as templates with which to compare the empirical results of the 
study. 
The case study approach was used over other possible approaches (such as 
surveys and historical or archival analysis) because it is suited to examining 
contemporary events (Yin 1994, 8). The case study's unique strength is its ability to 
deal with a full variety of evidence - documents, interviews and observations -
beyond what might be available in the conventional historical study. In addition, the 
case study approach offers the depth unavailable in surveys. 
Based on the aim of analytic generalisation, the findings have two 
limitations. First, are they generalisable to ethnic Chinese in countries other than the 
Philippines? Second, are the findings generalisable beyond Chinese business? 
8.6 - · Future research directions 
· Three research avenues in the study of interorganizatiorial relationships will 
be rewarding for scholars and practitioners alike in the future: 
• a study of networks delineated along functional rather than ethnic 
lines; 
• a focus on essential networks; and 
• the study of IORs over time 
The differentiation of networks as either 'Western' or 'Chinese' is not as 
useful as characterising and describing networks according to their functions or 
nature, such as networks built around access to finance, technology or research and 
innovation. Focusing on particular business functions facilitates the tracing of 
network ties. Meaningful comparisons between different industries or communities 
can also follow. 
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Another fruitful focus of further investigation is on a firm's essential 
networks. Essential networks are composed of a firm's most important ties. This 
importance can be evaluated quantitatively (such as percentage of sales or 
purchases) or qualitatively (such as technology partners). Studies focussed on firms 
within particular industries enable the comparison of strategy between firms. 
The study of networks over time is necessary. This study has demonstrated 
the importance of analysing business relations within their historical and 
environmental context. The consideration of this context allows one to consider the 
effects of economic conditions, government policies and technology on the 
evolution of business relations. The study of networks and their change using a 
historical lens permits meaningful questions to be asked about why and how their 
nature and composition have evolved over time. 
BACKGROUND 
History 
APPENDIX A 
Interview guide 
1. When was the company founded? 
2. Describe your operations five years ago ( or ten years ago) and compare with 
today. 
3. What has your revenue growth rate been over the last five years? 
4. What were the primary drivers of that growth? 
5. What role has your relationships with other businesses played? (Suppliers, 
customers, competitors, venture partners) 
6. Historically, how important have they been? 
Business description 
7. What are the company's products/services? 
8. In what markets and industries does the firm compete? 
9. How competitive are these? 
10. What does a firm have to do to be successful in these businesses? 
11. What are the most important drivers of competitiveness? 
• pnce 
• quality 
• delivery times 
• product features 
12. Are business partners ( or alliances) part of a strategy for success in these 
businesses? 
13. What research and development activities are you involved in? 
• existing product improvements 
• new product developn1ent 
14. Total number of employees: 
____
 Permanent ____ Casual 
15. Sales turnover 
------
---
GENERAL BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS 
16. How many material suppliers do you have? 
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17. On the basis of the cost structure, your product's value breaks down as follows: 
___ % value added by company ___ % material from suppliers 
18. Map out partners 
APPENDIX A - continued 
SPECIFIC BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
19. Any collaborations? 
• joint ventures 
• subcontracting 
• licensing agreement 
• distributors 
• other 
History 
20. Please consider your most important/largest/longest business relationship. 
21. How did this relationship begin? 
22. What factors caused you to enter into the relationship? 
23. Are they the same factors that keep you involved today? 
24. Describe the exchange as it began and any important stages in its evolution. 
Product or service exchanged 
25. What is the product, how is it made? 
•- resource type 
26. What percentage of sales or cost of goods sold does this represent? 
• scope 
• salience (goal relevant or ancillary activities) 
27. Partner size (larger, smaller) and importance to partner of this partnership 
Benefits 
28. How would you describe the benefits you get from this arrangement? 
29. Are there non economic benefits? 
• reputation 
• information 
• learning 
30. Were non-economic benefits expected? 
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31. In your overall assessment, how has the alliance performed as compared to your 
expectations? 
5 = very well; 4=well; 3=neutral; 2=poorly; 1 =very poorly 
32. Does your company have more or less influence over the direction and 
development of the partnership than your partner? 
33. Do you see the alliance as a long-term commitment? How long? 
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APPENDIX A - continued 
Costs 
34. Describe communications between the two firms. 
• structures 
• regularity of meetings 
• personnel involved 
35. What are the costs of maintaining the tie? 
36. Have there been disputes? How have they been handled? 
37. Has it been easy/difficult to maintain this alliance? 
38. What explains the stability over time? 
39. What kinds of investments have you made in this relationship/alliance? 
Performance 
40. How do you measure performance? 
41. How do you exercise control? 
Subcontracting 
42. Why did you form a relationship/alliance instead of manufacturing in-house? 
43. Are there advantages to this arrangement compared to manufacturing in-house? 
Disadvantages? 
44. How difficult/easy would it be to replace this alliance? 
45. What would be the gains/losses and costs? 
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